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INTRODUCTION
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 (SCPA)'
creates a new form of intellectual property law2 designed to
protect mask works3 of semiconductor chips against piracy and
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (Supp. II 1984).
2. Intellectual property law is generally considered to consist of copy-
right and related law, on the one hand, and industrial property law, on the
other. Copyright and related law is directed primarily at the personal literary
and artistic creations of authors and artists, and it tends to reflect the personal
values of authors and artists and society's interest in encouraging such creative
activity. Industrial property law, of which the SCPA is an example, is directed
primarily at mass-produced articles of commerce. It therefore tends to reflect
the economic values of manufacturers and sellers of such articles and society's
interest in encouraging innovation and investment.
3. SCPA § 901(a)(2) defines "mask work" as follows:
[A] "mask work" is a series of related images, however fixed or en-
coded-
(A) having or representing the predetermined, three-dimensional
pattern of metallic, insulating, or semiconductor material present or
removed from the layers of a semiconductor chip product; and
(B) in which series the relation of the images to one another is
that each image has the pattern of the surface of one form of the
semiconductor chip product ....
17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(2) (Supp. II 1984). "Semiconductor chip product" is defined
as:
the final or intermediate form of any product-
(A) having two or more layers of metallic, insulating, or semicon-
ductor material, deposited or otherwise placed on, or etched away or
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unauthorized copying. The SCPA is neither a patent nor a
copyright law; rather, it is a hybrid form of intellectual prop-
erty law that combines some aspects of patent and copyright
law with new elements of its own. It is the first enactment of a
form of intellectual property law devised specifically to meet
the legal needs of a new technology, and its peculiar combina-
tion of elements reflects the business and technological realities
of the semiconductor industry.
This Article analyzes the SCPA and its relation to existing
patent and copyright law to determine when a manufacturer or
seller of a semiconductor chip product is liable for infringement
of mask work rights under the SCPA. The first part of the Ar-
ticle discusses the elements of a claim for relief under the
SCPA. The second part examines the defenses to a claim of in-
fringement of mask work rights and the immunities from and
limitations on liability.
PART ONE: ELEMENTS OF A CLAIM FOR RELIEF
UNDER THE SCPA
Section 905 of the SCPA4 confers on the owner 5 of a mask
otherwise removed from, a piece of semiconductor material in accord-
ance with a predetermined pattern; and
(B) intended to perform electronic circuitry functions ....
Id. § 901(a)(1). The terms "chip," "semiconductor chip," "integrated circuit,"
and "monolithic integrated circuit" are also commonly used to refer to a semi-
conductor chip product.
4. Section 905 provides as follows:
The owner of a mask work provided protection under this chap-
ter has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the follow-
ing.
(1) to reproduce the mask work by optical, electronic, or any
other means;
(2) to import or distribute a semiconductor chip product in which
the mask work is embodied; and
(3) to induce or knowingly to cause another person to do any of
the acts described in paragraphs (1) and (2).
I& § 905.
5. Section 901(a)(6) defines the "owner" of a mask work as follows:
[he "owner" of a mask work is the person who created the
mask work, the legal representative of that person if that person is
deceased or under a legal incapacity, or a party to whom all the rights
under this chapter of such person or representative are transferred in
accordance with section 903(b) [governing ownership, transfer, licens-
ing, and recordation of mask work rights]; except that, in the case of a
work made within the scope of a person's employment, the owner is
the employer for whom the person created the mask work or a party
to whom all the rights under this chapter of the employer are trans-
ferred in accordance with section 903(b) ....
Id § 901(a)(6). The owner of a mask work is typically the employer of the de-
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work the exclusive right to exclude or prohibit others from do-
ing any of the following- reproducing the mask work in any
form,6 importing semiconductor chip products embodying the
mask work7 and distributing semiconductor chip products em-
bodying the mask work.8 A person who does any of these
things without the permission or authorization of the mask
work owner is liable for infringement of mask work rights.9
Part One of this Article examines the substantive elements
signer of the chip. For a discussion of ownership of rights in mask works, see
R. STERN, SEMIcONDUcTOR CHIP PROTECTION § 3.11 (1986).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 905(1) (Supp. II 1984).
7. Id. § 905(2).
8. Id. A fourth exclusive right, the right to use chips embodying a pro-
tected mask work, was included in the original versions of the Senate and
House bills, see S. 1201, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, 129 CONG. REC. S5992-93
(daily ed. May 4, 1983); H.R. 1028, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, 129 CONG. REC.
H643 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1983), but it was eliminated from both bills at an early
stage. The use provision was originally included to reach domestic purchasers
and users of pirated chips who did not resell or otherwise distribute the chips
or equipment containing them.
The provision created a storm of protest from copyright law purists, who
maintained that such a use right was foreign to traditional copyright law and
who termed it an illegitimate offspring of patent law notions. In the main, use
rights are foreign to copyright law, but copyright law's display and perform-
ance rights, see 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)-(5) (1982), are types of use rights. In con-
trast, patent owners have the exclusive right to make, use, and sell the
patented article. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1982); see also Bauer & Cie v.
O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1913) (contrasting patent and copyright law).
At that early stage, the semiconductor chip protection legislation was still
framed as an integral part of the Copyright Act, and the use right was not
worth the controversy that the concept generated. Accordingly, the propo-
nents of the legislation abandoned the use right at the hearings, and the use
provision was deleted from the first amended versions of S. 1201 and H.R.
1028. See Copyright Protection for Semiconductor Chips: Hearings on H.R
1028 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration
of Justice of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1983)
(testimony of F. Thomas Dunlap, Jr., Corporate Counsel and Secretary, Intel
Corp.) [hereinafter cited as 1983 House Hearings]; H.R. REP. No. 781, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 21 n.40, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5750,
5770 n.40 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT] [All citations to the House Re-
port are to the star print. United States Code Congressional and Administra-
tive News contains the initial version of the House Report. The star print
corrected typographical errors in the initial version and contains three addi-
tional pages.] S. REP. No. 425, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 11 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as SENATE REPORT].
9. 17 U.S.C. § 910(a) (Supp. II 1984). These three basic rights are supple-
mented by two additional exclusive rights. The owner may exclude others
from "inducing" any person to violate any of the owner's exclusive rights. Id.
§ 905(3). Anyone who induces a violation of the mask work owner's exclusive
rights is liable for infringement of mask work rights. Id. § 910(a). Finally,
"knowingly causing" another person to violate a mask work owner's exclusive
rights is also an infringement of mask work rights. Id. §§ 905(3), 910(a).
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of a claim for relief under the SCPA. 10 The plaintiff in such an
action must first establish ownership and registration of the
mask work alleged to have been infringed." Next, the plaintiff
must establish that the defendant has infringed upon the plain-
tiff's exclusive rights.12 Whether "copying" the protected work
must also be proved' 3 and whether a person or organization ac-
cused of direct infringement must have acted with scienter 14
are issues not yet resolved.' 5
I. OWNERSHIP
The plaintiff in an infringement action under the SCPA
must first establish ownership of the mask work alleged to
have been infringed. This element of the plaintiff's case does
not warrant extensive discussion because of the relative ease
with which the plaintiff can establish ownership, usually by
submitting the certificate of registration issued by the Copy-
right Office.16 If the plaintiff is not the original registrant, the
plaintiff's chain of title should be established as well.17
Unless the defendant denies that the certificate of registra-
tion is genuine, a presumption arises that all of the matters set
forth in the certificate are correctly stated and, therefore, that
10. The exclusive rights granted to the owner of a registered mask work
are enforceable through an action for infringement of mask work rights in an
appropriate federal district court and through proceedings before certain fed-
eral administrative agencies. For a discussion of what is an appropriate district
court, i.e., of venue and jurisdiction, see R. STERN, supra note 5, ch. 7. For a
discussion of administrative enforcement of the SCPA, see id. ch. 8.
11. See inzfra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
12. See inifra notes 21-101 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 102-131 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
15. Establishing actual injury and the right to particular relief, such as an
injunction, damages, or an accounting for profits, are subjects beyond the
scope of this Article. For a discussion of remedies under the SCPA, see R.
STERN, supra note 5, ch. 6.
16. Typically, the certificate of registration will be annexed to the com-
plaint. For a discussion of mask work registration, see R. STERN, supra note 5,
ch. 3.
17. SCPA § 910(b)(1) permits an exclusive licensee of all rights in the
mask work to sue for infringement of mask work rights, since the legal status
of an exclusive licensee of all rights is equivalent to that of an owner. See 17
U.S.C. § 910(b)(1) (Supp. II 1984). Such a plaintiff must prove its status, for
example, by introducing into evidence the certificate of registration and the
exclusive license. Nonexclusive licensees and licensees of less than all rights
in the mask work may not bring an infringement action. See 130 CONG. REC.
S12,916-17 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984) (Explanatory Memorandum-Mathias-Leahy
Amendment to S. 1201) [hereinafter cited as Mathias-Leahy Explanatory
Memorandum].
[Vol. 70:271
1985] SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP PROTECTION ACT 277
the registrant has complied with the statute and regulations.1 8
To qualify for protection under the SCPA, however, a mask
work must satisfy the "novelty" requirements of section 902(b):
the design must not be staple, familiar, or commonplace. 19 The
Copyright Office is not required, nor is it practicably able, to
determine compliance with the novelty requirement at the time
an application for registration is submitted for examination. 20
Hence, the presumption created by the registration certificate
has only limited force as to novelty.
II. DIRECT INFRINGEMENT
The exclusive reproduction, distribution, and importation
rights of owners of registered mask works21 concern a type of
conduct designated "direct infringement." The term "direct in-
fringement" applies when the person or organization charged
with violation of an intellectual property right has himself or
itself directly committed the infringing act.22 For example, an
equipment manufacturer that imports infringing chips and in-
corporates them into equipment that the manufacturer then
sells directly violates both the distribution and importation
rights. If the manufacturer imports infringing chips and incor-
porates them into equipment that the manufacturer keeps and
18. See 17 U.S.C. § 908(f) (Supp. II 1984); Mathias-Leahy Explanatory
Memorandum, supra note 17, at S12,917-18. The certificate apparently consti-
tutes prima facie evidence that the registrant owned the mask work at the
time of registration, that the mask work was first commercially exploited on
the date and at the place stated, that the mask work was original with the reg-
istrant, and that the registrant was a national of the country stated. See infra
notes 179-182 and accompanying text.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 902(b)(2) (Supp. II 1984).
20. Unless the applicant states in the application that the mask work is
unoriginal or that it is merely staple or commonplace, the Copyright Office or-
dinarily has no basis on which to consider such issues. Because the Copyright
Office does not have the means for examining this aspect of an application,
failure to satisfy the requirements of SCPA § 902(b) is ordinarily an issue that
can be raised for the first time only in litigation, either as a defense in an in-
fringement action or as the basis for a claim of invalidity in a declaratory judg-
ment action. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 19 n.38, 24-25, 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5768 n.38, 5773-74; Mathias-Leahy Explanatory
Memorandum, supra note 17, at S12,917; R. STERN, supra note 5, § 3.6. For a
discussion of challenges to the validity of a mask work registration, see infra
notes 140-198 and accompanying text.
21. See 17 U.S.C. § 905(1)-(2) (Supp. II 1984).
22. Direct infringement, although the most common, is not the only form
of infringement of intellectual property rights. A person may also indirectly
or vicariously infringe intellectual property rights by culpably causing another
person to commit direct infringement. For a discussion of "indirect infringe-
ment," see infra notes 39-60 and accompanying text.
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uses only within its own business, it directly violates only the
importation right.23 Importation or distribution of infringing
chips that are already incorporated into equipment is also a di-
rect violation of the mask work owner's exclusive importation
or distribution right.
In intellectual property law, the term "exclusive right" re-
fers to the power of the owner of the exclusive right to secure
the aid of the courts in excluding unauthorized persons from
engaging in the conduct that is the subject of the exclusive
right. Thus, the owner of the exclusive right to reproduce a
mask work is entitled to court orders against persons who
reproduce the mask work without authorization.2 4 The owner
is also entitled to other legal relief against infringers of the ex-
clusive right, such as an award of damages or an accounting for
profits.25 Owning the exclusive right to reproduce a mask work
does not necessarily mean being entitled to reproduce the
work, as distinguished from being entitled to exclude others
from doing so. Exclusive rights are sometimes mutually
"blocking," so that none of the owners of the various rights can
practice the subject matter without the others' authorization.
Although this situation is uncommon, it highlights the point
that an exclusive right is a right to exclude others, not a right
to do something affirmative oneself.
A. REPRODUCTION
The reproduction right granted to mask work owners by
section 905(1) is the most general and pervasive of the SCPA's
exclusive rights. It is the exclusive right to "reproduce the
mask work by optical, electronic, or any other means. ' 26 The
23. If the same manufacturer were to purchase the semiconductor chip
products in the United States from an importer, the manufacturer would not
directly violate the importation right, although the importer would be liable
for a direct infringement under SCPA § 905(2). See 17 U.S.C. § 905(2) (Supp.
II 1984). In some circumstances, however, a court could find that the manufac-
turer had induced or knowingly caused the importer's direct infringement; the
manufacturer would then be liable under SCPA § 905(3) for indirect infringe-
ment. See i&. § 905(3).
24. Id § 911(a).
25. Id. § 911(b).
26. Id- § 905(1). Section 905(1) therefore prohibits the reproduction of a
mask work without the owner's permission or authorization by any of the fol-
lowing means: making or copying a composite drawing;, making or duplicating
a data base tape; making or copying a mask; using a mask to manufacture a
chip by photolithography; using a data base tape to operate a computer-driven
electron or light beam device, thereby directly polymerizing resist on a wafer
into a mask work pattern; or photographing a chip after removing the outer
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reproduction right under section 905(1) of the SCPA is broader
than that of section 106(1) of the Copyright Act, which forbids
unauthorized persons from "reproduc[ing] the copyrighted
work in copies .... ,,27 Copyright case law establishes that in-
fringing "copies" do not include material objects made to the
casing. Both the House and Senate Reports emphasize that it was the inten-
tion of Congress to provide a reproduction right broad enough to include fore-
seeable advances in semiconductor chip technology. For example, both reports
expressly mention electronic storage of mask works in media other than
masks. The Senate Report states:
[A]lthough the use of masks to manufacture chips is the most preva-
lent technology today, it is not the only one. The bill is thus not lim-
ited to the manufacture of chips by means of masks. Rather, it covers
any means of fixing the images of a mask work into semiconductor
material.... Thus, directly impressing the images into silicon, ger-
manium, gallium arsenide, or any other semiconductor material by an
electron beam in conjunction with a data base tape in which a mask
work was stored would be within the coverage of S. 1201, even though
no actual mask was used.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 16 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The
Senate Report then goes on to declare that the reproduction right
is intended to be inclusive of all means of embodying the images of a
mask work onto a chip. This includes not only the use of masks to do
so, but also new technological processes of impressing the images of a
mask directly onto the chip with the aid of a computer-driven light
beam or electron beam, where the images of the mask work are previ-
ously fixed or stored in "digitized" form in a computer tape and
where in manufacturing there is not use of an actual mask. The Com-
mittee intends this provision to have sufflwient breadth to cover fore-
seeable advances in chip manufacturing technology, so that pirates
will not be encouraged to try to exploit loopholes in the law.
Id at 20 (emphasis added). In the same vein, the House Report states:
Optical means, such as conventional mask lithography, are the most
common means for reproducing a mask work in a semiconductor chip
product .... However, electronic means of reproduction are also in
use at this time. For example, a mask work can be stored in a data
base tape, so that the coordinates of various points in the semiconduc-
tor chip product are recorded. The mask work can then be repro-
duced in a semiconductor chip, in a mask, or in another tape by means
of the data base tape. The tape can be utilized, also,. . . to drive an
electron gun that directly etches patterns in the semiconductor chip
product, or to drive a light beam that polymerizes "resist" on the sur-
face of the chip during the manufacturing process so that a pattern
can then be etched onto the surface. The language of paragraph (1)
[§ 905(1)] is intended to include all of these and any other means of
reproducing mask works.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 20, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5769
(emphasis added). The House Report also states that copying a data base tape
violates the reproduction right of § 905(1). Id, at 17, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5766. The Senate accepted the House's wording of the exclusive
rights provisions of § 905 because "[s]ection 905 is at least as comprehensive as
S. 1201's Section 4" dealing with exclusive rights. Mathias-Leahy Explanatory
Memorandum, supra note 17, at S12,917.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1982).
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specifications in a copyrighted work or by copying something
depicted in a copyrighted picture.28 The SCPA, however, ex-
pressly extends its exclusive rights to material objects made in
accordance with a protected design or layout. The patent laws,
in contrast to the copyright laws, do prohibit unauthorized per-
sons from making a patented invention.29 In this regard, the ef-
fect of section 905(1) is to track the patent laws rather than the
copyright laws.
B. DISTRIBUTION
The exclusive distribution right of section 905(2) of the
SCPA covers not only the sale of chips, but also other commer-
cial transfers such as bailments, leases, and loans.30 The distri-
bution right is subject to a significant limitation, however.
When the owner of mask work rights consents to the sale, or
equivalent transfer, of semiconductor chip products embodying
the mask work, for example, by selling the chip or by licensing
another to do so, the redistribution of all chips so distributed is
immune from the SCPA.3 1 It should be noted that the distribu-
tion right of section 905(2), as contrasted with the prohibition
against inducing distribution in section 905(3), can be violated
only by the distributor, not by the distributee.32 Both the Sen-
28. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). A number of decisions to this
effect are cited in the House and Senate Reports. See HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 8, at 8 n.19, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5757 n.19; SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 8, at 19 ("[A] copyright on a picture of a dress or a bridge or
on blueprints for a house does not prohibit others from making the dress or
building the bridge or house.") (emphasis in original). See also 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1982) (definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" excludes
mechanical and utilitarian aspects of work).
29. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271(a) (1982).
30. The concept of distribution was left undefined until the final stages of
the legislative process, when the following definition was added to SCPA
§ 901: "To 'distribute' means to sell, or to lease, bail, or otherwise transfer, or
to offer to sell, lease, bail, or otherwise transfer ..... 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(4)
(Supp. II 1984).
31. See id § 906(b). Of course, this provision does not apply to chips sto-
len from the mask work owner, or to chips made and sold by a pirate. The
limitation does apply, however, to chip transfers not denominated as sales but
nonetheless having the quality of sales, as, for example, when the transferee
has substantially unlimited actual control over the transferred chips.
32. This principle also applies in copyright law. See Foreign & Domestic
Music Corp. v. Licht, 196 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 1952) (cited for this proposition
in HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 24, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS at
5773).
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ate and House Reports expressly make this point.33 Finally,
distribution of a semiconductor chip product includes distribu-
tion of equipment containing the semiconductor chip product.3
4
C. IMPORTATION
Section 905(2) of the SCPA gives the mask work owner the
exclusive right to import semiconductor chip products embody-
ing the mask work.35 Consequently, it is a direct infringement
to import pirated chips into the United States,36 either as chips
or as part of equipment.3 7 As with the distribution right, there
is a significant limitation on the exclusive importation right
created by the "exhaustion" provisions of section 906(b). When
the mask work owner sells semiconductor chip products or
licenses another to do so, those semiconductor chip products
are no longer covered by the exclusive importation right.
38
III. INDUCING INFRINGEMENT OF MASK
WORK RIGHTS
In addition to prohibiting direct infringement, discussed in
the preceding section, the SCPA protects mask work owners
against various forms of indirect infringement, i.e., conduct that
culpably causes others to commit direct infringement. In deter-
33. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 24, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5773; SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 21.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 901(b) (Supp. II 1984).
35. Id § 905(2). The original House and Senate bills did not expressly
mention an importation right. See S. 1201, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG.
REC. S5992-93 (daily ed. May 4, 1983); H.R. 1028, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129
CONG. REC. H643-44 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1983). Those bills were amendments to
the Copyright Act, however. Under the Copyright Act, any unauthorized im-
portation of a copyrighted article is an automatic violation of the copyright
owner's distribution right. See 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1982). It was therefore unnec-
essary to deal separately with importation in the original bills.
A subsequent House bill, H.R. 5525, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC.
H5489-91 (daily ed. June 11, 1984), rejected the copyright approach and created
sui generis protection of mask works independent of the Copyright Act. See
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 5, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5754.
H.R. 5525 initially did not cover importation, although importation became an
independent factor to consider once the SCPA was rewritten as a
noncopyright law. The omission was corrected when the House and Senate
bills were merged to form the SCPA. See 17 U.S.C. § 905(2) (Supp. II 1984).
36. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 905(2), 910(a) (Supp. II 1984).
37. SCPA § 901(b) provides that the importation of a product incorporat-
ing a semiconductor chip product is an importation of a semiconductor chip
product. Id § 901(b).
38. Id. § 906(b). For a more detailed discussion of first sale and exhaus-
tion rights, see iqfra notes 278-328 and accompanying text.
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mining the liability of a person for causing another to engage in
infringement of mask work rights, the focus is on the factors
that distinguish "culpably" from "nonculpably" (a term that is,
as will be seen, broader than "innocently") causing
infringement.
Under section 905(3), it is a violation of the exclusive rights
of the owner of a mask work "to induce or knowingly to cause
another person to [violate the mask work owner's exclusive re-
production, importation, or distribution rights]."39 The legisla-
tive history of section 905(3) is sparse.40 The absence of more
detailed legislative history and express statutory definitions of
inducing infringement and knowingly causing infringement
should not create any serious problem in interpreting the Act,
however, because the concepts are already familiar in intellec-
tual property law. The patent, copyright, and trademark laws
all have similar doctrines concerning the liability of indirect
infringers.4 1
A. INDUCING INFRINGEMENT
The concept of inducing infringement is borrowed from
patent law. Section 271(b) of the Patent Act provides that any-
one who "actively induces infringement of a patent shall be lia-
ble as an infringer."42 Although section 905(3) of the SCPA
does not use the word "actively," this distinction would seem
inconsequential because the idea of "inducing" another to do
39. 17 U.S.C. § 903(3) (Supp. II 1984).
40. The provision appeared for the first time in H.R. 5525, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess., § 905(3), 130 CONG. REC. H5489 (daily ed. June 11, 1984). The House Re-
port comments only on the second aspect of § 905(3), knowingly causing an-
other person to commit infringement of mask work rights:
Paragraph (3) makes contributory infringement of the reproduction,
distribution, and importation rights an act of infringement. Such a
provision has no statutory analogue in the Copyright Act. Paragraph
(3) does follow, however, a contributory infringement standard de-
scribed generally in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 104 S. Ct.
774 (1984), and Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377
U.S. 476 (1964).
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 21,1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5770.
The Senate floor memorandum is even more terse. It only mentions the "dis-
tribution of pirated masks" as an example of inducing or knowingly causing
infringement under SCPA § 905(3). See Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memo-
randum, supra note 17, at S12,917.
41. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 439-42 (1984) (copyright law); Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laborato-
ries, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982) (trademark law); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convert-
ible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 500-01 (1964) (patent law).
42. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1982).
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something necessarily connotes active, not passive, conduct.
The precedents under the patent laws emphasize the nonpas-
sive character of this type of wrong. For example, they uni-
formly hold a supplier of materials not liable for merely filling
a customer's order without any exhortation or, at least, sugges-
tion to the customer that it commit infringement.43
Inducing infringement of mask work rights can occur in
two principal contexts.44 A party charged with "inducing" may
have supplied materials to someone who then reproduced a pro-
tected mask work, for example, by making infringing chips or
photomasks.45 Alternatively, the "inducing" party may have
procured goods from someone who, in supplying them, violated
a reproduction, distribution, or importation right.46 The goods
need not be incapable of noninfringing uses, since the grava-
men of inducing infringement is the accused party's "inducing"
conduct, not the character of the goods.47
B. KNOWINGLY CAUSING INFRINGEMENT
The legislative history of section 905(3) equates knowingly
causing infringement with contributory infringement and in-
corporates by reference the doctrine of contributory infringe-
ment described by the Supreme Court in Aro Manufacturing
Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.48 and Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.49 In Aro, the Supreme
Court extensively reviewed the elements of an action for con-
43. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1141-42
(7th Cir. 1975); Goodwall Constr. Co. v. Beers Constr. Co., 216 U.S.P.Q. 1006,
1009-11 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Marston v. L.E. Gant, Ltd., 351 F. Supp. 1122, 1124-25
(E.D. Va. 1972); Aluminum Extrusion Co. v. Soule Steel Co., 260 F. Supp. 221,
224 (C.D. Cal. 1966).
44. Perhaps a "disinterested intermeddler" could in some way induce in-
fringement of mask work rights, but the two scenarios described in the text
accompanying notes 45-46 would seem to exhaust the realistic possibilities.
45. Examples would include supplying materials such as photoresist,
silicon wafers, photographic steppers, or ovens; furnishing facilities or equip-
ment for making pattern generation tapes, masks, or other tooling;, and provid-
ing information or engineering services to someone who uses them to
reproduce a protected mask work.
46. Examples would include procuring the preparation and supply of in-
fringing masks from a mask house, supplying pattern generation tapes to a
silicon foundry in order to procure infringing chips made by means of the
tapes, and persuading an importer to import infringing chips into the United
States.
47. See, e.g., Fromberg, Inc. v. Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 1963);
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 379 F. Supp. 754, 757 (D. Md. 1974).
48. 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
49. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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tributory infringement under the patent laws. The Court
stressed that to hold the defendant liable, the product that the
defendant supplied must have been unsuitable for any substan-
tial noninfringing use and the defendant must have known that
the product was especially adapted for infringing use.5°
In Sony, the Supreme Court held that the test for contribu-
tory infringement was the same in copyright as in patent law.
Although the Court never mentioned its decision in Aro, it ap-
plied the Aro test to a claim that a defendant was liable for fur-
nishing its customers with equipment potentially usable, and
probably used to some extent, in committing copyright infringe-
ment. The Court held that doing so was not a culpable act if
the product had any substantial noninfringing use.51
1. Beyond Contributory Infringement
The Supreme Court's decisions in Aro and Sony are the
most important precedents in interpreting the "knowingly
causing infringement" provision of section 905(3) of the SCPA,
because Congress expressly referred to them in explaining the
provision.52 Whether the scope of section 905(3) is the same as
or broader than patent/copyright contributory infringement is
not yet settled. "Knowingly cause" could arguably include con-
duct where there is "but for" causation even though the ac-
cused party does something other than knowingly furnish a
direct infringer with goods incapable of a substantial nonin-
fringing use.
The courts will probably equate "knowingly causing in-
fringement" and "contributory infringement," as Congress ap-
pears to have done. The question is not free from doubt,
however, and it is difficult to predict the business risks with
confidence. The courts will probably decide that the word
"cause" in "knowingly cause infringement" refers to "proxi-
mate cause" rather than "but for" cause. The concept of proxi-
50. Aro, 377 U.S. at 488-90. The 5-4 majority held that this second require-
ment meant that the alleged contributory infringer must know that the cus-
tomer's product infringes the patent, i.e., the infringer must know of the
patent and that the use actually infringes it. I& at 489-91.
51. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. The doctrine of contributory infringement in
patent law was originally a judge-made rule, but in 1952 it was codified in the
Patent Act. See Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792, 811 (codified at 35
U.S.C. § 271(c) (1982)). In copyright law, contributory infringement is still a
nonstatutory doctrine.
52. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 21, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5770. The relevant passage is quoted supra note 40.
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mate cause involves, of course, a policy determination. Courts
hold certain kinds of causal acts culpable and others not culpa-
ble, depending, in part, on the foreseeability of the conse-
quences and also, in part, on the degree of regulation of private
conduct that courts consider socially acceptable. The difficult
question then is charting the boundaries of what conduct the
courts will consider sufficiently culpable to make it a "proxi-
mate cause" of another person's infringement.53
2. Trademark Precedents
In trademark law, there may be a critical difference be-
tween the situation in which the supplier of a product capable
of innocent use merely suspects that a buyer is pirating a mask
work owner's chips and that in which he actually knows that
the buyer is doing so. In a recent trademark decision, the
Supreme Court stated, in dictum, that suppliers could become
liable for continuing to supply products to persons whom they
knew, or had reason to know, were mislabeling the products
with the plaintiff's trademarkm The Court stated, however,
that the mere fact that the defendant "'could reasonably antici-
pate'" infringement would not be legally sufficient to make the
53. The possible conflict of interests and policies may be illustrated by
two hypothetical cases:
A supplies ordinary, staple silicon wafers to B, who uses them in
committing chip piracy. A does not urge B to do anything.
First case: Assume that A only suspects B of piracy.
Second case: Assume that A is on notice from mask work owner
C that B is pirating C's chips, so that A knows or should know that B
is using the wafers in pirating C's chips.
If the Aro-Sony standard, discussed supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text,
is the beginning and end of the analysis, there is clearly no liability in either
case, since the silicon is capable of substantial noninfringing use. Moreover,
under patent law precedents, there would be no theory of liability under
which C could prevail against A. There are some copyright and trademark
precedents, however, which suggest a more extensive field of potential liabil-
ity. They suggest that if someone knows or has reason to believe that a third
party is engaged in infringement, he will be culpable if he deals with that
third party. See, e.g., Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456
U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982) (trademark); Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness
Horse Racing and Breeding Ass'n, Inc., 554 F.2d 1213, 1215 (1st Cir. 1977)
(copyright); Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354,
355 (7th Cir. 1929) (copyright). The writer's opinion is that the courts will
probably not apply these copyright and trademark precedents to cases involv-
ing infringement of mask work rights, but prudent counsel should, nonethe-
less, consider the possibility that they might do so.
54. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854
(1982).
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defendant liable. 55 The concurring opinion of Justice White
strongly attacked the "reasonably anticipate infringement" test
and noted that a "general consensus" exists in the law today
that suppliers need not refuse to deal with customers "who
merely might pass off ' the product and thus commit trademark
infringement.5
Under the rule obtaining in trademark law, therefore, a
court would probably not hold liable as having knowingly
caused infringement a silicon wafer supplier who merely sus-
pected that a buyer was pirating chips. On the other hand, de-
pending on the surrounding facts, a court might find the silicon
supplier liable if he had been on notice from the mask work
owner that the silicon buyer was pirating the owner's chips. It
is doubtful, however, that courts will extend the trademark
law's "knew or should have known" rule to SCPA cases.
The trademark doctrine probably creates greater liability
for suppliers than section 905(3) intends. The SCPA requires
proof that the accused party "knowingly caused" infringement
of mask work rights, which is conceptually quite different from
merely supplying ordinary articles of commerce to a known
wrongdoer, i.e., a person whom the supplier knows or should
know will use the article in committing infringement of mask
work rights. Most courts would probably view the chip pirate's
individual volition as a substantial intervening cause that pre-
vents the supplier's act from being the proximate cause of the
infringement. Simply facilitating infringement falls short of
"causing" it.
Certainly, Congress could have used other, less narrow
words than "cause" if it desired a more expansive concept than
that developed in Aro. If Congress had desired the semiconduc-
tor equivalent of a "dram shop" law, it could have used such
words as "aid," "facilitate," or "make possible" instead of
"cause," a word that invites the modifier "proximate." Alterna-
55. Id. at 854 n.13 (quoting a comment by the court of appeals that generic
manufacturers "could reasonably anticipate" illegal substitution of their drugs,
see Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 638 F.2d 538, 543 (2d Cir. 1981)).
56. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 861
(1982) (emphasis in original). Moreover, in Sony, the Supreme Court observed
that because of the considerable differences between trademark law, on the
one side, and patent and copyright law, on the other, the contributory infringe-
ment standard of Inwood, id. at 854, does not apply to copyrights. Sony, 464
U.S. at 439. The Court also noted that Sony's conduct did not meet the Inwood
test, because Sony did not "supply its products to identified individuals known
by it to be engaging in continuing infringement of respondent's copy-
rights ... ." Id.
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tively, Congress could simply have made third parties liable for
knowingly supplying materials used to infringe mask work
rights. It seems fair to conclude that the policies served by the
trademark laws and the SCPA are sufficiently different 7 that
different rules would apply. Under trademark principles, a
silicon supplier who had been on notice that a buyer was pirat-
ing the owner's chip would be liable for supplying the pirate;
the supplier who only suspected that the buyer was pirating
chips would not be. In contrast, neither silicon supplier would
be liable under section 905(3).
3. Copyright Precedents
In copyright law, the liability of third parties is even more
unpredictable, and the value of copyright precedents, which
have been developed mainly in the lower federal courts, to in-
terpretation of the SCPA is more uncertain. As the House Re-
port noted, there is no explicit statutory basis for vicarious
liability.58 The case law, however, has recognized vicarious lia-
bility, as well as the concept of the "related defendant." The
related defendant doctrine is probably much broader than sec-
tion 905(3), and the copyright case law is, therefore, probably
mostly immaterial.59 If the copyright doctrine of third-party li-
ability for involvement in copyright infringement were carried
57. The differences may possibly stem from the relative social values of
the protected forms of intellectual property and of the challenged conduct of
the accused suppliers. Differences may also be attributed to the relative diffi-
culty of determining whether the supplies will be used in committing infringe-
ment, and to the comparative extent of or irreparability of the harm done to
the intellectual property owner in the two contexts.
58. HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 21, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 5770.
59. An illustration of the broad reach of the related defendant doctrine
can be drawn from a line of cases involving owners of entertainment establish-
ments. Owners of entertainment establishments are liable for copyright in-
fringements that occur on their premises if they actively operate or supervise
the operations on their premises, even though they do not select the works
performed. The fact that they directly or indirectly benefit from the infringe-
ment suffices to make them liable. See, e.g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State
Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Assn, Inc., 554 F.2d 1213, 1215 (1st Cir.
1977); Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th
Cir. 1929).
These cases do not involve suppliers, unless the chain store or other third
party could be considered a supplier of premises. Yet, the rationale of these
cases arguably extends to suppliers. Certainly, the supplier of silicon benefits
from the infringement, just as the store whose concessionaire commits in-
fringement benefits from the unlawful conduct. It could therefore be argued
that if it makes sense to hold the one liable, it makes equal sense to hold the
other liable. This argument assumes, incorrectly in this author's opinion, that
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over to the SCPA, however, suppliers who were on reasonable
notice of pirating and those who merely suspected pirating
would probably both be liable.6°
IV. ROLE OF SCIENTER IN INFRINGEMENT OF MASK
WORK RIGHTS CASES
As indicated in the preceding section on indirect infringe-
ment,61 "inducing" infringement under section 905(3) has an
implied scienter or culpability element, because "inducing" con-
notes one person's actively urging or encouraging another per-
son to infringe mask work rights. Moreover, scienter is an
express statutory requirement for "knowingly causing" in-
fringement. There is no parallel scienter requirement in the di-
rect infringement prohibitions of sections 905(1) and (2).62
the policy behind the related defendant doctrine of copyright law applies with
equal force to infringement of mask work rights.
Moreover, liability of this type has been found even where the "related
defendant" did not know that the activities were copyright infringements. See
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963)
(store liable for copyright infringement by independent concessionaire because
store may have been able to police conduct of concessionaire). This judicially
created rule of copyright law thus appears to be inconsistent with Congress's
use of the word "knowing" in SCPA § 905(3), 17 U.S.C. § 905(3) (Supp. II
1984), and with the Supreme Court's decision in Aro, discussed supra note 50
and accompanying text.
60. The outer reach of the related defendant doctrine in copyright law
may have been suggested in a record piracy case, in which a district court held
that an advertising agency that places ordinary advertisements for the sale of
records that it knew or should have known infringe plaintiff's copyright is lia-
ble as a related defendant. The court also indicated that a radio station that
broadcasts the advertisements while knowing of the infringement may be lia-
ble. See Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 327 F.
Supp. 788 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (decision on the merits); Screen Gems-Columbia
Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 404-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(denying defendants' motions for summary judgment). The theory is that lia-
bility is established when the defendant's conduct aids the copyright infringe-
ment. Whatever validity-this position has under copyright law, it seems to go
far beyond the concept of "knowingly causing" mask work infringement under
SCPA § 905(3). In all probability, a court would find that merely aiding in an
act of infringement by supplying staples would be short of knowingly causing
it.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
62. See 17 U.S.C. § 905(1)-(2) (Supp. II 1984). SCPA § 905(1)-(2), involving
the unauthorized reproduction of mask works and the distribution and impor-
tation of semiconductor chip products that are unauthorized reproductions of
mask works, has no scienter requirement. Neither do the direct infringement
provisions of the patent and copyright laws. For example, printers and manu-
facturers have long been held liable under the Copyright Act for printing in-
fringing books or manufacturing infringing articles without knowledge of the
copyright infringement. See Belford v. Scribner, 144 U.S. 488, 507-08 (1892);
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The purpose of the Act, to curb chip piracy, suggests that
Congress intentionally omitted the scienter requirement for de-
fendant competitive manufacturers and distributors of infring-
ing chips, except where they could show innocent infringement
under section 907.63 One could argue that the case is less clear
for mask houses which may innocently reproduce mask works
by making unauthorized masks, for silicon foundries innocently
reproducing mask works by making unauthorized chips, and for
others in the same moral position as suppliers of staples such as
silicon or photoresist. These are persons who are not in direct
competition with the mask work owner but whose conduct,
even though innocent, may nonetheless facilitate another per-
son's directly competitive piracy. When this occurs, they are
literally violators of the reproduction right of section 905(1), ab-
sent a scienter requirement, and thus, to recover for infringe-
ment, the mask work owner need not sue them under section
905(3), the "inducing or knowingly causing" section, which has
an express scienter requirement. The argument may be ad-
vanced, however, that scienter or culpability of some kind
should nonetheless be shown before they are held liable for in-
fringement of mask work rights.
In some cases, such as that of the innocent mask house, an
argument based on the following anomaly may be advanced. If
the mask work owner chose to sue the mask house for distrib-
uting the unauthorized mask set to the pirating customer,
rather than for reproducing the mask work as a set of masks,
which would, of course, be a serious tactical error for the mask
work owner, the mask house could defend on the ground that it
neither induced nor knowingly caused any infringement. Thus,
there is the anomaly that the mask house can or cannot urge its
nonculpability as a defense, depending on which paragraph of
Section 905 the mask work owner chooses to rely. A similar
but more involved argument can be made for the silicon
foundry.
Moreover, if a customer innocently furnished a foundry
with unauthorized tapes or masks, and the foundry innocently
made chips from them for the customer, the customer could as-
sert the innocent infringement defense of section 907, because
American Code Co. v. Bensinger, 282 F. 829, 834 (2d Cir. 1922); Pickwick Music
Corp. v. Record Prods., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 39, 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Greenbie v.
Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
63. See 17 U.S.C. § 907 (Supp. II 1984). For a discussion of innocent in-
fringement under SCPA § 907, see infra notes 329-343 and accompanying text.
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the mask work owner could sue the customer only for distribu-
tion (assumedly, suing the innocent customer for "knowingly"
causing infringement is futile). The mask work owner could
sue the foundry for reproduction or distribution, as it chose. In
either case, scienter would be immaterial and innocent in-
fringement no defense.6 Again, the argument may be made
that the result is anomalous and therefore unfair.
If some changes are made in the fact pattern, additional
anomalies may appear. The conduct may be brought outside
the scope of sections 905(1) and (2) and become actionable, if at
all, only under section 905(3), for which scienter is a prerequi-
site. Suppose that the innocent silicon foundry or mask house
is able to restructure the way it does business so that the ar-
rangement becomes one like a "tolling" or "leased plant" con-
tract. Suppose also that the court does not regard this
arrangement as a sham.65 Then the customer is the one who
reproduces the mask work as a mask set or as chips, rather
than the foundry or mask house. There is no distribution of
the chips, either, by anyone but the customer. Hence, the lia-
bility, if any, of the foundry or mask house is under section
905(3) and depends on culpability. The mask work owner
would have to prove scienter. This consequence leads one to
question whether the result should depend on form, and, if so,
whether that suggests a defect in the rule as to scienter.
These anomalies may lead the observer to two conclusions.
One is that foundries, mask houses, and suppliers of similar
technical services may wish to restructure their business ar-
rangements, where feasible, so that they themselves do not risk
becoming liable for customers' infringements s6 by reproducing
mask works or by distributing semiconductor chip products.6 7
64. The innocent customer does not itself violate the mask work owner's
reproduction right. It unknowingly causes the foundry to violate the repro-
duction right, and it innocently violates the distribution right when it resells
the infringing chip as part of equipment or otherwise. Its innocence termi-
nates upon notice of the mask work owner's rights, however.
The foundry innocently violates the owner's reproduction and distribution
rights, but innocent infringement is not a defense to violation of either of
these rights. SCPA § 907 applies only to persons who buy and resell an in-
fringing chip, not to persons who make and sell an infringing chip. See 17
U.S.C. § 907 (Supp. II 1984).
65. Even if the court did not consider the arrangement a sham, there is
still the risk that it would invoke the related defendant doctrine discussed
supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
66. Here again, there is the risk that the court will invoke the related de-
fendant doctrine. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text and note 65.
67. Other alternatives are "hold harmless" agreements, see U.C.C. § 2-
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The other is that some courts may not interpret the SCPA lit-
erally, but instead may import a scienter requirement into the
Act in situations such as those involving an innocent foundry or
mask house.
In the long run, the latter development would be unfortu-
nate. It would be an example of seemingly hard cases making
bad law. It is not clear that these are hard cases, however, and
if they are, there is a better way to deal with the problem.6s To
add an implied scienter element to sections 905(1) and (2), con-
trary to patent and copyright law, would be to supply what
Congress consciously omitted. Congress created a limited inno-
cent infringement exemption for equipment manufacturers and
other chip purchasers and resellers in section 907.69 Congress
rewrote that section several times and struck manufacturing
rights from it in doing so. Congress also rewrote section 905
and, by adding paragraph (3), imposed the section's only scien-
ter requirement.70 If Congress had wanted a more expansive
innocent infringement exemption or a more pervasive scienter
requirement, it easily could have explicitly created one. The
omissions were the product of a negotiated compromise, not an
oversight.
There are two apparent rationales for injecting scienter
where Congress did not provide it, as an element of an infringe-
ment of mask work rights in cases against a foundry or mask
house. The first is the reluctance "harshly" to hold a foundry
or mask house liable for an infringement of mask work rights
induced or caused by a customer, of which only the customer, if
anyone, had knowledge. The second is the concern that making
mask houses and foundries "act at their risk" will chill innova-
tion and hinder semiconductor progress.
There are several problems with adding a scienter require-
ment to address these concerns. There is no rationale for con-
fining the addition of a scienter requirement to only those
cases involving foundries, mask houses, and others who are in-
duced by customers to commit infringement of mask work
rights. Hence, there is no rationale for not also injecting scien-
312(3) (1978) (concerning hold harmless clauses in the context of sales to
buyer's specifications), and insurance. These may not be practical alternatives,
however, because pirates do not always honor their hold harmless agreements,
and because the cost of liability insurance may be prohibitively high.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 72-73.
69. 17 U.S.C. § 907 (Supp. II 1984). For a discussion of innocent infringe-
ment under SCPA § 907, see infra notes 329-343 and accompanying text.
70. See 17 U.S.C. § 905(3) (Supp. II 1984).
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ter into all cases involving infringement of mask work rights,
such as those between rival chip manufacturers. Doing so
would gravely undermine the SCPA, however.
Even if limited to foundries, mask houses, and the like, the
approach is flawed. The SCPA is a remedial statute designed to
curb chip piracy and, by doing so, to encourage semiconductor
innovation by the potential victims of chip pirates. As in the
patent and copyright laws, Congress omitted scienter as an ele-
ment of ordinary or direct infringement and included it as an
element of contributory infringement. This is part of the bal-
ance that Congress struck among all of the competing interests
at stake, just as the exemptions for reverse engineering and in-
nocent infringement are part of that balance. It is inappropri-
ate for the courts to upset the balance that Congress struck, by
adding a nonstatutory element that weighs against mask work
owners and in favor of the other parties playing a role in the
industry.
Moreover, the analysis is not furthered by claiming that it
is "harsh" to impose liability on innocent reproducers of mask
works. This is an economic regulatory statute, not a civil rights
law. The choice of how to allocate liability is an economic judg-
ment, within the decision-making ambit of Congress, not the
courts. The question is whether the chip innovator/mask work
owner or the foundry/mask house/services supplier should
bear the economic risk of loss from infringement of mask work
rights. The chip innovator can just as well claim that it is
"harsh" to make it suffer for someone else's infringing conduct.
It is perfectly rational, although of course not inevitable, to al-
locate the risk between two innocent parties as the SCPA, on
its face, allocates it. Nor is it necessarily inimical to progress in
the semiconductor industry to make foundries and mask houses
assume the risk of liability when their customers cause them to
reproduce protected mask works. Again, it is simply a matter
of how Congress elects to allocate a business risk. Perhaps
either choice would have been reasonable, but it is hardly irra-
tional for Congress to have chosen to resolve the marginal case
in favor of the chip innovator.71 The decision is appropriately
legislative and should not be disturbed.
Finally, there is a better way to deal with the problem than
by requiring the courts to read an implied element of scienter
71. Holding printers liable for copyright infringement when they print in-
fringing books has apparently not chilled first amendment rights or stifled
progress in publishing books.
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into sections 905(1) and (2). There is no legitimate objection to
injunctions in these cases. Once the defendant's innocence ter-
minates, as it does when an infringement complaint is served,
there is no reason to project further infringements into the fu-
ture. Any problem of harshness goes only to monetary reme-
dies. Section 911(b) provides for an award to the mask work
proprietor of its actual damages caused by the infringement and
the profits of the defendant "attributable to the infringe-
ment."72 Alternatively, the mask work proprietor may elect a
civil penalty set by the court in its discretion.73 A sympathetic
court could help an innocent foundry or mask house by finding
intervening operative causes, such as the piratical customer's
conduct, of any actual damage; by not substantially attributing
the defendant's profits to the infringement of mask work
rights; and by exercising its discretion soundly as to any civil
penalty. These would be much better ways of dealing with the
case of the innocent foundry than would be rewriting section
905 to require scienter.
V. ACTIONABLE SIMILARITY
The concept of infringement under the SCPA is different
from the concepts of both patent infringement and copyright
infringement, although in some ways it parallels the concept of
copyright infringement. The concept of patent infringement is
based on the existence of a patent, an explanatory document
describing the invention and setting forth "claims," which in
verbal terms define the metes and bounds of the patentee's
right to exclude other persons from the patented subject mat-
ter.74 In principle, the claims allow a comparison between the
allegedly infringing device and the invention as defined by the
patent claims; the device infringes the patent if and only if the
device falls within the scope of the claims. Application of this
system to semiconductor chip products is impractical, however.
One cannot expect a precise verbal description of what is origi-
nal in a chip design.75
72. 17 U.S.C. § 911(b) (Supp. II 1984). For a discussion of remedies under
the SCPA, see R. STERN, supra note 5, ch. 6. For a discussion of damages and
profits, see idt § 6.4-.5.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 911(b) (Supp. II 1984). For a discussion of civil penalties
under the SCPA, see R. STERN, supra note 5, § 6.6.
74. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1983).
75. SCPA § 902(b) allows protection of mask works only insofar as their
designs are original and not, when considered as a whole, staple, familiar, or
commonplace. 17 U.S.C. § 902(b) (Supp. II 1984).
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The claimant of mask work protection could perhaps file a
diagram of the chip with the Copyright Office, showing the new
parts circled in red. Even if such a suggestion were practical, it
would work only with revisions of existing chips. In most cases,
however, the chip designer would feel that the whole chip, that
is, the design considered as a whole, is novel or that the un-
depictable relation of the parts, perhaps commonplace in them-
selves, to one another is new. In that sense, the design simply
"is"; all the designer can articulate to describe his contribution
is "lo and behold." This is also generally the case with copy-
righted works. Hence, copyright systems do not require copy-
right claimants to describe with any precision the nature of
their original contributions. In most countries, copyright hold-
ers do nothing at all but wait until litigation to assert the na-
ture of their rights. In the United States, unlike most other
countries, the copyright claimant must deposit a copy of the
work with the Copyright Office at some time before suing any-
one so that the court can compare the two works.76 That is es-
sentially how the SCPA operates as well.77 As a result, the
concept of infringement of mask work rights parallels that of
copyright infringement, in that proof of infringement reflects
not only the way that rights are defined by the statute but also
how they are identified under it. Neither the SCPA nor the
Copyright Act require a precise or verbal definition of the pro-
tected work; instead, both rely on an overall comparison of the
two works to determine whether the second is so close to the
first that it is to be considered an infringement. 78
An underlying principle of both the Copyright Act and the
SCPA is that the similarity between two works is actionable
only when the similarity is substantial. An infringement of
mask work rights occurs when the accused semiconductor chip
product embodies mask work patterns and configurations that
are "substantially similar" to those of the protected mask
work.79 This is similar to the concept of actionable similarity
76. 17 U.S.C. §§ 408, 411 (1982); see also Washingtonian Publishing Co. v.
Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 42 (1939) (no action may be maintained until copies are
filed with register of copyrights).
77. For a general discussion of registration and deposit procedures under
the SCPA, see R. STERN, supra note 5, ch. 3.
78. In the case of a patented article, it would be as if the court had no pat-
ent or claims to read and simply made a physical or visual comparison of the
two parties' products.
79. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 20, 25-27, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5769, 5774-76; see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 16-18.
The Senate bill, as originally introduced and as passed by the Senate, and
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under the copyright laws. 0 There are, however, significant dif-
ferences between copyright infringement and infringement of
mask work rights. Therefore, applying copyright infringement
principles to mask works may produce misleading results.
8
'
the original House bill provided that a mask embodies a mask work if the pat-
terns of the mask work and the mask are "substantially similar." See S. 1201,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2, 130 CONG. REc. S5837 (daily ed. May 16, 1984); S. 1201,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 129 CONG. REC. S5992 (daily ed. May 4, 1983); H.R.
1028, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 129 CONG. REc. H643 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1983).
Moreover, section 4 of S. 1201 defined the mask work owner's exclusive repro-
duction right as the right "substantially to reproduce . . .an image of the
mask work . .. ." See S. 1201, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4, 130 CONG. REC. S5838
(daily ed. May 16, 1984); S. 1201, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, 129 CONG. REC. S5993
(daily ed. May 4, 1983).
H.R. 5525, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H5489-91 (daily ed. June
11, 1984), the House sui generis bill that replaced H.R. 1028, avoided the use of
the phrase "substantially similar" in the bill itself, but the House Report ex-
tensively discusses the application of the "substantial similarity" concept to
mask work cases. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 25-27, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5774-76.
The SCPA follows H.R. 5525 on this point. The language quoted above
from section 2 of S. 1201 and H.R. 1028 is not in the SCPA because the SCPA
does not define "mask." The term "mask" is only rarely and unambiguously
used in the SCPA, whereas S. 1201 and H.R. 1028 used the term prominently
in their exclusive rights sections. See S. 1201, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, 129
CONG. REC. S5993 (daily ed. May 4, 1983); H.R. 1028, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4,
129 CONG. REC. H643 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1983). The provisions relating to the
reproduction right were extensively amended and greatly condensed. In the
process, the words "substantially similar" were deleted from SCPA § 905(1).
See 17 U.S.C. § 905(1) (Supp. II 1984).
80. For a discussion of the substantial similarity requirement under copy-
right law, see 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03 (1985).
81. At the very least, applying copyright infringement principles to mask
works requires attention to subtle nuances. First, mask works, like copyrights,
have no claims or explanatory specifications, as mechanical patents do; the le-
gally protected metes and bounds of mask works are not described verbally or
conceptually. Hence, the only way to compare two semiconductor chip prod-
ucts or their mask works for infringement is to make a visual examination,
from which must be made a determination of whether the two things are, in
whole or in economically significant parts, "substantially similar." That simi-
larity is not easily quantifiable, however, or even readily verbalized, and how
similar is "too similar" is uncertain. Second, aspects of mask works that are
dictated by chip function, are not protected. Third, copying that would be im-
permissible (infringing) under the copyright law is tolerated under the SCPA,
particularly in the context of reverse engineering. Fourth, and this point is re-
flected particularly in the SCPA's treatment of reverse engineering, the pri-
mary values protected by the SCPA are the investments of effort and expense
that innovative semiconductor firms devote to the development of new or im-
proved chips, rather than, as under copyright law, the literary, artistic, or per-
sonal values of the individuals who do the actual work.
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A. THE REQUISITE DEGREE OF SIMILARITY
Although the House and Senate Reports both explain in-
fringement of mask work rights in terms of the copyright con-
cept of "substantial similarity," they both carefully note that
the concept must be applied differently in regard to mask
works.8 2 Both the legislative history and common sense lead to
the conclusion that the similarity between two semiconductor
chips must be quite close for them to be actionably or infring-
ingly similar to one another. If the rule were otherwise, the
SCPA might be used to protect the "idea" of a chip layout
rather than just the mask work owner's investment in person-
nel-hours devoted to preparing an "expression" of the idea. To
protect the former would clearly run counter to the policy of
the SCPA.s 3
The principle is clearly laid down that actionable similarity
82. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 25-27, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5774-76; SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 16-18. The House Re-
port states:
While the Committee believes that the courts may usefully con-
sider the copyright law precedents concerning substantial similarity,
the Committee also intends that the courts should have sufficient
flexibility to develop a new body of law specifically applicable to semi-
conductor chip infringement. Moreover, the concept of substantial
similarity varies depending upon the nature of the work.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5775
(footnote omitted). As to the last of these points, the Senate Report had al-
ready stated:
[E]ven though no percentage "rule of thumb" can be stated, some
qualitative observation is in order. It is generally recognized in copy-
right law that the degree of similarity two works must share in order
for one to be considered "substantially similar" to, and therefore an
infringement of, the other, may depend on the subject matter.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 17.
Both the Senate and House Reports give examples that illustrate different
standards of substantial similarity for different types of work. When the case
involves a play or a highly creative drawing, the court may consider a broad
range of paraphrases to be substantially similar to the copyrighted work. See
id- at 17. Fictional and imaginative works may also be broadly protected
against paraphrase. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5775. But the copyright in a plastic toy, commercial doc-
ument, or lace design, where the quantum of originality is modest, will extend
only to almost identical copying. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 17. The
similarly narrow copyright in fact-based works, such as histories and directo-
ries, also is infringed only by very close copying. See HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 8, at 26, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5775.
83. See 17 U.S.C. § 902(c) (Supp. II 1984) ("In no case does protection
under this chapter for a mask work extend to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work . . ").
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for SCPA purposes is greater than that required by copyright
law for infringement of highly creative works, of which even
"paraphrases" are deemed infringements. The SCPA provides
no specific standard, however. Indeed, the Senate Report ex-
pressly disclaims the existence of any "percentage 'rule of
thumb' for determining substantial similarity."
The legislative history asserts that the absence of a bright
line distinction between substantial similarity and insubstantial
similarity is not a matter for concern in administering the
SCPA.85 If the legislative history is correct, then, litigation
under the SCPA should not be impeded by lack of a clearer
standard for separating substantial similarity from insubstan-
tial similarity.
B. CELL LIBRARIES
A special problem in determining substantial similarity
may exist for "cell libraries." Cell libraries are collections of
parts of semiconductor chip products, such as counters, regis-
ters, or oscillators, that can be transported from the layout of
one chip to that of another. A chip designer may select and call
up the configuration of such a component stored in a memory
bank, in order to incorporate it into a current chip layout. Any
single such component may represent only a small percentage
84. SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 17. The Senate Report simply ob-
serves that "[t]he case of semiconductor chips falls [somewhere] between these
two extremes" of imaginative plays and mere toys. Id at 18. The House Re-
port states:
No black letter rule of law can be formulated to draw a precise
boundary between substantial similarity and insubstantial similarity
under this chapter. This is a classic type of legal question to be put to
the judge or jury.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 27,1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5776.
85. The Senate Report states:
The Committee believes, however, that the question is more theoreti-
cal than real, because of the business realities of the chip industry.
The economics of chip copying appear to favor either wholesale copy-
ing or else none at all; it is not economical for a pirate to copy only a
small part of a chip and then incur the expense of engineering other
parts.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 17. See also id at 21 ("[A]s a practical mat-
ter, it does not make economic sense for a pirate to appropriate the fruits of a
chip innovator's mask design labor unless the appropriation is wholesale.");
Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 17, at S12,917 ("[A]s a
practical matter, copying of an insubstantial portion of a chip and independent
design of the remainder is not likely... ."). The same point was made by the
principal sponsor in the House when he introduced H.R. 1028, see 129 CONG.
REC. H645 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1983) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
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of the entire "silicon real estate" on the chip.8 6
It is not clear whether appropriating parts of a cell library
can lead to infringement liability under the SCPA. Both the
Senate and House Reports suggest that it can. The Senate Re-
port observes that copying only a single chapter of a copy-
righted book may create copyright infringement liability,8 7 and
notes that, similarly, "copying individual copyrighted 'cells'
forming part of a 'cell library' of building blocks for chips may
be an infringement. This would be so only if the cells' layouts
were not functionally dictated, and if the copying were other-
wise close enough to meet the substantial similarity test."88 In
the same spirit, the House Report observes: "Mask works
sometimes contain substantial areas ... (so-called 'cells')
whose layouts involve creativity and are commercially valuable.
In appropriate fact settings, the misappropriation of such a cell
. . . could be the basis for an infringement action under this
chapter."8' 9 Hence, it would seem that near-identical copying of
a whole cell would be actionable under the SCPA. This would
be particularly likely if the cell were separately registered as a
mask work, so that the near-complete identity of the two par-
ties' products were apparent.90
86. For further discussion of cell libraries and legal problems relating to
their exploitation, see R. STERN, supra note 5, § 12.5; Stern, MicroLaw, IEEE
MICRo, June 1985, at 73.
87. SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 17.
88. 1& at 17 n.8. See also Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum,
supra note 17, at S12,917 ("mask work owners are protected not only from
wholesale copying but also against piece-meal copying of substantial or mate-
rial portions of one or more mask works").
89. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26-27, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5775-76 (footnote omitted).
90. If copyright law applied, rather than the SCPA, the interplay of two
principles would be significant, perhaps determinative. On the one hand, the
copyrightability of compilations of facts or preexisting materials, e.g., directo-
ries, mathematical tables, books on parliamentary procedure, histories, collec-
tions of game rules, and cookbooks, is based on the act of selecting particular
alternatives from the many choices available. See generally Patry, Copyright
in Collections of Facts: A Reply, COM. AND THE LAw, Oct. 1984, at 11, 25-34.
On the other hand, as the size of the work diminishes, so too does the
plausibility of its status as a work of authorship. Expressions such as "[a]pply
hook to wall" have been considered too slight to qualify as copyrightable
works. See E.H. Tate Co. v. Jiffy Enters., Inc., 16 F.R.D. 571, 573 (E.D. Pa.
1954). The Copyright Office has taken the position that slogans are not copy-
rightable for the same reason. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT OFFICE
CIRCULAR R-1: THE NuTs AND BOLTS OF COPYRIGHT 4 (1983).
It must be recognized, however, that copyright law precedents are of lim-
ited utility in industrial property law, and that the SCPA has its own legisla-
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C. FUNCTIONALLY DICTATED SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY
Any similarity between two chips or their mask works that
results from the requirements of the technology of the product
is not actionable similarity under the SCPA. The Senate Re-
port states that if there are only a limited number of ways to
make a chip in order to achieve a particular function, then an-
other chip would not be infringing because it used the same
pattern.91 The Senate Report identifies a line of precedent to
this effect under the Copyright Act.9 2 Under these decisions,
substantial similarity dictated by function is either not substan-
tial similarity for the purposes of the Copyright Act, or else the
copyright is invalid insofar as it is sought to be extended to the
parts of the work dictated by function.93 In discussing the rele-
vance of copyright precedents to the SCPA, the House Report
reaches the same conclusion, suggesting that "idea" and "ex-
tive history and different underlying policies and operative concepts. See, e.g.,
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5775.
91. The Senate Report states:
[I]f the pattern of part of a mask were dictated by function, so that
only one or a few ways existed in which to make the chip in question,
then another chip would not be infringing merely because it used that
pattern.... [I]f a defendant in a chip copyright infringement case
convinces the fact-finder that the copied chip or part of a chip was ca-
pable of expression in only one or a few ways, then the defendant
would prevail on the charge of copyright infringement of the func-
tionally dictated copied part.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 16-17. See also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8,
at 26 & n.49, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & A.D. NEWS at 5775 & n.49 (" 'Moreover,
where there are only a limited number of ways to express an idea, there may
be no protection for the particular expression.'") (quoting Morrissey v. Proc-
tor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967)).
92. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 16 (collecting cases).
93. SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 16. The concept of functionality
under the SCPA appears broad enough to extend to whatever is useful or eco-
nomically valuable. Thus, a layout that minimized use of chip area (so-called
"silicon real estate") would apparently be functional. So, too, would be layouts
that improved product yield, thermal stability of the circuit, freedom from
noise, or that otherwise lowered cost or improved reliability.
Achieving "form, fit, and function compatibility" appears to be a legiti-
mate activity, defensible either under SCPA § 906(a)'s reverse engineering
privilege, discussed infra notes 199-261 and accompanying text, or as form dic-
tated by function. See, e.g, HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 22, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5771 ("this practice fosters fair competition and provides
a frequently needed 'second source' for chip products"). Hence, layout aspects
that are dictated by compatibility considerations, such as pin layout and place-
ment of blocks near their pins, would not contribute to actionable similarity.
The rule in the case of copyrighted software, in contrast, is less clear. See Ap-
ple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir.
1983) (need for compatibility not part of function), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S.
1033 (1984).
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pression" merge "when function dictates form."
It is unclear whether function dictating form is a real or
only theoretical possibility for semiconductor chip products pro-
tected under the SCPA. Several witnesses at the Senate hear-
ings testified that the function of a semiconductor chip product
rarely or never dictates its form, and that there are usually a
vast number of different ways to lay out a chip.95 Other wit-
nesses, however, expressed the concern that chip protection
under the copyright laws "might be exploited to create patent-
type monopolies over functional features of semiconductor
chips, without the requirements of the patent law [examination
for novelty and invention] having first been satisfied."6 The
Senate Report did not attempt to resolve the factual dispute,
but instead concluded that proper application of the form-dic-
tating-function aspect of the "substantial similarity require-
ment should allay that concern."7
Moreover, both the Senate and House Reports emphasize
the importance of using expert testimony in determining sub-
stantial similarity-a departure from copyright law principles.98
94. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5775.
95. SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 17 n.7.
96. Id. at 16-17. The problem may become more significant in the case of
dynamic RAM (DRAM) or EPROM cells, or other small, highly replicated
modules.
97. Id at 17. Both groups were probably right, but as to different aspects
of chip layouts. At the two extremes of the general "floor plan" (the overall
layout), on the one hand, and of the cells or even transistors of the chip, on
the other, functional considerations and accepted engineering practice may
cause designs to converge. Between these two extremes, however, there is
usually considerable room for individual choice and thus variation of design.
For an illustration of chip design, see R. STERN, supra note 5, § 1.1[C] n.17.
98. This reliance on expert testimony is a very significant departure from
traditional copyright law. A number of copyright precedents point to
mandatory use of a highly subjective "lay observer" test in determining
whether the similarity between two works causes copyright infringement lia-
bility. See Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d
607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274
F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960); see also 3 M. NIMmER, supra note 80, § 13.03[E], at
13-46 to 13-47 (collecting cases). Thus, the Senate Report observes:
Some courts have declined to permit expert testimony in copyright
litigation on the issue of substantial similarity, believing the question
to be determinable only by an overall subjective evaluation based on
the spontaneous impression of a lay observer.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 18.
Regardless of whether such decisions are sound in the copyright context,
they are not applicable to the SCPA and mask work infringement actions.
The Senate Report notes that it was the Committee's intention that expert tes-
timony on the question of substantial similarity be admitted in cases arising
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This stress on the importance of expert testimony in mask
work infringement litigation should also tend to allay the con-
cern that courts might be misled into according mask work pro-
tection to functional aspects of semiconductor chip products. A
semiconductor expert may usefully explain whether function
dictated the form of a mask work; whether apparent similari-
ties in two mask works involve staple, familiar, or common-
place design choices; and whether that which seems quite
similar to the inexpert observer actually involves subtle design
nuances that significantly distinguish the two mask works.99
under the Act. The Senate Report states what it describes as "the better
view" as "expressed in the hearing record by one expert on chip technology"
as follows:
"[I]t has been said that even very subtle mask changes may represent
significantly different and original designs. This is true. It has been
further said that exactly the sort of tests that demonstrate such dif-
ferences are specifically disallowed as defenses in copyright infringe-
ment cases.... I feel that evidence of this type should be allowed in
semiconductor chip copyright infringement cases and hope that the
legislative history of S. 1201 would include a statement endorsing use
of expert testimony to show subtle functional differences in circuit
layouts."
Id. (quoting an expert on chip technology). The Senate Report concludes that
"it would ordinarily be appropriate to permit expert testimony on all aspects
of the 'substantial similarity' or copyright infringement issue in cases arising
under this bill." Id
Accordingly, both the plaintiff and the defendant in a mask work infringe-
ment case would probably rely heavily on expert testimony in presenting their
respective sides of the case. The plaintiff's expert would probably emphasize
that the similarities between the defendant's chip and the plaintiff's reflect de-
fendant's appropriation of the most creative and important aspects of the
plaintiff's layout. The plaintiff's expert might also assert that a multitude of
design choices were available, and that the defendant simply tried to cut cor-
ners and reduce its design costs by appropriating the plaintiff's work.
The defendant's expert would probably emphasize that most of the simi-
larity between the two chips relates to the staple, commonplace aspects of the
design; that the defendant made subtle changes in layout that were highly cre-
ative and beneficial to performance, even though they are not immediately ap-
parent to the lay observer; and that the other similarities between the two
chips occurred because there are only a few possible ways to lay out such cir-
cuits. For example, the defendant's expert might point out that good engi-
neering practices dictated the following aspects of the "floor plan": that
thermally sensitive circuitry be kept far away from heat-producing circuitry;
that circuits with many interconnections with one another be adjacent or at
least close to each other; that input and output circuits be near their pins, and
thus on the outer periphery; and that cross-overs be minimized. At the subeir-
cuit level, the defendant's expert might argue that engineering and economics
dictated the following- use of minimum area layouts; use of high yield layouts;
avoidance of sharp turns and edges; and selection of transistor sizes reflecting
output power requirements.
99. For further discussion of the use of expert testimony, see R. STERN,
supra note 5, at § 7.7. Finally, in connection with the defense of function dic-
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D. REVERSE ENGINEERING
The test of actionable or infringing similarity under the
SCPA is modified in reverse engineering situations.10° When
there is proof of reverse engineering, that is, when there is
proof that the defendant has expended substantial toil and in-
vestment in developing its version of the semiconductor chip
product, it is not enough for the plaintiff to show substantial
similarity between the two parties' chips. To establish a case of
infringement of mask work rights when there is such proof, the
plaintiff must show substantial identity. This is a major depar-
ture from copyright law.101
To summarize the provisions of the SCPA on actionable or
infringing similarity: There is no percentage rule of thumb for
actionable similarity under the SCPA, but the degree of simi-
larity required for mask work infringement is nearer to iden-
tity than that required under the Copyright Act for in-
fringement of imaginative works (as compared with toys, de-
signs, and directories). If the function of a chip dictates the
tating the form of a semiconductor chip product, there is some authority in
copyright law that the defense may be asserted only by one who has made an
independent analysis and concluded that other designs are infeasible. See
WPOW, Inc. v. MRLJ Enters., 584 F. Supp. 132, 138 n.17 (D.D.C. 1984). It is
possible, but not probable, that this principle might be applied to semiconduc-
tor chip cases.
The WPOW opinion indicates that the defense is not available if it is only
an afterthought of counsel in litigation, as opposed to the motivating force for
the defendant's use of the same design at the time of the infringement. Id. at
137-38. The authority cited in WPOW for the proposition is not closely on
point, however. The authority holds that one may fairly use another work,
such as a directory or law book, that compiles information, when one indepen-
dently verifies the information before publishing the later work. While compi-
lations of information and dictation of form by function both involve
determining the line between idea and expression, the two issues do not in-
volve parallel policies. For example, in compilation cases there is a tendency
to protect the first compiler's expenditure of effort in selecting the material.
There is also a tendency to protect only the particular arrangement of the
data. See, e.g., Patry, supra note 90, at 27. On the other hand, form/function
cases involve the policy of free and open competition which underlies the free
enterprise system. In any event, decisions in noncompilation copyright cases
do not require accused infringers who raise the defense that "function dictated
form" to establish that they analyzed the available alternatives and concluded
that they must use the same form used by the copyright owner. See 3 M. NIM-
MER, supra note 80, § 13.05[B]. Thus, the principle is not firmly established
even under copyright law.
100. The reverse engineering defense is discussed infra notes 199-261 and
accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 235-248 and accompanying text.
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form of the chip layout, the resulting similarity is not actiona-
ble as an infringement of mask work rights. If actual reverse
engineering is involved, the similarity necessary for a finding of
infringement of mask work rights is substantial identity.
VI. COPYING
Copying is an element of copyright infringement under the
Copyright Act,102 but is not an element of patent infringement
under the Patent Act.103 Although it is not yet settled, it would
also appear that copying is not an element of a claim for relief
under the SCPA. If the courts were to decide that copying is
an element of infringement of mask work rights, two conse-
quences would follow. The plaintiff would have to establish
that the defendant copied the plaintiff's mask work, by showing
that the defendant had access to the mask work and impermis-
sibly took substantial parts of it. In addition, because independ-
ent creation of a semiconductor chip product would be in-
consistent with copying, either the plaintiff would have to
show, as part of its affirmative case, that independent creation
did not occur, or the defendant would prevail if it showed that
independent creation had occurred. It is unclear which party
would have the burden of proof on this issue.
A. INDEPENDENT CREATION UNDER COPYRIGHT LAw
Ordinarily, in a copyright infringement case, the copyright
owner must first prove substantial similarity between the
works and then, to establish that the defendant could have cop-
ied the plaintiff's work, that the defendant had access to the
plaintiff's work.104 From that evidence, particularly when the
similarity of the works is too close to be believed a mere coinci-
dence, the fact finder may infer that copying occurred.'0
5
Independent creation of a substantially similar work is not
copyright infringement. Thus, according to the established my-
thology of copyright law, it is said that if a person who had
never read Keats's "Ode on a Grecian Urn" were to create that
same poem independently,loe that person would not be guilty of
102. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 80, § 13.01, at 13-3.
103. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1982); see also Thurber Corp. v. Fairchild Motor
Corp., 269 F.2d 841, 849 (5th Cir. 1959) (infringement does not require deliber-
ate act such as copying).
104. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 80, §§ 13.01-.03.
105. Id- § 13.02, at 13-9.
106. Apparently, this hypothetical is based on the supposed statistical the-
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copyright infringement. 10 7 Hence, under copyright law, if the
defendant can convince the fact finder that the defendant inde-
pendently created the accused work, the defendant is not liable
for infringement. Moreover, a copyright plaintiff must con-
vince the court that copying did occur. If the plaintiff's evi-
dence of access by the defendant is weak, the defendant may
still prevail despite great similarity between the two works.1 08
The rationale for the doctrine of independent creation has
not been well articulated. One theory is that "copyright"
means "right to copy," and therefore copyright protection does
not extend to coincidental duplications of a copyrighted work.
This is not a theory, however, but an unthinking appeal to ety-
mology. It is a refusal to analyze why copyright is so limited
and whether so limiting the right makes sense. The more so-
phisticated rationale for independent creation comes from the
context in which the traditional subject matter of copyright,
i.e., belles lettres and fine arts, is created--a context far from
the industrial setting of Silicon Valley or that of other indus-
trial property laws such as the Patent Act. It is argued that we
should not stifle the creativity and self-expression of the second
author of the "Ode on a Grecian Urn," because creativity and
self-expression enrich the quality of life. Permitting independ-
ent creation as a defense, or making plaintiffs prove copying,
gives that creativity and self-expression some breathing room
by resolving doubts and close cases in their favor. Perhaps, in
that context, freedom of speech and freedom of expression are
more important than commercial certainty.
ory that if 100 monkeys sit before 100 typewriters for 100 years, one of them
will eventually type "Thou still unravished bride of quietness," and so on.
107. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.),
cert denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
108. See Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 902-03 (7th Cir. 1984). In Selle, the de-
fendant Bee Gees's song ("How Deep Is Your Love") was remarkably like the
plaintiff Selle's song ("Let It End"). The Bee Gees denied, and Selle could not
prove, access. The court of appeals therefore set aside a jury verdict in the
plaintiff's favor. The only expert witness had testified that "the two songs had
such striking similarities that they could not have been written independently
of one another," but he was unwilling to testify that the similarity had to be
the result of copying. Id. at 899. The court of appeals concluded that the evi-
dence of the defendants' access to the plaintiff's music was "virtually de
minimis," and that it was therefore conceivable that both songs were de-
scended from a common ancestral source. The court held that the plaintiff
could not recover unless he disproved this possibility. Id at 902-03.
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B. COPYING UNDER PATENT LAW
As indicated above, independent creation is not a defense
in patent' °9 or related industrial property law.110 Indeed, even
an earlier inventor who fails to file for a patent, but instead
secretly practices the invention, may be held to infringe the
patent of a later inventor who files for and secures a patent,
thereby disclosing the invention to the public and promoting
the progress of useful arts.:"' Under most patent systems
outside the United States, the right to a patent belongs to the
first person to file an application rather than to the first person
to complete the invention. Hence, not only is subsequent in-
dependent creation of the invention unavailable as a defense,
but even earlier independent creation than that of the owner of
industrial property rights is not a defense.
The rationale of this rule is the promotion of commercial
certainty and security of investment. Business disputes are ex-
pensive and a distraction. Rules that increase certainty are,
therefore, preferable, unless there are policy reasons mandat-
ing other rules. Placing industrial products on the market may
require large front-end investments. Unless the investments
are relatively secure, fewer, if any, will be made. When pro-
109. See, e.g., Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d 1166, 1168 n.3
(6th Cir. 1980) (independent creation is no defense to patent infringement
claim); Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., 532 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir.
1976) ("one may therefore infringe a patent by innocent and independent re-
production"); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir.
1951) ("independent reproduction of copyrighted work ... is not infringe-
ment, whereas it is vis a vis a patent") (citations omitted).
110. See Gambrel, Overview of Ownership Conflicts That Arise With Re-
spect To Intellectual Property, in SORTING OUT THE OWNERSHIP RIGHTS IN IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A GUIDE TO PRACTICAL COUNSELING AND LEGAL
REPRESENTATION 9, 11 (ABA Sec. Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law, ed.
1980). The field of intellectual property law is generally divided into two main
parts: copyright and related law and industrial property law. Patent law is
part of industrial property law. See supra note 2. Examples of related indus-
trial property laws are utility model laws and design patent or industrial de-
sign laws. A utility model is a lesser, narrower patent covering only a very
specific embodiment of a technological advance; the United States does not
have utility model laws, but other countries, including Germany, Italy, and
Australia, do. See C. FELLNER, THE FUTURE OF LEGAL PROTECTION FOR INDUS-
TRIAL DESIGN 137, 153, 166 (1985). A design patent covers the ornamental as-
pects of a useful article. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1982).
111. See, e.g., Woofter v. Carlson, 367 F.2d 436, 448 (C.C.P.A. 1966); Mason
v. Hepburn, 13 App. D.C. 86, 96 (1898). However, when the first inventor prac-
tices the invention openly or publishes it, the invention will fall into the public
domain. A second inventor cannot then secure a patent that would exclude
the first inventor. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (1983).
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gress in technology is an important goal, promotion of commer-
cial certainty and security of investment in industrial property
rights is an important subsidiary goal.
Because acceptance of independent creation as a defense
tends to decrease commercial certainty and security of invest-
ment, it is rejected under industrial property law. The doctrine
of independent creation tends to decrease commercial certainty
and security of investment in several ways. First, a firm consid-
ering whether to invest in a new product which may be pro-
tected by industrial property law can make an educated guess
as to whether the product will enjoy freedom from competition
(i.e., a "monopoly" of some sort), by using ordinary research
methods, such as consulting literature, product catalogs, and in-
dustrial property registration records. That research, however,
will not provide information about whether other persons will
subsequently claim independent creation of the same product.
That remains an area of uncertainty. Second, the availability of
an independent creation defense not only decreases the predict-
ability of infringement litigation, but also decreases by an inde-
terminable amount the probability that an owner of proprietary
rights will succeed in such litigation. Third, the availability of
an independent creation defense in infringement litigation in-
creases the probable cost of the litigation, even when the owner
of industrial property rights eventually prevails on the mer-
its. 112 By the same token, the prospect of such increased costs
has an effect, adverse to the interests of the owner of industrial
property rights, on the desirability of settling and on the terms
of settlement. For these and perhaps other reasons, the availa-
bility of the independent creation doctrine tends to decrease
112. Some defendants in infringement cases will seize upon any faintly col-
orable defense, in the hope of delaying the day of judgment and possibly so
confusing the jury that no judgment is returned against the alleged infringer.
Courts should measure the likelihood that a defendant will prevail upon a de-
fense against the cost to the judicial system and the parties in determining
whether or not a defense should be recognized. Such considerations are a ma-
jor part of the rationale for per se rules. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) ("This principle of per se unreasonableness not only
makes the... [law] more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it
also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic
investigation ... an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken."); see
also Continental TN., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977)
("Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations about the
social utility of particular commercial practices .... Cases that do not fit the
generalization may arise, but a per se rule reflects the judgment that such
cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify the time and expense
necessary to identify them.").
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the projected return on an investment. To the extent that it
does, it shifts the margin in the direction away from investment
in new technology. Considerations such as these have led to
the rejection of independent creation in patent and other indus-
trial property law.
C. COPYING UNDER THE SCPA
Under the SCPA, there is no express requirement of copy-
ing. The SCPA, unlike the Copyright Act,113 does not use the
word "copy."'114 There is no express requirement in the SCPA
that the defendant "copy" the plaintiff's work, just as there is
none in patent law. Under a literal reading of the SCPA, there-
fore, proving that the defendant copied or had access to the
plaintiff's chip or mask work is not part of the plaintiff's case
for infringement of mask work rights.
On the other hand, it may be argued that the word "copy"
is used as a noun, rather than a verb, in section 106 of the Copy-
right Act, that only the verb implies plagiarism, and therefore,
that the copyright law requirement of "copying" is not based on
the statute. If this were the case, the absence of a "copying" re-
quirement in the SCPA might not preclude judicial require-
ment of proof of copying, meaning the defendant's intentional
plagiarism of the plaintiff's chip, or at least the defendant's
nonindependent derivation of its chip from the plaintiff's, be-
cause such a judicially imposed requirement would be analo-
gous to the requirement imposed by the courts in copyright
cases.
A rejoinder to this argument might be that the courts have
read no such "copying" requirement into the patent law, which
113. Under section 106 of the Copyright Act, it is an infringement for the
defendant "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies" or "to distribute cop-
ies" of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), 106(3) (1982) (emphasis
added).
114. By contrast, under the SCPA, it is an infringement "to reproduce the
mask work" (no reference to "copies") or "distribute a semiconductor chip
product in which the mask work is embodied" (no reference to "copies"). 17
U.S.C. § 905(1)-(2) (Supp. II 1984). In the English language, the word
"reproduce" does not necessarily connote "copying," although the word is
often used that way.
The drafters of SCPA § 905(1) could have avoided this ambiguity by using
one of the following phrases: "embody the mask work in a physical object,"
"make a physical object embodying the mask work," or "copy the mask work
in any fixed, tangible form." Whether independent creation negated infringe-
ment of mask work rights evidently was not perceived as a problem when
SCPA § 905 was drafted. The drafters apparently assumed the answer was ob-
vious and therefore did not address the issue.
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indicates that there is no compulsion to read the requirement
into the SCPA. Moreover, the noun and verb forms of a word
usually have the same, not different, meanings under a single
statute.11
5
Clearly, interpretation of the SCPA as to copying and in-
dependent creation cannot be based solely on language argu-
ments of this sort. Rather, the matter must be determined on
the bases of the purposes of the Act, the problems or evils that
it seeks to remedy, the nature of the technology and the indus-
try, and the consequences of having or not having a "copying"
requirement. In turning to that kind of inquiry, one may prop-
erly distinguish two contexts: cases involving second sourcing of
entire chips and those involving competitive duplication of
small parts of chips.
1. Cases Involving Second Sourcing
Cases involving the second sourcing of a semiconductor
chip product are almost inevitably far beyond copying, in the
copyright sense. Nobody independently creates a second-
sourced chip in the manner suggested by the myth of the "Ode
on a Grecian Urn."'1 6 Among other reasons, if the second firm
independently created its chip in that manner, its chip would
not be form, fit, and function compatible with the first chip,
and it would therefore be useless for second sourcing. Thus,
the defendant in a second sourcing case almost inevitably will
have copied the plaintiff's chip, in the copyright sense of the
term.
Proof of copying in the copyright sense does not, however,
suffice to establish infringement of plaintiff's mask work rights.
To infringe on plaintiff's mask work rights, the defendant's
copying must result in a similarity much closer than the sub-
stantial similarity of an ordinary copyright case. Even then, the
115. But see Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65 (1916) ('The same
word may have different meanings in different parts of the same act .... ");
see also Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) ("It is not necessarily true
that income means the same thing in the Constitution and the [income tax]
act. A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it . .. may vary
greatly in... content according to the circumstances and the time in which it
is used.").
116. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. As the General Counsel of
the Copyright Office has aptly phrased it: "We do not believe that independ-
ent creation is a very useful legal fiction under the SCPA." Remarks of Doro-
thy Schrader, General Counsel, Copyright Office, Law & Business Symposium
on the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, San Francisco, California (Dec. 12,
1984).
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defendant may prevail if it shows enough toil and expense of its
own in creating the copied mask work to qualify for immunity
under the reverse engineering defense. 117 Copying is not a
meaningful part of plaintiffs case under the SCPA when sec-
ond sourcing is involved, because copying always occurs to some
extent. The real questions in such cases are whether the copy-
ing is too close and whether the copying is excusable because of
the amount of defendant's own further or independent work
wrapped up in the copy. Accordingly, in cases involving entire
chips or very substantial parts of chips, independent creation is
either irrelevant or a sham defense. Requiring the plaintiff to
prove access and copying in addition to the requisite degree of
substantial similarity would merely prolong and delay the liti-
gation, needlessly and uselessly consuming the court's and par-
ties' resources." 8 In second sourcing cases, therefore, the
better view would be that independent creation is no defense
117. A copyright infringer that adds its own work to the copied work is or-
dinarily not excused from the copyright infringement. The question is not
how much of its own work the infringer added, but how much of the copyright
owner's work the infringer took. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates,
581 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 1978) ("this Court and others have... consistently
focused on the substantiality of the taking"). The rule in patent law is the
same. See, e.g., Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 43 (1929)
(that patent is granted to defendant on improvement product does not excuse
defendant's infringement of plaintiff's earlier patent); Ziegler v. Phillips Pe-
troleum Co., 483 F.2d 858, 871 (5th Cir.) ("the grant of a patent on an improve-
ment of a patented article does not excuse infringement of the dominant
patent"), cert denied, 414 U.S. 1079 (1973).
The concept of infringement of mask work rights under the SCPA is more
fluid, however. See Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 17,
at S12,917. Adding one's own work to that of another may well turn unlawful
infringement of mask work rights into permissible reverse engineering. See 17
U.S.C. § 906(a) (Supp. II 1984) (setting out the reverse engineering defense).
118. In some cases, the legal fiction of independent creation, if understood
as requiring the plaintiff to prove access and copying, could defeat justice. For
example, suppose that a United States distributor-defendant acquired semicon-
ductor chip products from a foreign supplier who was beyond the reach of ef-
fective discovery. The plaintiff might then be unable to prove copying. Cf.
Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussed supra note 108).
To be sure, the distributor may be equally unable to acquire evidence.
Clearly, someone is put at a disadvantage whichever way the burden of pro-
ducing evidence is allocated. In the semiconductor chip industry, a chip dis-
tributor is probably in a better position to ascertain the facts (or, in the
alternative, to secure an effective indemnification agreement) than is a mask
work owner asked to prove what went on in the factory of an alleged foreign
pirate. Moreover, the relative frequency of piracy as compared with that of in-
dependent creation, when there is striking similarity between the layouts of
the first and the second source chip, further suggests where the balance of
equities lies.
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or, at the very least, that mask work plaintiffs should not have
to establish that it did not occur.
2. Cases Involving Cells
In the much rarer case when second sourcing is not in-
volved, and the claim of infringement of mask work rights is
predicated on the supposed misappropriation of a cell or other
small module of the plaintiff's chip or cell library, the question
may become more difficult. For example, two parties may both
be manufacturing and selling chips containing substantially
similar dynamic RAM cells, perhaps a single transistor and a
capacitor for storing a binary digit of memory.119 Two possibili-
ties may occur. The first, and more important, is the possibility
that whether the later layout was independently devised or not,
this is a case where chip designers would gravitate toward the
particular layout because it permits fastest execution or mini-
mal die area, or because the layout has some other functionally
significant character that helps to accomplish the desired func-
tion and there are not a large number of other ways to accom-
plish that function. The second possibility is that the later
comer may indeed have independently devised the particular
layout even though it is substantially similar to the first de-
signer's layout, because the layout is so simple. Even when
there are ten equally satisfactory possible layouts for a cell,
each time a design is made there is a ten percent probability of
coincidence.
When the disputed cell layout is functionally significant,
the choice of rule as to independent creation may be important
for reasons of public policy. First, there is no examination sys-
tem under the SCPA.120 Second, as compared to patent law,
the novelty or creativity requirement is low. It may be, there-
fore, unduly anticompetitive and harmful to the public interest
to permit a first comer to monopolize a cell configuration that
is the fastest, least expensive, or otherwise functionally impor-
tant way of accomplishing some semiconductor purpose.12 ' Af-
119. There is a great deal of current interest in the registrability of dy-
namic RAM and EPROM cells for 256K binary digit ("bit") and 1 megabit
memory chips. Several major semiconductor chip product manufacturers wish
to protect their layouts against competitors, but the Copyright Office creates
great obstacles to the registration of cells. See R. STERN, supra note 5, § 3.3.
The question of possible independent creation to date has been raised primar-
ily with regard to such memory cells.
120. See infra notes 189-192 and accompanying text.
121. There is another approach to such problems, which is beyond the
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ter all, the first comer has not satisfied the requirements of the
patent system. The first comer was merely the first to design
the semiconductor configuration and then to register or com-
mercially exploit it. 12
2
If these were the only pertinent considerations and if the
SCPA lacked a different means for dealing with the problem of
functionally significant cell layouts,m2s one might conclude that
copying should be made part of the concept of infringement of
mask work rights in cells. That is, one might conclude that the
plaintiff should be required to prove copying, as under copy-
right law. Alternatively, one might conclude that the statute
should be interpreted to permit the defendant to prove lack of
copying, and that, if successful, the defendant should be exon-
erated. Under the latter rule, copying would not be part of the
plaintiff's case of infringement of mask work rights, but lack of
copying would be an affirmative defense. 124
An important question that still remains is whether an ad-
ded element of copying in mask work cases is necessary or de-
sirable at all. This is a question on which reasonable minds
may differ. Briefly, the author's view is that for reasons of pol-
icy, discussed below, it would be a serious mistake to allow
copying and independent creation to be part of either party's
case for infringement of mask work rights when second sourc-
ing is involved. As already suggested,2 5 there is no gain and all
scope of this Article. Briefly, this approach would be to recognize the first
comer's right to the layout, without recognizing a right to an injunction or to
extensive monetary relief, i.e., more than a reasonable royalty. For a discus-
sion of this approach in the software field, see Stern, MicroLaw, IEEE MICRO,
Apr. 1984, at 69-70. The judicial adoption of such an approach under the SCPA
may well be foreclosed by the mandatory requirement that profits be awarded,
see 17 U.S.C. § 911(b) (Supp. II 1984), and by the express innocent infringe-
ment provisions, which may exclude it by implication, see id § 907.
122. To use an example given previously, see supra note 119 and accompa-
nying text, the one-transistor dynamic RAM (DRAM) cell has been patented
by a major corporation. Patent counsel for that corporation has advised the
author, however, that there are many ways to lay out the patented DRAM
configuration, and that, accordingly, no mask work registration would confer a
nonpatent monopoly on the first to register the layout.
123. It is suggested below that the doctrine against protecting functionally
dictated layouts adequately deals with functionally significant layouts, and
that its presence in mask work law makes the doctrine of independent crea-
tion at best unnecessary. See infra notes 129-131 and accompanying text.
124. The second treatment of copying is preferable because it avoids requir-
ing the plaintiff to prove something that the defendant is in a better position
to disprove. Also, it puts the burden of proof on the party less likely to be in-
nocent, given the history of the semiconductor industry.
125. See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text.
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detriment in doing so. Although the question is more difficult
when substantially similar cell layouts are involved, the author
believes that it would still be a mistake to require the mask
work owner to prove copying, for similar but somewhat less
forceful reasons.
Three different policies have been mentioned as bearing on
the value of the independent creation defense. The first, a
copyright law policy involving the first amendment and free-
dom of self-expression, is irrelevant in the semiconductor chip
product context. Economic interests, rather than personal in-
terests, predominate under the SCPA. The second, the patent
law policy of promoting commercial certainty and security of
investment, is disserved by the doctrine of independent crea-
tion.126 The third, that of maintaining competition in function-
ally significant chip layouts, requires further discussion. It is a
relevant and important policy; it can, however, adequately be
served by another means-the policy regarding functionally
dictated layouts, which is already incorporated into the SCPA.
The interplay between the second and third policies suggests
that an independent creation doctrine would be both unneces-
sary and harmful under the SCPA.
The second policy, promoting commercial certainty and se-
curity of investment, has already been discussed as it relates to
industrial property in general.127 The same considerations ap-
ply to semiconductor chip products. The purpose of the SCPA
is to bring about further progress in semiconductor technology
by increasing security of investment in chip innovations.12s
Greater assurance that potential investors in the creation and
marketing of new chip technology will recoup their invest-
ments, as opposed to noninvestors reaping the benefits of those
investments, will attract investors. To the extent, then, that
commercial certainty and investment security in the marketing
of the products of chip technology is lessened, the purposes and
policies of the SCPA are contravened.
The third policy, concerning the competitive availability of
functional la: outs, involves the public interest in competition,
recognized by the reverse engineering privilege of SCPA
126. See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
127. See id.
128. The House Report states that "[t]he purpose of the legislation is to
protect semiconductor chip products in such a manner as to reward creativity,
encourage innovation, research and investment in the semiconductor industry,
prevent piracy, while at the same time protecting the public." HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 8, at 1, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5750.
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§ 906(a).129 As already suggested, a mask work owner should
not get the equivalent of a patent on some branch of semicon-
ductor technology by monopolizing the only or one of a limited
number of means of reproducing a particular circuit in silicon.
The public's and competitors' interest in free competition is am-
ply safeguarded, however, by the doctrine of functionally dic-
tated similarity. The SCPA's legislative history makes it clear
that a similarity between two mask works that results from the
needs of chip technology is not actionable similarity under the
SCPA.130 Hence, in any case of infringement of mask work
rights in which a defendant would invoke the doctrine of in-
dependent creation to justify procompetitive conduct, the doc-
trine of functionally dictated similarity would serve the same
purpose. Under that rule, defendants will escape liability if
they show that the nature of the technology led to the design.
There is no other persuasive reason to import the doctrine of
independent creation into mask work law, and there are sev-
eral reasons not to do so.1 31
SUMMARY OF PART ONE
The SCPA provides owners of mask works with rights
against direct infringement similar to those of the copyright
laws, although the reproduction right of the SCPA is more ex-
tensive in that it extends to useful objects, chips, whose manu-
facture is classified as reproduction of the protected work. The
SCPA's right against indirect infringement appears to be al-
most identical to that provided by the patent laws. The role of
scienter in infringement of mask work rights cases is not yet
certain, although it appears probable that it will play the same
minimal role it plays in patent and copyright infringement
cases.
The concept of actionable or infringing similarity under the
129. See 17 U.S.C. § 906(a) (Supp. II 1984).
130. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
131. The discussion above has focused on functionally significant cell lay-
outs, where the policy reasons for a rule exonerating independent creation are
strongest. The possibility of purely coincidental independent creation of a cell
layout without functional significance has not been discussed because such un-
usual cases would have little effect on whether the doctrine of independent
creation was read into the SCPA. Considerations of "equity" or fairness might
suggest that in such cases the second creator should be excused. These consid-
erations have not generated a doctrine of independent creation in patent law,
however. Moreover, these considerations seem to be outweighed by the social
interests in promoting commercial certainty and security of investment in new
chip technology.
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SCPA is unlike that of either the patent or copyright laws. It
could not be patterned on the patent law model because there
are no claims defining the metes and bounds of a mask work as
there are for a patent. A mask work simply "is," like the sub-
ject matter of a copyright, so that there is no way of verbally
articulating what is protected and what is left to the public do-
main. Nonetheless, there are reasonably well-defined policies
as to competition and technological progress that play a role in
deciding whether an accused chip is actionably similar to an
earlier, protected chip. The second part of this Article will re-
turn to and explore that theme in greater depth.
Finally, the role, if any, of copying in infringement of mask
work rights cases is uncertain. In copyright law, proof of copy-
ing is essential to the claim; in patent law, it is not required.
Because the policies underlying the SCPA seem closer to those
of the patent laws in this respect, the better view would be not
to require the mask work owner to prove copying, but merely
to prove infringingly close similarity.
PART TWO: DEFENSES, IMMUNITIES, AND
LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY
As explained in Part One, the SCPA is a new form of intel-
lectual property law. It differs from traditional intellectual
property law, such as patent and copyright law, in significant
ways, although the SCPA adopts a number of features from
those bodies of law. The defenses available to a charge of in-
fringement of mask work rights, and the SCPA's provisions for
immunity from and limitation on liability for infringement of
mask work rights illustrate the characteristics peculiar to the
SCPA. Some of the defenses that an accused infringer may
raise in a mask work infringement case are the same as those
that an accused infringer could raise in a copyright, patent, or
trademark infringement case. Precedents from those fields of
law may be helpful in deciding some aspects of a mask work in-
fringement case or in planning a defendant's trial or negotia-
tion strategy. Other defenses that an accused infringer may
raise in a mask work case have no precedent or parallel in ex-
isting law, because they are peculiar to the SCPA or to the en-
vironment of the semiconductor chip manufacturing industry.
Utilization of these defenses will call for new thinking.
The defenses available in a mask work case may be divided
into three categories: those that the defendant must plead in
the answer to the complaint and then prove at trial, those that
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the defendant must specifically plead, lest they be waived, 32
and those subsumed in a general denial of the claim or within a
denial of the allegations that the mask work proprietor must
make in its complaint. Most of the defenses considered here
are in the first category, defenses that the accused infringer
must plead and prove by evidence. Rule 8(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure specifically requires the defendant to
plead estoppel, fraud, illegality, laches, license, statute of limi-
tations, waiver, and any other affirmative defense.133 The ma-
jor affirmative defenses under the SCPA are invalidity,'3
reverse engineering,135 first sale, I' 6 and innocent infringe-
ment.1 37 The defenses in the second category, those which
must be raised before trial to avoid waiver, are not peculiar to
mask work litigation.13 The defenses in the third category,
those subsumed within denials, include defective title in the
mask work, ineligibility under section 902(a), lack of actionable
similarity, absence of effect on commerce, and failure to regis-
ter the mask work before filing the action. 39 Part Two of this
Article is primarily concerned with the first category of de-
fenses, and particularly with the affirmative defenses not listed
in Rule 8(c).
I. INVALID REGISTRATION OF MASK WORKS
A mask work registration is invalid if there is a serious, ir-
remediable error in the recitations in the registration. 40 A re-
gistration is also invalid if there is a defect in the registrant's
132. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(h)(1).
133. FED. R. CIv. P. 8(c).
134. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 19 n.38, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5768 n.38 ("In the event of mask work infringement litigation,
failure to satisfy the requirements of § 902(b) would be a defense.").
135. See 17 U.S.C. § 906(a) (Supp. II 1984).
136. See id § 906(b).
137. See id § 907.
138. Among such defenses are lack of personal jurisdiction, defective ser-
vice, and improper venue. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1).
139. The plaintiff must prove ownership as part of its case and should al-
lege ownership in the complaint. See 17 U.S.C. § 910(b)(1) (Supp. II 1984).
The defendant thus need not specially plead the plaintiff's lack of ownership;
the defendant may simply deny the plaintiff's allegation that the plaintiff
owns the mask work that the defendant allegedly infringed. The denial would
require the plaintiff to prove ownership at trial. If, however, the plaintiff in-
troduces into evidence a certificate of registration showing the plaintiff as the
owner of the mask work, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the
prima facie evidentiary effect of the certificate. See id- § 908(f).
140. A registration would be invalid if, for example, it misstated ownership
or claimed as an original mask work a chip layout that was completely in the
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chain of title as mask work owner. Such a defect may be cura-
ble by reregistration within a period of two years of commercial
exploitation.141 A registration would also be invalid if the facts
recited in the certificate showed on their face, or otherwise,
that no registration should have issued.142 Finally, and most
important, the registration would be invalid if the layout of the
chip is unprotectable because it is too staple or commonplace. 143
Unprotectability of the layout is a major category under inva-
lidity and one of the most important defenses in mask work
litigation.
A. MASK WORK NOT PROTECTABLE UNDER THE SCPA
The layout of a semiconductor chip is not protectable when
the mask work "consists of designs that are staple, common-
place, or familiar in the semiconductor industry, or variations
of such designs, combined in a way that, considered as a whole,
is not original."' 44 The SCPA, unlike the patent laws, does not
create a system for administratively examining creativity on
the merits prior to issuance of a certificate of protection. In-
stead, the SCPA opts for the low front-end costs of a registra-
tion system, leaving the courts to adjudicate validity if and
when the mask work is ever the subject of litigation. 145 When
litigation arises over infringement of mask work rights, the cer-
tificate of registration is prima facie evidence that the mask
work meets the law's creativity and originality standard.146
The court would not expect the plaintiff to prove the nega-
tive proposition that its design, considered as a whole, is not
staple, familiar, or commonplace. Rather, the court would ex-
pect the defendant to identify the staple, familiar, or common-
place aspects of the plaintiff's design and their antecedents in
the public domain. It would then become the plaintiff's respon-
sibility to negate that showing. Thus, the defendant must do
more than simply challenge the validity of the registration in
public domain. For a general discussion of registration requirements and pro-
cedures, see R. STERN, supra note 5, ch. 3.
141. See 17 U.S.C. § 908(a) (Supp. II 1984).
142. For example, if the mask work owner were an ineligible foreign na-
tional who first commercially exploited the chip abroad, see i& § 902(a)(1), or
if the first commercial exploitation of the mask work had occurred more than
two years before registration, see i& § 908(a).
143. See id § 902(b)(2).
144. Id,
145. See infra notes 189-192 and accompanying text; R. STERN, supra note
5, § 3.9.
146. See 17 U.S.C. § 908(f) (Supp. II 1984).
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its pleadings. The defendant must, at trial or in resisting a mo-
tion for summary judgment, show some evidence of the staple,
familiar, or commonplace character of plaintiff's mask work.
Only at that point, and not unless that point is reached, would
it become plaintiff's responsibility to negate defendant's evi-
dence, by expert testimony or other satisfactory evidence of
creativity.147
1. Concept of "Originality"
To be protectable under the SCPA, a mask work must sat-
isfy the Act's creativity or novelty requirements. 148 The word
"original" occurs twice in section 902(b). 149 Although the ques-
tion is not completely free from doubt, a mask work is probably
"original" for the purposes of section 902(b)(1) if it is not copied
from another work.15° This concept of originality, meaning
nothing more than failure to plagiarize, is derived from copy-
right law.151
In section 902(b)(2), however, "original" is used to mean
"novel" or "creative," rather than merely "not copied from an-
147. See Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 17, at
S12,917-18.
148. See 17 U.S.C. § 902(b) (Supp. II 1984).
149. Section 902(b) provides:
Protection under this chapter shall not be available for a mask
work that-
(1) is not original; or
(2) consists of designs that are staple, commonplace, or familiar in
the semiconductor industry, or variations of such designs, combined in
a way that, considered as a whole, is not original.
I (emphasis added). The word "original" is also used in § 906(a)(2). See id.
§ 906(a)(2).
150. A definition of "original" was included in H.R. 5525, see H.R. 5525,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 901(4), 130 CONG. REC. H5489 (daily ed. June 11, 1984)
("a mask work is 'original' if it is the independent creation of an author who
did not copy it from another source"); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 17, 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5766, but it was omitted from the SCPA.
Whether it was omitted as surplusage or for other reasons is not clear from
the legislative history.
151. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d
Cir. 1951). It should be noted, however, that copyright law's standard of origi-
nality is slightly more exacting in the case of a work based on or derivative of
earlier works. Then, "something [slightly] more than merely refraining from
outright copying is required before a new variation on an old work has suffi-
cient originality to be copyrightable." Vogue Ring Creations, Inc. v. Hardman,
410 F. Supp. 609, 611-12 (D.R.I. 1976). See also Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy
Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910-11 (2d Cir. 1980) (Donald Duck toy); L. Batlin & Son,
Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (toy bank based on similar
bank within public domain), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
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other."' 52 This novelty or creativity requirement is a major de-
parture from copyright law. Imposing this requirement was a
step in the direction of patent law,153 and was part of Con-
gress's decision to protect chip layouts as industrial property
rather than as part of a system for protecting authors' and art-
ists' rights. Under copyright law, an author or artist may have
a copyright in his creation, almost without regard to how slight
or inferior it may be, as long as he can call it his own.1M The
SCPA, on the other hand, sets a minimum threshold of creativ-
ity below which protection is denied. The threshold is not spec-
ified with precision; a minimum level of creativity can perhaps
never be marked with a bright line. The level of creativity re-
quired under the SCPA is somewhat less than that required
under patent law155 and somewhat more than that required
under copyright law, although it is probably closer to the
latter.156
152. The word "original" is also used in SCPA § 906(a)(2), with perhaps a
third significance. See 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(2) (Supp. II 1984). For a discussion of
the meaning of "original" as it is used in § 906(a)(2), see infra notes 243-248
and accompanying text. See generally Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65
(1916) (the same word may have different meanings in different parts of a
law).
153. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (1982) (requiring patentable devices and the
like to be both novel and not obvious from what went before).
154. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir.
1951). There is a de minimis test, however, under which wholly negligible
"creations" are denied copyright protection. Thus, the sentence, "Apply hook
to wall," was denied copyright protection. E.H. Tate Co. v. Jiffy Enters., Inc.,
16 F.R.D. 571, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
155. The House Report expressly states that the patent system's inventive
level is above the SCPA's novelty requirements. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8,
at 19, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5768.
156. According to SCPA § 902(b)(2), the layout of a chip is not protectable
when the mask work "consists of designs that are staple, commonplace, or fa-
miliar in the semiconductor industry, or variations of such designs, combined
in a way that, considered as a whole, is not original." 17 U.S.C. § 902(b)(2)
(Supp. II 1984) (emphasis added). The italicized portion of the language of
§ 902(b)(2) became part of the House bill as an amendment in response to in-
dustry concern that, because all chip layouts consist of squares, rectangles,
arcs, lines, and other staple elements recombined to meet the needs of the cur-
rent product, a strict interpretation of the original provision (without the itali-
cized and bold faced words) might make all chips unprotectable. The boldface
portion of the language was added to SCPA § 902(b)(2) later when the Senate
and House bills were merged. The phrase "considered as a whole" is based on
language taken from the House Report, see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 19,
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5768 ("The subject matter of the mask
work must be original, when considered as a whole, even though, if the indi-
vidual elements of the mask work were dissected away from the whole they
might appear familiar or commonplace."), which in turn was taken from the
patent law's standard for "obviousness" found at Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950,
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The House Report states that two concerns led to the
House's adoption of a creativity requirement. First, the House
Committee deemed it appropriate to require a minimum level
of creativity to qualify a mask work for protection under the
Act.157 Apparently, this requirement was viewed as being con-
sistent with the decision to reject the copyright approach and
create sui generis protection for most mask works.'-' Since a
"mask work is not a book," the House Committee saw no rea-
son to indulge in "the legal 'fiction' of treating books and mask
works similarly."'159
The House Committee's second concern was to prevent
material in the public domain from being usurped and
transformed into proprietary, i.e., monopoly, rights.16° The
Committee noted that "[tihere is a fundamental congressional
policy against 'recapturing' works in the public domain [and]
this legislation pays careful heed to that policy."z61
In drafting section 902(b)(2), the House recognized that the
courts would need some guidance in infringement actions for
separating the protectable from the unprotectable. The stan-
dard for protectability set forth in the House Report is original-
ity of the subject matter of the mask work, as a whole, even
though the component parts of the mask work, when standing
alone, may be familiar or commonplace. If familiar and com-
monplace elements are combined to create an unoriginal mask
work, the mask work is not protectable 6 2 It is not enough to
isolate individual elements of a chip layout and show that ear-
lier chips displayed the same arcs and rectangles or "insubstan-
tial variations" of such designs. It may not be enough even to
show that whole "cells" were found in earlier chips. The com-
bination must be unoriginal when it is considered as a whole
rather than part by part.163
66 Stat. 792, 798 (current version at 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West Supp. 1985)). That
statute requires a determination of whether the subject matter of the inven-
tion, considered as a whole, would have been obvious to a person of ordinary
skill in the field of the invention.
157. HOUSE REPORT, supa note 8, at 19, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 5768.
158. I. at 6, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5755.
159. Ic-
160. Id- at 19, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5768.
161. I&
162. See 17 U.S.C. § 902(b)(2) (Supp. II 1984).
163. The House Report states:
[The Committee recognizes that all chip designs consist of arcs, lines,
rectangles, and like staple designs; in a new chip these staple designs
are arranged in an original particular way. The key to section
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There is a certain inevitable measure of subjectivity in this
standard.164 Considering the whole of a design means balancing
the similarities and dissimilarities of different aspects of the de-
sign without a common denominator or gauge of comparison.
Like the "reasonable man" test of tort law, this standard is in-
capable of precise formulation, yet it can be applied to specific
facts by a jury or other fact finder. Despite the imprecision of
the standard, it is probably fair to conclude that any further at-
tempt to make the standard more objective and predictable
would fail totally or would result in undue rigidity.165
The Senate memorandum on the final bill echoes the
902(b)(2)'s protection of the public against usurpation of the public
domain is the final phrase, "combined in a way that is not original."
To be eligible for protection, the combination of arcs, lines and rectan-
gles in a mask work must be original .... If staple, familiar, or
commonplace elements are combined in a way that is not original, the
resulting mask work is not protectable under this Act. The subject
matter of the mask work must be original, when considered as a
whole, even though, if the individual elements of the mask work were
dissected away from the whole they might appear familiar or
commonplace.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 19, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5768
(emphasis added). The Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum states the
same position. See Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 17,
at S12,917.
164. It is not as subjective, however, as the "spontaneous impression of a
lay observer" test of copyright law. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 18.
The Senate Report is quoted in relevant part supra note 98. The SCPA stan-
dard is therefore more predictable in application.
165. The Supreme Court stated a procedure for measuring creativity under
patent law in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). First, the scope
and content of the prior art must be determined. Second, the differences be-
tween the present work and the prior art must be ascertained. Third, the level
of ordinary skill in the field must be determined. Id. at 17. Against this back-
ground of factual information, the obviousness of the subject matter claimed
as an invention must be evaluated by the court as a legal question. See id. at
36-37.
Although informative, the Graham decision does not provide a road map
for the SCPA. The first two inquiries under Graham, concerning the prior art,
are probably analogous to those required for measuring originality under the
SCPA. Indeed, the Senate memorandum on the final bill appears to prescribe
a similar approach. See Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note
17, at S12,917. But the third factual inquiry, concerning the level of ordinary
skill in the art, has no parallel in the SCPA. Originality under SCPA
§ 902(b)(2) clearly does not require ability beyond ordinary skill in the art.
Here, Graham is uninformative.
The House Report invites the federal courts to develop a new substantive
law in the field: "[Tihe courts should have sufficient flexibility to develop a
new body of law specifically applicable to semiconductor chip infringement lit-
igation." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5775.
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House Report while adding a few additional points. One is that
the background against which the novelty or creativity of a
mask work is to be judged is the prior art existing on the date
of registration.16 Another is that the factors to be considered
in evaluating the work under section 902(b)(2) include whether
the work "reflects effort and original contributions resulting in
a work that, considered as a whole, is not old and staple. 167
The memorandum states that the purpose of section 902(b)(2)
is to protect the mask work owner who has expended substan-
tial toil and investment to reach a result that is more than an
insubstantial variation on the prior art.168 This language, which
echoes much of the testimony in support of the legislation, is
reminiscent of the "misappropriation" doctrine of unfair com-
petition law. According to that doctrine, a right against imita-
tive competition is created by the expenditure of time, money,
and effort, for it is inequitable to let one person "reap" where
another has "sown. '' 169 The doctrine may be regarded as em-
phasizing the "investive step" rather than the "inventive step."
2. Functionally Dictated Form
As previously discussed, 170 if the function of a chip dictates
the layout, the resulting similarity may not be actionable as in-
fringement. It may be said, alternatively, that the mask work is
not protectable under the SCPA insofar as function dictated
166. The Senate memorandum on the final bill states that "the evaluation
of whether the design is staple, or merely an insubstantial variation on what is
staple, should be made in the light of the prior [art] existing at the time of
registration." Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 17, at
S12,917. The same section of the memorandum also states that in a case in-
volving infringement of mask work rights, the court would have to decide
whether the allegedly infringed work is just an insubstantial variation of
"prior work in the field as it stood on the date of registration." Idc The memo-
randum further states that the purpose of SCPA § 902(b)(2) is to "weed out
mere insubstantial or trivial variations on prior mask works," and that the
SCPA allows protection of mask works "which contain more than insubstan-
tial variations on the prior mask work art." Id The date of registration is the
date on which an application in proper form is "received in the Copyright Of-
fice." 17 U.S.C. § 908(e) (Supp. II 1984).
167. Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 17, at S12,917.
168. I&
169. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-41
(1918) (newsgathering corporation's expenditures of money, skill and effort in
collecting certain news items gave it a property interest in those items, which
could not lawfully be appropriated by another news agency). A similar princi-
ple underlies the reverse engineering defense set forth at 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(2)
(Supp. II 1984). See infra text accompanying notes 208-210.
170. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
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the layout or that the registration is to that extent invalid.' 71
Accordingly, defendants may plead and prove this issue as part
of their case as to invalidity, rather than raise the issue only de-
fensively or negatively in opposition to the plaintiffs proof of
actionable or substantial similarity.
172
3. Evidence of Invalidity
Documentary evidence of prior art is of some help in ascer-
taining what is staple, familiar, or commonplace. Expert testi-
mony, however, is the sine qua non. It is impossible for a fact
finder, unaided by expert testimony, to sort the wheat from the
chaff, or even to recognize subtle differences. 173
In a mask work infringement action, a plaintiff's expert
would probably stress the economic success of the chip, note
how it met real economic needs of the computer industry or
other target market, and suggest that the new combination of
old elements in the plaintiff's chip was responsible for these re-
sults. The plaintiff's expert would perhaps also argue that if
these elements were all old staples combined in an unoriginal
way, the defendant or someone else would have combined them
himself, instead of waiting for the plaintiff to do it and then
copying the plaintiff's chip.
The defendant's expert would probably stress the staple
quality of each of the elements, perhaps suggesting that such
circuitry has been around so long that no one can any longer
combine the elements in an original way. The defendant's ex-
pert would try to dissect the mask work into its elements and
identify their presence in earlier mask works. To rebut such a
showing, the plaintiff's expert would have to assert that the
plaintiff's chip is more than just the sum of its individual parts
and cite the statutory admonition to consider the mask work as
a whole.174
171. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 16 (discussing copyright cases in
which functionally dictated similarity was not infringing either because func-
tionally dictated similarity is not deemed "substantial similarity" or because
the expressions are not copyrightable).
172. It may be tactically advantageous to defendants to take both opportu-
nities to raise or argue the issue.
173. As the Senate Report notes, "'even very subtle mask changes may
represent significantly different and original designs."' SENATE REPORT,
supra note 8, at 18 (quoting an expert on chip technology).
174. See 17 U.S.C. § 902(b)(2) (Supp. II 1984).
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B. UNTIMELY REGISTRATION
Section 908(a) of the SCPA requires that a mask work be
registered within two years of its first commercial exploitation
or the owner will forfeit its rights.175 Obviously, if a date of
first commercial exploitation more than two years before the
date of application is stated on the application form, the Copy-
right Office will deny registration. This is unlikely to happen,
however. Moreover, section 908(h) places on the defendant the
burden of showing the error of the date stated in the registra-
tion certificate.176 Thus, the defendant presumably must plead
and prove invalidity based on section 908(a).
C. BURDEN OF PROOF
Invalidity of the mask work registration and plaintiff's re-
gistration certificate are defenses to an action for infringement
of mask work rights, 77 just as invalidity of a patent or copy-
right would be a defense in a patent infringement or copyright
infringement case. The defendant, the alleged infringer, must
prove invalidity, since the plaintiff, the mask work owner, will
always put its registration certificate into evidence at an early
stage in order to rely on its prima facie evidentiary effect under
section 908(f). 1 8 The prima facie evidence created by the cer-
tificate is that every matter stated in the certificate, such as
ownership and relevant dates, is true and that the registrant
has satisfied the requirements of the statute and regulations,
such as eligible citizenship or domicile, standing to apply, and
payment of the requisite fee.179
Several important elements of the validity of a mask work
registration are requirements of the statute. One such require-
ment is ownership,8 0 which is expressly stated in the applica-
tion and thus in the certificate. Other such requirements are
originality and sufficient creativity.' 8 ' Section 908(f) appears to
175. Id- § 908(a).
176. IcL § 908(h).
177. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 19 n.38, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5768 n.38; Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 17,
at S12,917-18.
178. See 17 U.S.C. § 908(f) (Supp. II 1984). It is probably best for the plain-
tiff to annex a photocopy of the certificate to the complaint as an exhibit.
179. See id.
180. See id- § 908(a).
181. See id § 902(b). Space 8 on Form MVW requires the applicant to state
the nature of his "new, original contribution in this mask work for which stat-
utory protection is sought ... ." The instructions on the back of Form MW
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make the certificate prima facie evidence as to all of these mat-
ters. 8 2 Therefore, the certificate appears to create a rebuttable
presumption as to all of the important aspects of validity.
To overcome this prima facie evidence or to rebut these
presumptions, the defendant must put in enough evidence to
shift the burden of persuasion back to the plaintiff. Only in the
Senate floor memorandum on the final bill is there any discus-
sion in the legislative history of whether the standard for re-
butting these presumptions is a scintilla of evidence, a
preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence,
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, or some other standard:1 a
The floor memorandum explains that, on the one hand, mere
allegations of invalidity on grounds of lack of creativity or
otherwise, without allegations of facts to support them, are not
enough to overcome the effect of the registration certificate.'L 4
Allegations of fact without any documentary or testimonial evi-
dence to support them would also be insufficient, as would be
allegations of fact based "on information and belief.' u85 Hear-
say and noncredible evidence, or even evidence implausible to
the fact finder, are also inadequate. 86
On the other hand, to expect the defendant to produce evi-
dence beyond a reasonable doubt is clearly asking too much in
a civil case. The clear and convincing evidence that some pat-
ent decisions 8 7 have required to overcome the presumption of
validity is also too much. As the floor memorandum explains,
direct the applicant to provide "a brief, general statement that describes the
new protectible [sic] contribution that is the basis of the claim."
182. Section 908(f) provides:
In any action for infringement under this chapter, the certificate
of registration of a mask work shall constitute prima facie evidence
(1) of the facts stated in the certificate, and (2) that the applicant is-
sued the certficate has met the requirements of this chapter, and the
regulations issued under this chapter, with respect to the registration
of claims.
17 U.S.C. § 908(f) (Supp. II 1984) (emphasis added).
183. See Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 17, at
S12,918.
184. See id.
185. See id. Where, however, the mask work owner is clearly in control of
all the evidence on the matter, allegations of fact on information and belief
should be enough to justify discovery against the mask work owner. If discov-
ery turned up nothing, however, the matter would have to be dropped.
186. See id. (rebuttable presumption of validity "may only be overcome by
probative, plausible evidence").
187. See, e.g., In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985); American
Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 95 (1984).
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patents are issued "on inventions after an examination of their
novelty, unobviousness, and compliance with other substantive
requirements; the examination is carried out by persons sup-
posed to be of skill in the relevant field of technology, so that
the decision to issue a patent reflects a considered and expert
judgment on the merits."'8 In contrast, mask work registra-
tion certificates, like copyright registration certificates, issue af-
ter an examination of only the face of the application form
(which becomes the registration certificate) and the material
accompanying the application.18 9 The Copyright Office, more-
over, lacks expertise in semiconductor technology and cannot
deliver a considered judgment on whether a chip design is origi-
nal within the meaning of section 902(b)(2). 190 Thus, as the
House Report observes, section 902(b) does not mandate an ex-
amination system for chips like that provided for patent appli-
cations.191 Instead, the Copyright Office issues the registration
certificate if the application appears to be in order and then,
"[i]n the event of mask work infringement litigation, failure to
satisfy the requirements of [section] 902(b) would be a
defense."'192
In the rare case where the evidence is exactly balanced on
both sides, or where the plaintiff rests on its certificate and the
defendant offers no evidence, the certificate should be enough
to support a finding that the registration is valid.' 93 If nothing
else, such a finding rests on the presumption of regularity and
correctness of an agency's administrative action.194 Moreover,
on an application for a preliminary injunction or for similar re-
lief, where the court does not have the opportunity to examine
the issues as thoroughly as at trial, it would be proper to give
some weight to the certificate. In these situations, giving the
188. Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supr note 17, at S12,918.
189. See i& The Copyright Office will possibly consider other facts of
which it is aware. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 25, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5774 ("If the application, identifying materials, and any
other information supplied by the applicant or otherwise known to the exam-
iner support the conclusion that the claim is facially in compliance with the
statute and regulations, a certificate of registration issues.") (emphasis added).
190. See supra notes 152-169 and accompanying text.
191. HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 19 n.38, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs at 5768 n.38.
192. I&
193. Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 17, at S12,918.
194. I Of course, it must also be recognized that the Copyright Office's
action is presumed regular and correct under the circumstances in which it op-
erates, which here include accepting the applicant's factual assertions at face
value.
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mask work registrant the benefit of the doubt furthers the stat-
utory purpose of promoting security of investment in develop-
ment of new chip technology and thereby encourages
semiconductor innovation. 195
For these reasons, in determining validity of mask work re-
gistrations, the courts should assign the burden of proof as fol-
lows: The court should find that the mask work is protected
under the SCPA if the only evidence is the registration certifi-
cate, the validity of which will be assumed.19 The alleged in-
fringer should prevail if it offers credible, probative evidence
showing that the mask work registration was invalid in some
way and the mask work owner offers no further evidence. If
the mask work owner and the alleged infringer both adduce ac-
tual evidence, then the validity issue should be decided on the
basis of the actual testimonial and documentary evidence
before the court. The standard should be the ordinary civil
standard of a preponderance of the evidence. 197 Where the evi-
dence is nearly in equipoise, and in preliminary injunction
hearings, however, a court should give some weight to the re-
gistration certificate to further the statutory purpose of encour-
aging and promoting security of investment in semiconductor
chip innovation.198
II. REVERSE ENGINEERING
Reverse engineering is probably the most important de-
fense in mask work infringement cases. Often, it will be the
only possible defense, and certainly, some kind of reverse engi-
neering argument is generally available. If the reverse engi-
neering defense is established, the defendant is completely
immunized from liability for infringement of mask work
rights.1 As an affirmative defense,2°° reverse engineering is
part of the defendant's case at trial, unless, of course, the po-
tential defendant becomes the plaintiff by bringing a declara-
195. Clearly, these were the predominant concerns of Congress in enacting
the SCPA. See HouSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1-4, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEWS at 5750-53; SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 4-6.
196. See Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 17, at
S12,917.
197. See id at S12,917-18.
198. See id
199. 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. II 1984).
200. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 23, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEWS at 5772.
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tory judgment action against the mask work owner for a
declaration of noninfringement.
A. INDUSTRY CONCEPT OF REVERSE ENGINEERING
What the semiconductor industry calls "reverse engineer-
ing" reflects the highly competitive customs of the industry and
its traditional emphasis on competition in the form of contin-
ued technological improvement.20' Semiconductor chip manu-
facturers often make themselves "second sources" for products
that another chip manufacturer has pioneered, with or without
the pioneer's consent. However, the second firm does not sim-
ply duplicate the first chip without improving or reworking it.
Typically, the second manufacturer may attempt to improve
the signal/noise ratio and thermal stability, to decrease chip
size, and to decrease the number of masks and wafer
fabrication steps.
Extensive testimony before both houses explained the in-
dustry concept of reverse engineering, including the aspects im-
portant enough to recognize and preserve in the SCPA.
Semiconductor industry representatives testified that it is an
established industry practice to make photographs of one an-
other's chips in order to analyze them and design similar chips.
The new chips are then sold in competition against the earlier
chips.20 2 Because the second chip has the same electrical and
physical characteristics as the first chip, the two chips are fun-
gible in the marketplace.20 3 This practice creates second
sources of supply for chips and is considered fair competition
because the industry considers this conduct on the right side of
the line between chip piracy and legitimate reverse
engineering.
The right side of the line is that where the second chip
manufacturer's photography and reproduction of the mask
work is for the purpose of study and analysis, rather than sim-
ply for appropriation of the first chip manufacturer's labor and
expense in creating and laying out the first chip. In both situa-
tions, the two chips are "substantially similar" in the copyright
law sense. In the case of reverse engineering, however, there
201. See i&i at 2-3, 21-22, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5751-52,
5770-71; SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 4-6, 21.
202. HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 22, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs at 5771.
203. This is known as "form, fit, and function compatibility." Id at 21, 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5771. For a discussion of form, fit, and func-
tion compatibility, see R. STERN, supra note 5, § 1.2[B].
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has been "substantial analysis and study, '20 4 defined as toil and
expense by the second firm. In the case of chip piracy, the sec-
ond chip is "the mere result of plagiarism accomplished with-
out such study or analysis. '205 The distinction between a
semiconductor chip company that invests its own substantial la-
bor and expenditures in developing the second chip, and a com-
pany that cuts corners and avoids the expense of independent
chip layout work is critically important. One witness testifying
before the Committee noted that a legitimate job of reverse en-
gineering leaves "a very big paper trail" made up of computer
simulations, time records, and other compilations.2°6 Another
difference between piracy and reverse engineering is that the
work recorded by the paper trail almost inevitably leads to a
second semiconductor chip product layout that is not substan-
tially identical to the first, unless the second comer's engineer-
ing efforts are completely ineffective.
The industry concept of reverse engineering is to some ex-
tent similar to the copyright law's concepts of "fair use" or of
copying "idea" rather than "expression. '20 7 But "fair use" and
"idea/expression" are concepts that apply better to books and
similar traditional subjects of copyright; they translate very im-
perfectly to semiconductor chips and other industrial property.
When the Senate Report states, in explaining the difference be-
tween reverse engineering and chip piracy, that "the bill is di-
rected at the appropriation of substantial parts of the drawings
embodied in the masks and chips, when that is done to take
free advantage of the first comer's great costs in developing the
layout of the chip,"208 it far more accurately captures the mis-
appropriation-like flavor 2°9 of the semiconductor industry's
concept of reverse engineering than do the "fair use" or "idea-
expression" analogies.2 10
204. See HouSE REPORT, supm note 8, at 22, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5770.
205. Id
206. 1983 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 36 (statement of F. Thomas
Dunlap, Jr., Corporate Counsel and Secretary, Intel Corp.).
207. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 22, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5771.
208. SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 21.
209. Cf. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236-37
(1918) (newsgathering corporation's expenditures of time, skill and effort in
collecting certain news items gave it a property interest in those items, which
could not lawfully be appropriated by another news agency).
210. Probably the most concise explanation of the SCPA's concept of re-
verse engineering is found in the House Report:
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B. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
As originally introduced, the Senate and House bills had no
reverse engineering provisions.211 Congress perhaps over-confi-
dently assured the industry that the "fair use" exemption
found in the Copyright Act2 ' 2 would fully protect the industry
practice of reverse engineering.2 13 A number of witnesses ex-
pressed concern, however, that the courts would not interpret
the Act and the fair use doctrine in accordance with this assur-
ance.214 At the same time, the publishers' association strongly
protested that bringing reverse engineering under the fair use
doctrine would lead to a general and undue expansion of the
fair use doctrine and thus an erosion of the rights of book pub-
lishers and other owners of traditional copyrights.215 No one
opposed continuing the semiconductor industry's established
practice of reverse engineering; the only question was whether
it was sufficient to rely on the legislative history or whether an
express statutory guarantee of the reverse engineering privi-
lege was necessary. The latter view prevailed, and express re-
It is the intent of the Committee to permit, under the reverse en-
gineering limitation [on the exclusive rights of the owner of a mask
work], the "unauthorized" creation of a second mask work whose lay-
out, in substantial part, is similar to the layout of the protected mask
work-if the second mask work was the product of substantial study
and analysis, and not the mere result of plagiarism accomplished
without such study or analysis.
HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 22, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
5771.
211. See S. 1201, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S5992-93 (daily ed.
May 4, 1983); H.R. 1028, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H643-44 (daily
ed. Feb. 24, 1983).
212. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
213. See 129 CONG. REC. H645 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1983) (statement of Rep.
Edwards upon his introduction of H.R. 1028).
214. See The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1983: Hearing on S.
1201 Before the Subcomm. on Patent Copyrights & Trademarks of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 100-01, 102, 103, 114-15 (1983)
(statements of A.G.W. Biddle, President, Computer and Communications ,In-
dustry Association; Ronald Palenski, Associate General Counsel, Association
of Data Processing Service Organizations; Jon Baumgarten, Copyright Coun-
sel, Association of American Publishers, Inc., accompanied by Carol Risher,
Director of Copyright and New Technology, Association of American Publish-
ers, Inc.; and Robert C. Hinckley, General Counsel, NEC Electronics U.S.A.
Inc.) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Senate Hearings]; SENATE REPORT, supra note
8, at 22.
215. See 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 214, at 102-06 (statement and
prepared statement of Jon Baumgarten, Copyright Counsel, Association of
American Publishers, Inc., accompanied by Carol Risher, Director of Copy-
right and New Technology, Association of American Publishers, Inc.); SENATE
REPORT, supra note 8, at 22.
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verse engineering provisions soon appeared in the Senate 216 and
then the House bills.217 The provisions failed to satisfy every-
one, however, and were rewritten repeatedly until the eve of
passage of the SCPA.21 8
The main purpose of the revisions was to make it explicit
that legitimate reverse engineering could properly lead to man-
ufacture and sale of some types of competitive chips.2 1 9 Some
very late legislative history explaining these changes confirmed
that section 906(a) permits a semiconductor chip product result-
ing from reverse engineering to be substantially similar to the
pioneer mask work, but not to be substantially identical as, for
example, a virtual photocopy would be.220 In the course of so
providing, Congress further required that the product of re-
verse engineering itself must be "an original mask work" if it is
to escape liability. 221 This last addition is nowhere explained in
the legislative history, and the final language of section 906(a)
216. See S. 1201, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5, 130 CONG. REC. S5838 (daily ed.
May 16, 1984); SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 21 ("To respond to these con-
cerns, the version [of S. 1201] reported by the Subcommittee and the Commit-
tee includes an express provision [section 5] guaranteeing the right to use a
chip or mask for reverse engineering purposes. This right is not termed a
form of 'fair use,' but is simply described in S. 1201 without reference to 'fair
use.' ").
217. See H.R. 5525, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 906(a), 130 CONG. REC. H5489
(daily ed. June 11, 1984).
218. When S. 1201 and H.R. 5525 were merged into the SCPA, the two pro-
visions were already so similar that neither can be said to have prevailed. See
130 CONG. REC. E4432-33 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (Explanatory Memorandum
of the Senate Amendment to H.R. 6163, Title III, as considered by the House
of Representatives) [hereinafter cited as Kastenmeier Explanatory Memoran-
dum]; Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 17, at S12,917.
As enacted, § 906(a) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 905 [concerning the ex-
clusive rights of a mask work owner], it is not an infringement of the
exclusive rights of the owner of a mask work for-
(1) a person to reproduce the mask work solely for the purpose of
teaching, analyzing, or evaluating the concepts or techniques embod-
ied in the mask work or the circuitry, logic flow, or organization of
components used in the mask work; or
(2) a person who performs the analysis or evaluation described in
paragraph (1) to incorporate the results of such conduct in an original
mask work which is made to be distributed.
17 U.S.C. § 906(a) (Supp. II 1984).
219. See Kastenmeier Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 218, at E4432-
33; Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 17, at S12,917.
220. See Kastenmeier Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 218, at E4433;
Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 17, at S12,917.
221. See 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(2) (Supp. II 1984).
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about "original mask work" appears in none of the earlier pub-
lished versions of the bill.
The unofficial legislative history of section 906(a) sheds
some light on this otherwise mysterious provision. An unoffi-
cial, revised draft of the chip bill that was circulated for com-
ment and suggestion in July and August of 1984 provided a
version of § 906(a)(2) that immunized from infringement liabil-
ity the conduct of a person who reproduced the work "in a sub-
stantially similar, but not substantially identical, mask work
embodied in a semiconductor chip product that the person dis-
tributes.1222 This provision reflected an effort by various indus-
try representatives to clarify and emphasize the difference
between reverse engineering a semiconductor chip product
under the SCPA and fair use of a book under copyright law.
The language "in a substantially similar, but not substantially
identical, mask work" troubled many of those involved, how-
ever, because it seemed too complex for statutory language. A
less complicated substitute was suggested: "in an original mask
work prepared to be commercially exploited." 223 The substi-
tute was combined with the original language to produce the fi-
nal version of section 906(a)(2) of the SCPA. The concept of
permitting the second semiconductor chip product to be "sub-
stantially similar" but not "substantially identical" to the first
semiconductor chip product was moved from the statute to the
legislative history,224 and without any detailed explanation, the
requirement of an "original mask work" came into the
statute.225
222. Draft Bill § 906(a)(2) (SIA-AAP 1984) (personal papers of Richard H.
Stern, copy on file in the office of the Minnesota Law Review).
223. Letter to Representative Kastenmeier (Aug. 7, 1984) (author's name
withheld) (personal papers of Richard H. Stern, copy on file in the office of
the Minnesota Law Review).
224. See Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 17, at
S12,917 ("If the resulting semiconductor chip product is not substantially iden-
tical to the original, and its design involved significant toil and investment so
that it is not a mere plagiarism, it does not infringe the original chip, even if
the layout of the two chips is, in substantial part, similar.").
225. The Explanatory Memorandum of the Mathias-Leahy Amendment to
S. 1201 says only this regarding the inclusion of the original mask work re-
quirement: "The end product of the reverse engineering process is not an in-
fringement, and itself qualifies for protection under the Act, if it is an original
mask work, as contrasted with a substantial copy." Id. See also Kastenmeier
Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 218, at E4433 (identical language).
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C. REVERSE ENGINEERING UNDER THE SCPA
As enacted, section 906(a) of the SCPA permits competi-
tors of a mask work owner to reproduce the mask work for re-
verse engineering purposes notwithstanding section 905(1)'s
exclusive reproduction right. The first step of the reproduction
is to photograph the layout of the original chip. An enlarge-
ment of the photograph may be used to prepare a composite
drawing, so that both the photograph and the drawing are sub-
stantially similar to the mask work owner's work, and thus, but
for section 906(a), mask work infringements. The same picto-
rial material may be digitized and stored in a tape, which is a
further reproduction of the mask work. Nonetheless, this is
permissible if part of legitimate reverse engineering.
The competitor then analyzes the foregoing material and
the semiconductor chip itself. The competitor will ascertain the
circuit schematic and the logic flow within the chip, determin-
ing the physical and electrical specifications of the chip. Even-
tually, the competitor will combine the results of these reverse
engineering efforts with its own engineers' engineering efforts
to yield a new, and possibly improved, version of the chip.226
The second chip may not be substantially similar to the
original one. In that unlikely event, its manufacture would not
violate the reproduction right under section 905(1),22 and its
sale would not violate the distribution right under section
905(2),228 even if there were no reverse engineering privilege.229
More likely, the second chip will be one "whose layout, in sub-
stantial part, is similar to the layout of the protected mask
work .... ,,230 The two semiconductor chip products and the
two underlying mask works will be substantially similar. Were
it not for section 906(a), manufacture of the chip would be a vi-
olation of the reproduction right and its sale a violation of the
distribution right.231 There will be no such liability, however, if
the second chip is "the product of substantial study and analy-
226. Such improvements may include shrinking the size of the silicon chip,
using fewer fabrication steps, and improving stability.
227. See 17 U.S.C. § 905(1) (Supp. II 1984).
228. See ic. § 905(2).
229. The photography would violate SCPA § 905(1), if performed within
the United States, were it not for SCPA § 906(a)(1). See id §§ 905(1),
906(a)(1).
230. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 22, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 5771.
231. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 905(1)-(2), 906(a) (Supp. II 1984).
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sis,"23 2 is not substantially identical to the first,23s and embodies
an original mask work.234
A spectrum of similarity is relevant, therefore, for semi-
conductor chip products in reverse engineering situations. It
runs as follows: total identity, substantial identity, substantial
similarity, insubstantial similarity, no similarity.23s The first
two parts of the spectrum are always actionable; that is, the
plaintiff always prevails when the two chips are identical or
substantially identical. The last two parts of the spectrum are
never actionable in this context; that is, the defendant always
prevails if the two chips are not even substantially similar.
When the two chips are substantially similar, but not substan-
tially identical, however, reverse engineering can be a valid de-
fense; the plaintiff prevails unless the defendant proves reverse
engineering, or some other defense. 236
There are three separate criteria that the defendant must
satisfy to establish the reverse engineering defense. The first
two are more or less objective, focusing on how much money,
toil, effort, and study the defendant expended as evidenced by
his documentary evidence and on whether the two semiconduc-
tor chip products are substantially identical. The third condi-
tion is more qualitative and subjective, asking whether the
result of the defendant's investment, toil, effort, and study re-
sulted in a work that is sufficiently different from the plain-
tiff's to be "an original mask work."
The word "original" is not defined in the SCPA. Moreover,
the Act uses it three times-in sections 902(b)(1), 902(b)(2), and
906(a)(2)-each time in a slightly different context and
232. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 22, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 5771.
233. Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 17, at S12,917.
The memorandum is quoted in relevant part supra note 224.
234. See 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(2) (Supp. II 1984).
235. The legislative history of SCPA § 906(a)(2) expressly recognizes these
distinctions, explaining that the reverse engineering defense applies only in
the case of a substantially similar, but "not substantially identical," mask
work. See Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 17, at
S12,917. It should be understood that in this context, the term "substantial
similarity" is used to mean similarity without identity. In other contexts,
"substantial similarity" is used in a sense including identity as well as similar-
ity. Thus, for purposes of copyright law a photocopy of a document which is
virtually identical to the original is "substantially similar" to the original docu-
ment and therefore may be a copyright infringement. Id
236. See i&
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sense.237 The House sui generis bill, H.R. 5525, defined "origi-
nal" as independent creation by an author who did not copy the
work from another source.238 The definition was deleted, with-
out explanation, from the final bill.2 9 The deleted definition
appears to correspond to the meaning of "original" as it is used
in section 902(b)(1), although even there the word possibly im-
plies some novelty or being first in time.2 40 In section 902(b)(2),
protection is barred for semiconductor designs that are merely
variations of staple designs, "combined in a way that, consid-
ered as a whole; is not original."24' 1 In that context, "original"
appears to have a connotation of novelty, over and above in-
dependent creation without copying.242 In section 906(a)(2),
the reverse engineering privilege is limited to "an original
mask work" that incorporates the results of analysis and evalu-
ation of the earlier mask work.2 4 3 In that context, "original"
clearly does not mean independent creation without copying,
for the context of reverse engineering presupposes nonindepen-
237. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 902(b)(1), 902(b)(2), 906(a)(2) (Supp. II 1984). For the
text of section 902(b), see supra note 149. Section 906(a) provides:
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 905 [specifying the
exclusive rights in mask works], it is not an infringement of the ex-
clusive rights of the owner of a mask work for-
(1) a person to reproduce the mask work solely for the purpose
of teaching, analyzing, or evaluating the concepts or techniques em-
bodied in the mask work or the circuitry, logic flow, or organization of
components used in the mask work; or
(2) a person who performs the analysis or evaluation described
in paragraph (1) to incorporate the results of such conduct in an origi-
nal mask work which is made to be distributed.
Id. § 906(a) (emphasis added).
238. H.R. 5525, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 901(4), 130 CONG. REC. H5489 (daily
ed. June 11, 1984). As the House Report points out, independent creation
without copying from another source is essentially the copyright law concept
of "original." See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 17, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5766.
239. The definition may have been omitted as surplusage, or as inconsistent
with other parts of the SCPA.
240. See 17 U.S.C. § 902(b)(1) (Supp. II 1984). For the text of § 902(b)(1),
see supra note 149.
241. 17 U.S.C. § 902(b)(2) (Supp. II 1984) (emphasis added). For the full
text of § 902(b)(2), see supra note 149.
242. The section of the Senate floor memorandum captioned "Originality,"
states that whether a new mask work is just an "insubstantial variation of
prior work in the field" is to be determined with regard to the prior art ex-
isting in the field at the time of registration. Mathias-Leahy Explanatory
Memorandum, supra note 17, at S12,917. Thus, the originality requirement ap-
pears to involve novelty over the prior art rather than just independent
creation.
243. See 17 U.S.C. § 906(a) (Supp. II 1984). For the text of § 906(a), see
supra note 237.
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dent creation and some amount of copying, at least in the copy-
right sense of "copying." "Original mask work" must mean
something else in section 906(a)(2). Undoubtedly, it means be-
ing different in some amount from the earlier work on which
the reverse engineered work is based.
To be sure, "originality" in this sense is not necessarily the
same as the "novelty" or "creativity" required by section
902(b)(2). The two concepts are different. Novelty under sec-
tion 902(b)(2) entails a combination of the old in a way that,
considered as a whole, is original. Section 906(a)(2) does not, by
its terms, require a reverse engineered semiconductor chip
product to meet the full novelty standards of section 902(b)(2),
but it does require something more than failing to be substan-
tially identical to or a mere copy of the earlier semiconductor
chip product. Unfortunately, the required degree of novelty or
creativity is left unclear by the mysterious legislative history of
section 906(a)(2).2A
Probably the best analogy is suggested by the Second Cir-
cuit's rule relating to copyrights of derivative works. In several
cases involving products based on prior works, which were
either in the public domain24 5 or created by a licensor of both
parties,m the Second Circuit held that such derivative works
could support a new copyright only if the new work was differ-
ent in some nontrivial respect from the work that came
before.M7 Section 906(a)(2) appears to impose the same rule on
reverse engineered mask works, but in the context of avoiding
infringement liability rather than that of gaining copyright pro-
tection. Thus, for a semiconductor chip product developed by
244. For a discussion of the legislative history of § 906(a)(2), see supra
notes 211-225 and accompanying text.
245. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.), cerL
denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
246. See, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.
1980).
247. See id. at 909-11; L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976). Snyder involved the copyrightability of
a toy bank based on 19th century banks. The derivative work was found to
differ too trivially from the prior work to sustain a copyright. The court said
that "there must be at least some substantial variation, not merely a trivial va-
riation such as might occur in the translation to a different medium," such as
from cast iron to plastic. Id. Durham involved the copyrightability of toys
based on Walt Disney cartoon characters. Since both parties were Disney
licensees, the toy-copyright owner was entitled to copyright protection only for
its additions to the Disney works. The court held that the additions were too
trivial and insubstantial to sustain a second copyright. Durham Indus., Inc. v.
Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 911 (2d Cir. 1980).
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reverse engineering to escape liability, it must, in effect, qualify
as what the Second Circuit would consider to be a legitimate
derivative work under copyright law.
248
This is an unusual infringement test for intellectual prop-
erty law. Having any merit or qualifying for any kind of intel-
lectual property protection is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition to avoid infringement liability in patent or
copyright law. An improvement patent is likely to infringe any
"dominant" patent to which it is "subservient," and a derivative
work copyright often cannot be exploited without infringing
the work from which it is derived. Section 906(a)(2) takes the
unusual step of making this particular kind of derivative work,
a reverse engineered mask work, free of subservience to the
earlier work. The later mask work is wholly immune from lia-
bility for infringement of mask work rights if it is the result of
reverse engineering. It is doubtless the unusual nature of this
rule that led to section 906(a)'s requirement that an otherwise
infringing chip must have some merit before it is excused from
liability for infringement. The requisite merit, however, is only
a small quantum of originality-not necessarily even enough to
satisfy section 902(b)(2).
D. APPLICATION OF THE REVERSE ENGINEERING DEFENSE
The legislative history of section 906(a) asserts that it will
rarely be difficult to distinguish between piracy and legitimate
reverse engineering, because most actual fact situations will
tend to fall into one of these two polar categories rather than
into the "gray area" between the poles.2 4 9 The Senate Report
summarizes testimony on this matter in terms of two factors.
First, it is uneconomical for a pirate to copy only part of a chip
and then spend its own money to design the rest; a strategy of
wholesale appropriation is more sensible from the pirate's
standpoint.25° Second, because the parts of a chip tend to be
highly integrated, copying a part of a chip and combining it
with something else is likely to result in a product that does not
function properly.25 ' Accordingly, there will be few cases occu-
pying the gray area between clear copying and clearly legiti-
248. This does not necessarily mean that the second mask work would
qualify for registration under SCPA § 902(b), for that is not what § 906(a)(2)
requires. See supra text accompanying note 244.
249. SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 22.
250. I- at 21.
251. I& at 22.
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mate reverse engineering.2s2
Of course, clear cut fact situations are not litigated as fre-
quently as close cases. Still, whatever uncertainty is left should
be resolved, the Senate Report states, by use of proper docu-
mentary evidence at trial.253 This documentary evidence is the
"paper trail" that legitimate reverse engineering leaves behind,
but piracy does not.2 The House Report concurred with the
Senate as to the "evidentiary importance of the 'paper trail' of
legitimate reverse engineering that helps distinguish it from
mere piracy."255
The "paper trail" is not the only evidence to be considered
on reverse engineering. Testimonial evidence from expert wit-
252. The Senate Report concludes: "Hence, cases will rarely arise that are
in a gray zone between clear copying and clearly legitimate reverse engineer-
ing, since most actual fact situations in this field are either at one end or the
other of the spectrum." Id. Not all observers agree, however, that most actual
fact situations will be at one extreme or the other. For example, one commen-
tator has asserted that disagreements will occur over whether it is illegal chip
piracy or legitimate reverse engineering to use the original "floor plan" of a
chip and then to do one or more of the following: modify the layout within a
block or subcircuit, substitute a different block or subcircuit, or reformat all
subcircuits in accordance with a different process technology. See Petraske,
Comments on the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 4 COMPUTER L.
REP. 828, 830 (1985).
253. SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 22.
254. The "paper trail" of reverse engineering was described by Leslie L.
Vadasz, Senior Vice President, Intel Corp., in a letter made part of the record
of the 1983 Senate Hearings on S. 1201, which the Senate adopted "as a guide
to its intent:"
"Whenever there is a true case of reverse engineering, the second
firm will have prepared a great deal of paper-logic and circuit dia-
grams, trial layouts, computer simulations of the chip, and the like; it
will also have invested thousands of hours of work. All of these can
be documented by reference to the firm's ordinary business records.
A pirate has no such papers, for the pirate does none of this work.
Therefore, whether there has been a true reverse engineering job or
just a job of copying can be shown by looking at the defendant's
records. The paper trail of a chip tells a discerning observer whether
the chip is a copy or embodies the effort of reverse engineering. I
would hope that a court deciding a lawsuit for copyright infringement
under this Act would consider evidence of this type as it is extremely
probative of whether the defendant's intent is to copy or to reverse
engineer."
SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 22 (quoting 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note
214, at 146 (letter of Leslie L. Vadasz, Senior Vice President, Intel Corp.))
(footnote omitted). The same letter was also made part of the record of the
1983 House Hearings on H.R. 1028. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 8, at
36-37 (letter of Leslie L. Vadasz, Senior Vice President, Intel Corp.).
255. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 21 & n.42, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 5770 & n.42.
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nesses is also important.258 Such testimony would help explain
the significance of the paper trail or that of its absence. Expert
testimony would also cover the importance or lack of impor-
tance of the obvious or subtle changes that the defendant made
in its version of the mask work.257
E. BURDEN OF PROOF
Since reverse engineering is an affirmative defense,2-5 the
burden of proof is on the accused infringer. Unless the defend-
ant persuades the fact finder that the defendant's competitive
replication of the chip is immunized under the reverse engi-
neering exemption, the plaintiff's prima facie case of infringe-
ment will stand unrebutted.259 No one item of documentary
evidence is necessarily decisive, but in the aggregate, the evi-
dence may paint a very persuasive picture.260
In defending against a charge of piracy involving at least
superficially similar products and where the circuitry did not
compel any particular design choice, the defendant may try to
256. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 18.
257. See id (quoting 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 214, at 145-46 (letter
from Leslie L. Vadasz, Senior Vice President, Intel Corp.)).
258. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 23, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5772.
259. Some of the objective, documentary evidence that a fact finder might
consider in a reverse engineering case includes the relative development costs
of the two semiconductor chip products, the person-hour figures, and the
elapsed time from start to finish. A great disparity would suggest misappropri-
ation. Additionally, a fact finder might consider whether the defendant's
records show substantial expenditures for analysis, testing, computer simula-
tions of the functioning of the chip, and other indicia that the defendant inde-
pendently exercised its judgment in determining the design it used; whether
there are common mistakes, unnecessary elements, and arbitrary design
choices; whether there is the same "fix" to correct a prior error;, and whether
the second chip contains substantial design enhancements.
260. A well-publicized case of this sort occurred with the 8086 microproces-
sor. At a very late stage of the development of the product, its designers de-
cided that they had to change several 1's in the microcode of the ROM to O's.
To remove these transistors entirely would have meant redoing several masks,
with the attendant opportunity to make mistakes. Therefore, the decision was
made simply to remove the interconnections that "wired" these I's into the
circuit, so that the "floating," unconnected transistors would, in effect, become
O's. This meant changing only one mask-that for making the holes in an up-
per insulating layer to permit aluminum to pass through them to make the in-
terconnections. When another company then copied the 8086, it copied the
several nonfunctional transistors along with the functional ones. See Morgan,
High Tech. Leaving Home-Battling to Innovate and Emulate: Intel Versus
Nippon Electric, Washington Post, May 2, 1983, at Al, col. 1, reprinted in 1983
House Hearings, supra note 8, at 375; 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 214, at
164-65.
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convince the court that the market compels "form, fit, and
function compatibility." Moreover, the defendant might argue
that compatibility considerations require that the second chip
include what seem to be flaws or arbitrary design choices in the
original chip. For compatibility purposes "better is worse," be-
cause improvements may interfere with product fungibility,
and a nonfungible second product may be unsalable.261
III. FAIR USE
It is not yet clear whether a defendant may maintain a
"fair use" defense in SCPA cases. The reverse engineering de-
fense 262 started out as a species of fair use, but was given in-
dependent status to underscore its availability as a defense.26 3
It is possible, however, that inclusion of express language on re-
verse engineering was not intended to prevent any judicial de-
velopment of a fair use defense.
The room for such evolution is limited, however, because
the practice of reverse engineering in the semiconductor indus-
try goes far beyond the ordinary concept of "fair use" in copy-
right cases. Business conduct that typically would be
considered reverse engineering in the semiconductor chip in-
dustry would probably not qualify as fair use if copyright law
were applied.264 The courts have developed,265 and the 1976
Copyright Act codified,26 a number of criteria for deciding
whether a use of a copyrighted work is fair or unfair.267 Most
261. For a discussion of "better is worse" from a technological standpoint,
see R. STERN, supra note 5, § 1.2[B].
262. See supra notes 199-261 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 212-217 and accompanying text.
264. Of course, the practice of reverse engineering in the semiconductor in-
dustry evolved during a period when copyright protection was unavailable to
semiconductor chip products and before there was a chip protection statute, so
that copyright law's "fair use" rule had little relevance to industry concerns
and values.
265. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1352
(Ct. Cl. 1973), affd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
266. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
267. Section 107 lists four factors which must be considered in determining
whether a use is a "fair use:"
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
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of the factors tend to weigh heavily against reverse engineering
as a fair use. The reverse engineering use is usually commer-
cial, which, although not decisive, "tends to cut against a fair
use defense, '26 8 or may even raise a presumption that the tak-
ing is an unfair, rather than a fair, use.2 69 The amount taken
from the first chip will often be quite substantial.270 Finally,
the effect on the market for the original chip is likely to be ad-
verse, since the defendant usually seeks to substitute its chip
for the plaintiff's, competing directly with the plaintiff for the
same customers. Accordingly, if SCPA defendants had to sat-
isfy the Copyright Act's fair use standards when a chip had
been reverse engineered, defendants would probably lose most
cases.
Of course, defendants do not have to meet the Copyright
Act's standard, because section 906(a) of the SCPA sets its own
standard regarding fair use of a prior mask work in engineering
a new mask work. The concept of reverse engineering under
section 906(a) is not as limited as copyright law's fair use con-
cept. For example, it does not prohibit commercial competition
by the user, who is free to distribute a substantially similar
semiconductor chip product.2 7 1
It is unclear whether any separate doctrine of fair use ex-
ists under the SCPA, apart from section 906(a)'s express recog-
nition of reverse engineering. For example, suppose that one
company uses an identical reproduction of another company's
mask work in comparative advertising.272 Such a use is proba-
bly a "fair use" or is otherwise privileged, despite the exclusive
268. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626
F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1980).
269. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449
(1984) (if a copy were made for "a commercial or profit-making purpose, such
use would presumptively be unfair").
270. On occasion, however, even taking an entire work has been excused as
fair use. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1353
(Ct. Cl. 1973) (limited photocopying by libraries of copyrighted medical journal
articles held to be fair use), a.ffd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376
(1975). In Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984), entire copyrighted works were videotaped, but the circumstances were
such that the Court concluded that "the fact that the entire work is repro-
duced, see [17 U.S.C.] §107(3), does not have its ordinary effect of militating
against a finding of fair use." Id. at 449-50.
271. See 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(2) (Supp. II 1984).
272. Suppose, for example, a company's advertisement reads: "See how we
shrink the die and accomplish the same function as XYZ, faster and using less
silicon!"
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reproduction right of section 905(1),273 the express allowance of
reverse engineering reproduction in section 906(a), and the fail-
ure of that section to include comparative advertising. Other
examples can perhaps be formulated, although the reverse en-
gineering privilege of section 906(a) is so much broader than
fair use that invocation of the latter doctrine would usually be
futile.27 4
The House Report asserts in a footnote that there is no fair
use doctrine under the SCPA because the provisions of the
Copyright Act do not apply to the SCPA275 However, the fact
that the recently codified fair use rule of the copyright law does
not expressly extend to the subsequently enacted SCPA does
not mean that judicial application of the fair use rule to semi-
conductor chip products is inappropriate. This is particularly so
since fair use had its origins as a judicial rule.2 7 6 Counsel, faced
with a fact situation that could be fair use but which does not
fit under section 906(a), should therefore explore fair use argu-
ments despite the footnote in the House Report. If an area de-
273. See 17 U.S.C. § 905(1) (Supp. II 1984). For the text of SCPA § 905(1),
see supra note 4.
274. Another possible example is suggested by an occurrence at the Janu-
ary 7, 1985, ceremony at the Copyright Office, in which the first mask work
applications for registration were accepted and the congressional sponsors of
the legislation were honored. Several members of Congress held up to press
photographers acetate overlays of masks, and the photographers then photo-
graphed the scene. Theoretically, unless fair use or a similar doctrine applies,
the press photographers violated the mask owner's reproduction right, and the
members of Congress knowingly caused the unlawful reproductions. See 17
U.S.C. § 905(1), (3) (Supp. II 1984). Clearly, this kind of reproduction of a
mask work was not the evil Congress sought to remedy when it passed the
SCPA.
275. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 23 n.45, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5772 n.45 ("The provisions of [the Copyright Act] do not apply to this
Chapter .... and thus there is no right of fair use under the Act.") (emphasis
added). The word "thus" implies a logical connection that does not exist. See
infra note 276 and accompanying text. It should be noted that the House Re-
port discusses a version of section 906(a) different from that finally enacted by
Congress. The comment about fair use may therefore be of limited signifi-
cance. The Senate Report is silent on this issue. See SENATE REPORT, supra
note 8.
276. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1350
(Ct. Cl. 1973), affd by an equally divided Court 420 U.S. 376 (1975). Fair use
is also a judicially created defense to claims of patent or trademark infringe-
ment. See cases cited infira note 277. One cannot therefore conclude with any
certainty that the fair use doctrine does not apply to semiconductor chip prod-
ucts. If the argument were to be made at all, it would be that inclusio unius
est exclusio alterius. That is, it could be argued that when Congress specifi-
cally provided for reverse engineering, and went no further, it intended SCPA
§ 906(a) to be a substitute for any other or more expansive fair use defense.
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velops in which the question is of practical significance, the
courts may well create a semiconductor chip product doctrine
of fair use just as they created fair use doctrines in copyright,
trademark, and patent law.2 77
IV. FIRST SALE AND EXHAUSTION OF RIGHTS
The "first sale" doctrine,278 or "exhaustion doctrine"' 9 as
277. As indicated in such decisions as Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd by an equally divided Cour 420 U.S.
376 (1975), fair use was a judicially created doctrine in copyright law long
before it was codified in the 1976 Copyright Act. Id. at 1350.
In trademark law, use of another's trademark in comparative advertising
or to identify a product correctly is fair use or otherwise not a trademark in-
fringement. See, e.g., Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 129-
30 (1947) (reconditioned "Champion" plugs may be so designated); Societe
Comptoir de L'Industrie Cotonniere, Etablissements Boussac v. Alexander's
Dep't Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1962) (copy of "Dior" dress may be so
designated); American-Marietta Co. v. Krigsman, 275 F.2d 287, 291 (2d Cir.
1960) (refills may be designated in terms of brand that they fit).
In patent law, noncommercial laboratory or "experimental" use of an in-
vention is a form of fair use and is not patent infringement. See, e.g., Kaz Mfg.
Co. v. Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc., 317 F.2d 679, 681 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that
use of invention in television commercial was not patent infringement, and
collecting cases on other noninfringing uses of inventions); Poppenhusen v.
Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279) (law is "well set-
tled, that an experiment with a patented article for the sole purpose of gratify-
ing a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement, is not an
infringement of the rights of the patentee"). In Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 183 (1984),
the court sought to limit this doctrine to wholly nonbusiness use and held that
the experimental use of a patented drug product constituted patent infringe-
ment because the purpose of the experiment was to complete during the life of
the patent the testing required to market the generic drug after the patent on
the name brand drug expired. Id. at 863. Within a few months, Congress in
effect reversed the holding in Roche Products by passing Pub. L. No. 98-417,
§ 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (1984) (codified at 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(e) (West Supp.
1985)) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1982)). See H.R. REP. No. 857, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 27 (Part II), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2647, 2711
("The provisions of section 202 have the net effect of reversing the holding of
the court in Roche Products, Inc..... "); see also id. at 45-46 (Part I), 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2678-79 ("It is the Committee's view that ex-
perimental activity does not have any adverse economic impact on the patent
owner's exclusivity during the life of a patent, but prevention of such activity
would extend the patent owner's commercial exclusivity beyond the patent ex-
piration date.").
278. The first sale doctrine is codified in section 109(a) of the Copyright
Act, 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982), and in section 906(b) of the SCPA, 17 U.S.C.
§ 906(b) (Supp. II 1984).
279. The term "exhaustion doctrine" is more often used in relation to in-
dustrial property rights such as patents and trademarks. In the United States,
the doctrine has developed in the case law and has no statutory basis. For a
discussion of the exhaustion doctrine in United States patent law, see Stern,
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it is often called, provides that a product protected under intel-
lectual property law passes outside the protection of that law
after the intellectual property rights owner or its licensee sells
the product to a customer. Accordingly, the owner of the intel-
lectual property rights cannot bring an infringement action
against direct or indirect customers with respect to the custom-
ers' further utilization or disposition of their purchases.2 80
Courts usually strike down attempts by sellers to exercise "re-
mote control" over the resale or use of the goods, or to impose
limitations or restrictions on further resale or use. At a mini-
mum, the exhaustion doctrine makes infringement actions un-
available, on the theory that the first authorized sale of the
goods "exhausts" the intellectual property monopoly or places
the goods "outside the monopoly." Courts often go further,
however, and refuse to enforce contracts, whether express or
merely quasi-consensual, that purport to give the intellectual
property rights owner some measure of remote control over the
goods after their sale.28 1 Courts also tend to disregard the use
of licenses, bailments, and other nonsale transaction formats by
an intellectual property rights owner to avoid the exhaustion
doctrine, at least when the transaction has most of the ordinary
earmarks of a sale.28 2
Vertical Patent Restraints in the United States of America: Exhaustion of
Rights by an Authorized Sale, After the GTE Sylvania Case, 1985 INDUs. PROP.
278.
280. The first sale defense is equivalent to a license or estoppel defense.
The defendant alleges that the plaintiff licensed the activity of which the
plaintiff now complains, by providing the semiconductor chip product to the
defendant or its source of supply or by authorizing manufacture of the prod-
uct. License is an affirmative defense. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Similarly, in civil
copyright litigation, first sale is an affirmative defense to be proved by the de-
fendant. See American Int'l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661, 663 n.1
(5th Cir. 1978) ("the burden of proving that a particular copy was lawfully
made or acquired rests on defendant"). But see United States v. Wells, 176 F.
Supp. 630, 635 (S.D. Tex. 1959) (in criminal cases, the government must show
that defendant's copies were not published by a lawful licensee of the copy-
right proprietor). The criminal cases are inapplicable in the civil context, how-
ever, because the predominant reason for placing this burden on the
government, rather than on the defendant, is the principle that the govern-
ment has the burden of proof on every essential element of the crime. Ameri-
can Int7 Pictures, 576 F.2d at 663 n.2. Similarly, because first sale is a defense
or exemption from liability for infringing mask work rights, it is up to the de-
fendant to plead and establish it. Moreover, the defendant in such cases is or-
dinarily in control of information regarding its source of supply.
281. See, e.g., Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8, 27
(1918).
282. See, e.g., United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277-78 (1942);
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A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE
Section 906(b) of the SCPA carries over to mask works the
"exhaustion of monopoly rights" and "first sale" doctrine of the
Copyright Act28 3 and many years of prior case law.2 84 Some
form of the first sale rule has appeared in every version of the
bills that became the SCPA.28 5 Nonetheless, the Copyright Of-
fice and others expressed concern that the bill might in some
way impair the first sale doctrine. Accordingly, a second provi-
sion was placed into an early version of the Senate bill 286 to
"make it clear that the intention of Congress [was] to continue
and carry forward ... the entire existing body of law concern-
ing the exhaustion of copyright by the first authorized sale of
the copyrighted product. '28 7 The House's sui generis bill dupli-
cated the relevant provisions of the Copyright Act in its own
provision on first sale.28 8 This provision, section 906(b), imme-
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516
(1917); Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1917).
283. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982).
284. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 23, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5772. The House Report is quoted in relevant part infra note 288.
285. Thus section 2 of the Senate bill, as introduced and as finally passed
by the Senate, and section 2 of the original House bill both contained a sen-
tence stating that the provisions of § 109(a) of the Copyright Act also apply to
semiconductor chip products. See S. 1201, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 2, 130 CONG.
REC. S5838 (daily ed. May 16, 1984); S. 1201, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 129 CONG.
REC. S5992 (daily ed. May 4, 1983); H.R. 1028, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 129
CONG. REC. H643 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1983); see also SENATE REPORT, supra note
8, at 19 (the first sale doctrine of § 109(a) of the Copyright Act should apply to
the sale of a chip).
286. This provision, known as the "savings provision," was added to S. 1201
as section 9. See S. 1201, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 9, 130 CONG. REC. S5838 (daily
ed. May 16, 1984). For a discussion of the savings provision, see SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 8, at 26.
287. SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26 (footnote omitted). A footnote
adds that the last paragraph of section 2 of the Senate bill expressly applies 17
U.S.C. § 109(a) (the codification of the first sale doctrine in the Copyright Act)
to semiconductor chip products. I& at 26 n.10. The final version of the SCPA
was not part of the Copyright Act, and therefore SCPA § 906(b)'s first sale
provision is a complete substitute for § 109(a) of the Copyright Act rather than
a supplement to it.
288. See H.R. 5525, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 906(b), 130 CONG. REC. H5489
(daily ed. June 11, 1984). The House Report described the intended scope of
H.R. 5525 § 906(b) as follows:
Section 906(b) carries over to mask works the "exhaustion of monop-
oly rights" and "first sale" doctrine of 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) and many
years of case law. As in the case of copyrighted products, the owner
of a mask work has no right to try to exercise "remote control" over
the pricing or other business conduct of its semiconductor chip cus-
tomers once the semiconductor chips have passed into their hands.
Except where the Congress expressly orders otherwise, the exhaus-
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diately followed the bill's description of a mask work owner's
exclusive rights and placed a limitation on them. Section 906(b)
of the House bill became section 906(b) of the SCPA.28 9
In combining the House and Senate bills, the language of
section 906(b) of H.R. 5525 was modified to incorporate some of
the greater generality of section 9 of the Senate bill,29° to in-
clude an express provision regarding importation, and to clarify
the language. As enacted, section 906(b) of the SCPA allows
customers to import, sell, and otherwise use or dispose of
whatever semiconductor chip products they buy from the mask
work owner or its licensee. The same right then passes down
the distribution chain to subsequent customers. The right ap-
plies only to the particular units of the semiconductor chip
product so purchased, and not to units acquired from infringers
or to stolen units.29I
B. EXHAUSTION OF DISTRIBUTION RIGHT BY FIRST SALE
The first authorized sale of a semiconductor chip product
exhausts the distribution right as to that semiconductor chip
product.292 Thus, if a mask work owner manufactures semicon-
ductor chips and sells them, the purchaser becomes their owner
and may resell the same chips anywhere in the United States,
at any price. The purchaser may also export the same chips
without liability under the SCPA. None of these acts would vi-
olate the exclusive distribution right of the seller. There is also
no liability for infringement of mask work rights if the cus-
tomer first incorporates the purchased chips into another prod-
tion of any rights by the first authorized sale is a basic tenet of our
intellectual property law. [citations to copyright and patent cases.]
Accordingly, the Act specifies that purchasers of semiconductor chips
have the right to use and resell them freely (whether as chips or in-
corporated into other products which contain chips).
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 23, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5772
(citations omitted).
289. SCPA § 906(b), as enacted, provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 905(2) [creating exclu-
sive importation and distribution rights], the owner of a particular
semiconductor chip product made by the owner of the mask work, or
by any person authorized by the owner of the mask work, may im-
port, distribute, or otherwise dispose of or use, but not reproduce, that
particular semiconductor chip product without the authority of the
owner of the mask work.
17 U.S.C. § 906(b) (Supp. II 1984).
290. See S. 1201, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 9, 130 CONG. REC. S5838 (daily ed.
May 16, 1984).
291. See 17 U.S.C. § 906(b) (Supp. II 1984).
292. See id.
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uct, such as personal computers, and then resells the chips as
part of the other product. Similarly, when a mask work
owner's licensee makes the chips and sells them to a customer,
the customer will not be liable.
1. Sales Contracts
A mask work owner's notice or an express contract in
which a mask work owner attempted to limit a customer's dis-
position of the purchased chips would probably be ineffective
because the courts would not enforce them. A court order for
specific performance or an award of damages against a cus-
tomer who disregarded the notice or contract would aid the
seller in contravening the policy underlying the SCPA. Hence,
a court would probably refuse either to order specific perform-
ance or to award damages in such cases.
A mask work owner might argue that sale of the semicon-
ductor chip product exhausts only the right to bring an action
for infringement of mask work rights and does not affect any
other rights or claims, such as a claim based on the contract.
This argument would probably not succeed, however, because
there is no indication in the statute or its legislative history
that by selling the chip, the mask work owner gives up only the
power to bring an infringement action and can still otherwise
exercise "remote control" over customers through a contract.
The House Report simply states in sweeping terms that the
owner of a mask work has no right to try to exercise such con-
trol over customers and that purchasers of semiconductor chips
have the right to use and resell the chips freely.2 3 Without
question, a resale price notice or contract would be
ineffective.294
2. Nonsale Transactions
Although the practice does not exist in the semiconductor
industry, cases have arisen in other industries testing whether a
293. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 23, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5772.
294. For example, the following resale price notice would be ineffective:
"This chip must not be resold for less than $1." Both the Senate and House
Reports cited Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908), on this point as
an illustration of the exhaustion doctrine. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at
23, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5772; SENATE REPORT, supra note 8,
at 26. Bobbs-Merrill involved a price restriction as to a copyrighted book, simi-
lar to the example given above. For a general discussion of this issue, see R.
STERN, supra note 5, §§ 9.4, 9.5, 12.3.
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seller may avoid the first sale rule or exhaustion doctrine by
adopting a nonsale transactional format. Under such a format,
the customer is not the "owner" of the product. The Supreme
Court, in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,-5 held that a book pub-
lisher's purported "license" of books was ineffective to control
their resale price.296 In patent cases, patentees have unsuccess-
fully sought to use "licenses" to control the resale price and the
territories in which their customers use products and to use del
credere agency and other devices to convert, or purport to con-
vert, sales into bailments.297 On the other hand, mass market-
ers of computer software frequently seek to avoid the impact of
section 109(a) of the Copyright Act s8 by purporting not to sell
the software or the diskette in which the software is encoded,
purporting instead to license or bail the diskette or software.299
As yet, there is no precedent on the enforceability of these so-
called "shrink-wrap licenses." Proprietors of other copyrighted
works, such as motion pictures and music, have sought enact-
ment of amendments to section 109 that would permit them to
prevent or control rental of video tapes, audio tapes, and
records. In the discussions of such bills before Congress, those
involved assumed that the proprietors of these works could not
exercise control over rental absent the enactment of the legisla-
tion sought.3°° Thus, the weight of authority and general opin-
ion indicates that use of putative nonsale formats for
transactions will not defeat the exhaustion doctrine.
The language of section 906(b) and the legislative history
indicate that avoidance or evasion devices, such as bailments,
would be ineffective. A court would probably find that the cus-
tomer is the "owner" of the semiconductor chip product when-
ever the transaction appears to transfer dominion and control
over the semiconductor chip product. This is not to say that
295. 210 U.S. 339 (1908). Bobbs-Merrill was cited with approval in both the
Senate and House Reports. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 23, 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5772; SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26.
296. Bobbs-Merri14 210 U.S. at 350.
297. See, e.g., United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 274 (1942); Mo-
tion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917);
Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895); Adams v. Burke,
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456-57 (1873).
298. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982) (the codification of the first sale doctrine).
299. See Stern, Shrink-Wrap Licenses of Mass-Marketed Software: En-
forceable Contracts or Whistling in the Dark?, 11 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 301, 303-13 (1985).
300. See, e.g., Audio and Video Rentak Hearing on S. 32 and S. 33 Before
the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 25, 51, 87, 89-91, 93-97 (1983).
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courts would disregard a true consignment of semiconductor
chip products, adopted for conventional business purposes, or
the retention of a security interest in semiconductor chip prod-
ucts intended to insure payment. If, however, the principal
purpose of an arrangement were to avoid section 906(b), it
would undoubtedly be stigmatized as a "sham" and disre-
garded.301
C. IMPORTATION RIGHT
A late amendment to section 906(b) of the SCPA added im-
portation to the exhaustion doctrine of that section. 30 2 A cus-
tomer of the mask work owner, or of its licensee, may
therefore import protected semiconductor chip products that
the customer purchased. For example, if the mask work owner
sells a number of chips to A in Japan, or to B in Chicago who
resells to C in Taiwan, or to D in France who resells to E in
Australia, then A, C, and E, and the customers of A, C, or E,
may ship the same chips back into the United States, where
they may be resold freely. The same result would occur if the
mask work owner had not itself manufactured the chips in
question, but had granted A, B, and D simple licenses to manu-
facture the chips.
Suppose, however, that the mask work owner grants A a li-
cense to manufacture chips for use and sale only in Japan,
grants B a license to manufacture chips for domestic use and
sale only, and grants D a license to manufacture chips for use
and sale only within the European Economic Community. Sup-
pose, further, that A, B, or D agree not to sell knowingly to per-
sons who will ship the chips outside the assigned territory.
Putting aside United States antitrust law and foreign restrictive
practices laws, the question is whether these transactions bring
about a different result under section 906(b). The analysis
should focus on whether the licensee is a person "authorized
by" the mask work owner to sell the chips.303 The phrase could
301. See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942).
302. See 17 U.S.C. § 906(b) (Supp. II 1984).
303. SCPA § 906(b) provides:
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 905(2) [setting forth
the importation and distribution rights], the owner of a particular
semiconductor chip product made by the owner of the mask work, or
by any person authorized by the owner of the mask work, may im-
port, distribute, or otherwise dispose of or use, but not reproduce, that
particular semiconductor chip product without the authority of the
owner of the mask work.
Id. (emphasis added).
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mean several things, for example, "authorized to any extent,"
"authorized specifically to sell for importation into the United
States market," or "not expressly prohibited from selling for
United States importation."
The precise meaning of "authorized by" is uncertain, but
the thrust of section 906(b) and its legislative history seem to
indicate that the importation will not be an infringement of
mask work rights. Whether a contract or tort action, such as
inducing breach or interfering with business relations, or even
fraud, lies against A, B, C, D, E, or others is another question.
To the extent that the answer to that question depends on the
policy of section 906(b), the answer would appear to be nega-
tive. In contract cases, however, policies other than those of
section 906(b) may dominate.3° 4
D. USE LIMITATIONS AFTER SALE OR
LICENSED MANUFACTURE
1. Copyright and Patent Precedents
The suggestion has occasionally been made that under the
copyright laws, there is no general exhaustion doctrine, and
that an authorized first sale of a copyright product exhausts
only the distribution right. Under this theory, the customer
may resell the copyrighted product intact, but may not modify
the copyrighted product and then resell it, display it publicly,
or cause its public performance.30 5 Thus, the owner of a video
game machine may not modify the copyrighted computer code
and audiovisual work of the video game and then allow patrons
to play (publicly perform) the modified video game. 3°6 Simi-
larly, software licenses frequently provide that customers may
not modify copyrighted computer programs or merge them
with or into other computer programs and sell the resulting
products.30 7 On the other hand, courts have allowed purchasers
304. For example, that promises ought to be kept and that there is a duty
to act in good faith, in both inducing and performing the contract. On the
other hand, in Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942), the
Supreme Court found the field of patent licensing so dominated by the sweep
and interplay of federal policies that it said state contract law policies must
give way to them. Id. at 176; accord Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673
(1969).
305. Under copyright law, public display and public performance are rights
separate from distribution. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)-(5) (1982).
306. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1013 (7th Cir.),
cer denied, 104 S. Ct. 90 (1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741,
753 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
307. See Stern, supra note 299, at 315-17. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982) (owner
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to disassemble packages containing copyrighted parts and resell
the components,30 to rebind and combine copyrighted books
with other material,30 9 and to convert copyrighted products into
other products and resell them.310
In patent law, and in patent-related antitrust law, a perva-
sive view of the exhaustion doctrine seems to prevail. Sale of
the patented product carries with it an unqualified right of
modification, use for any purpose, and resale in any form.3 1 '
2. Legislative History of the Exhaustion Doctrine
The language of section 906(b) and the legislative history
suggest that the sale of a semiconductor chip cuts off all power
of the seller to exercise remote control over the use of the chip.
Thus, section 906(b) expressly refers to other use and disposi-
tion of the chip, as well as to distribution.3 12 There is no sug-
gestion in the legislative history that only the distribution right
is exhausted when a mask work owner sells a semiconductor
chip product. Indeed, the intimation is to the contrary. The
Senate Report speaks in general terms of "exhaustion of copy-
right," not merely exhaustion of the distribution right.3 13 The
House Report generally inveighs against any attempt to exer-
cise "remote control" over the pricing or other business conduct
of copy of computer program may make or authorize reproduction of another
copy or adaptation if new copy is used solely as "essential step in the utiliza-
tion of the computer program" or for archival purposes).
308. See Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v. Arrow Drug, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 881,
884 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (knowledge by retailer of contract between copyright
holder and original customer requiring that copyrighted product be sold only
as part of promotional package did not bind retailer to observe terms of
contract).
309. See Fawcett Publications v. Elliot Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 717, 718
(S.D.N.Y. 1942); see also Lantern Press, Inc. v. American Publishers Co., 419 F.
Supp. 1267, 1273 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (rebinding paperback books in hard covers).
310. See C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 189, 192 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
311. See United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 60-64 (1973) (resale
of drug chemical in unauthorized market); Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther, 377 U.S.
422, 425 (1964) (modification of canning machinery to make different size
package); Munters Corp. v. Burgess Indus., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1195, 1205
(S.D.N.Y.) (use of material in unauthorized equipment), modified in part
affd in relevant part on reargument, 450 F. Supp. 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Bald-
win-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Sys. Co., 169 F. Supp. 1, 29-30
(E.D. Pa. 1958) (use of device in unauthorized equipment), affd 268 F.2d 395
(3d Cir.), cert denied, 361 U.S. 894 (1959).
312. For the full text of SCPA § 906(b), see supra note 303.
313. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26. See also Mathias-Leahy Ex-
planatory Memorandum, supra note 17, at S12,917 ("[lit now is made clear that
a customer is free to use a semiconductor chip product unit as he chooses, after
becoming its owner by buying it from the mask work owner or its licensee.").
[Vol. 70:271
1985] SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP PROTECTION ACT 351
of customers and proclaims that "the exhaustion of any rights
by the first authorized sale is a basic tenet of our intellectual
property law."3 14 The Report states that the Act gives purchas-
ers "the right to use and resell [the chips] freely. '315 Finally,
Congress refrained from giving mask work owners any exclu-
sive "use" right.316 This suggests that the legislative intent is to
establish a broad policy in favor of customer freedom to use
purchased chips as customers see fit, a policy that would be
contravened by any device extending "remote control" over the
chip's use, including contractual restrictions. Therefore, any
notice or contract limiting customers' use of purchased semi-
conductor chip products317 would probably be ineffective. 318
In any event, the question is more theoretical than real.
Practice at this time in the semiconductor industry is consistent
with the broader view of section 906(b). It is not the custom in
the industry to impose use, price, or other distribution restric-
tions on chip purchases. Although chips are not sold at this
time for use only with specified types of machines, that could
change in the future. At this time, however, section 906(b) im-
poses no real impediments on semiconductor chip manufactur-
ers' business practices.
314. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 23, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5772 (emphasis added).
315. Id (emphasis added).
316. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 21 n.40, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5770 n.40; SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 20-21. The elimina-
tion of the exclusive "use" right from the original House and Senate bills is
discussed supra note 8.
317. E.g., "This chip may be used only in mainframe computers," "This
microprocessor may be used only in printed circuit boards containing XYZ
RAM chips," "This chip is not licensed for use in modems," "This chip is li-
censed for distribution only via authorized jobbers, wholesalers, and retailers
of XYZ Co."
318. The issue is not completely free from doubt, however. The argument
may be made that the policy behind SCPA § 906(b) is not so strong as to pre-
vent the parties to a contract from bargaining for a limitation on the pur-
chaser's power to use chips freely. It may be said that the policy only prevents
SCPA infringement actions against those who disregard contracts limiting dis-
position or use of chips, and does not prevent state contract law actions. For
example, it is clear that it is not patent or copyright infringement to disregard
a territorial limitation on the distribution of the patented or copyrighted arti-
cle, but geographically limited distributorships for patented and copyrighted
goods appear to be permissible under present law. The language of the SCPA
and its legislative history are cast in somewhat stronger terms than those of
the patent and copyright laws; nevertheless, courts might simply regard that
as a reason to interpret narrowly contracts bargaining away or limiting
§ 906(b) rights, rather than to refuse to enforce them at all. For a general dis-
cussion of this issue, see R. STERN, supra note 5, § 9.5.
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3. Use Limitations in Licenses to Manufacture Equipment
There is a possible exception to the general proscription
against devices that limit subsequent use of the chip, but it, too,
may raise only theoretical questions. Sometimes, a semiconduc-
tor chip product manufacturer will license an equipment manu-
facturer to make a particular chip for "in-house use only." A
chip used "in-house" is one included as part of the equipment
sold by a licensee, as contrasted with a chip sold as such in the
ordinary (so-called "merchant") semiconductor chip product
market. In the latter market, the licensee's sales of the chip
would compete with the licensor/chip manufacturer's sales.
Suppose the equipment manufacturer breached and sold
the chips, as opposed to equipment containing the chips, on the
regular market. That would raise the questions of whether the
equipment manufacturer could be enjoined and whether the
wholesalers or retailers who bought chips from the equipment
manufacturer could be prevented from -reselling them. Since
the license would presumably not authorize sale of the chips on
the regular market, at least arguably the chips so sold are
unlicensed.
The counterargument is as follows: The equipment manu-
facturer was licensed ("authorized" in the words of section
906(b)) to make chips; all of the chips are fungible, and, at the
time they are made, the equipment-bound chips are indistin-
guishable from those bound for the regular market. Further,
the mask work owner has no right to control the distribution of
the chips so made, and once the chips are made they pass
outside the monopoly. This argument appears to be weak, be-
cause courts are likely to refuse to extend the exhaustion doc-
trine to the manufacture as well as sale of chips.319 In effect,
the argument would so extend the exhaustion doctrine.
It would not be surprising, however, if a court enjoined
only the equipment manufacturer but let the chip wholesalers
319. See generally United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488
(1926) (where dealers were found to be sales agents, not purchasers, price fix-
ing did not violate common law or antitrust law). In United States v. Ciba
Geigy Corp., 508 F. Supp. 1118, 1147-51 (D.N.J. 1976), the court held that gen-
erally similar license restrictions as to a patented chemical were antitrust vio-
lations when imposed on purchasers but were lawful when imposed on
manufacturing licensees. The restrictions at issue permitted only certain spec-
ified chemicals to be combined with the patented chemical. For a decision sim-
ilarly upholding against an antitrust challenge an "in-house" restriction on
chemicals produced by a patented process, see United States v. Studiengesell-
schaft Kohle, M.B.H., 426 F. Supp. 143, 149 (D.D.C. Cir. 1976).
[Vol. 70:271
1985] SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP PROTECTION ACT 353
and retailers alone. The theory would be that the mask work
owner created the situation where the wholesalers and retailers
innocently, or at least nonculpably, acquired an ordinary article
of commerce.320 Once they acquired the chip, under ordinary
principles, the wholesalers and retailers would be free to use it
or dispose of it as they chose. Even a requirement by the mask
work owner that the equipment manufacturer label the chips
"not for sale" would probably be ineffectual against the equip-
ment manufacturer's customers who disregarded the label.
Nevertheless, this scenario will probably never occur in any
real business setting. The reason is that the equipment manu-
facturer would probably recognize that no one would ever again
license such a "treacherous" equipment manufacturer to make
semiconductor chip products, and most equipment manufactur-
ers would be too honorable to violate what both parties consid-
ered an agreement.321
E. REPRODUCTION RIGHT NOT EXHAUSTED BY FIRST SALE
The first sale rule can apply only after an authorized first
sale of a semiconductor chip product has occurred, and only to
those rights that come into play after such a first sale. Distri-
bution and importation of a semiconductor chip product are in
that category of rights, but reproduction of a semiconductor
chip product is not. Therefore, inducing or causing others to
import or distribute chips legitimately purchased from the
mask work owner is not a wrongful act 322 and not a violation of
320. See 17 U.S.C. § 907 (Supp. II 1984).
321. Technically, there is no agreement not to sell the chips as such. There
is merely a limited or conditional license, for example, A licenses B to make
semiconductor chip product C only on the condition that B place the semicon-
ductor chip products into product D. A license on a condition is generally not
considered to imply a promise by the licensee not to engage in unlicensed con-
duct, i.e., conduct beyond the scope of the license. The remedy for conduct be-
yond the scope of the license is an action for infringement, not one for breach
of contract. See, e.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339
U.S. 827, 836 (1950) (limited license for home use production is "neither an ex-
press nor implied agreement to refrain from production for 'commercial' or
any other use as part consideration for the license grant").
Nevertheless, most businesspersons would consider all of this a lawyer's
quibble, because the intent of the parties was that the licensee would engage
only in the licensed conduct. See Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of
the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 278-79 (1966)
("infringers no less than promise-breakers are pariahs in the business
community").
322. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434-35
(1984). As the Supreme Court stated in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Re-
placement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961), if there is no direct infringement there can
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section 905(3).323
Reproduction of a mask work is in a different category
from importation and distribution. Reproduction of a mask
work, by making a semiconductor chip product embodying the
mask work or by photographing the layout and preparing a
composite drawing, data base tape, or mask, is not the kind of
customer "use" of a purchased semiconductor chip product that
section 906(b)'s first sale doctrine authorizes. Such conduct is
permissible if it qualifies as reverse engineering under section
906(a), but otherwise it is a violation of section 905(1)'s repro-
duction right.3 24 Ordinarily, reproduction of the mask work
could not be justified as a necessary adjunct to the customer's
getting the benefit from the sale of the semiconductor chip
product. In any event, at a late stage of the legislative history,
an amendment was added to section 906(b) changing the provi-
sion so that it would allow the customer of a semiconductor
chip product to use, but not reproduce, the semiconductor chip
product.325 Thus, a mask work owner's sale of a semiconductor
chip product does not give the customer any right to reproduce
the semiconductor chip product. 326 By the same token, induc-
not be contributory infringement. Id at 341. By the same token, someone
must commit direct infringement for the defendant to be guilty of inducing
infringement.
323. See 17 U.S.C. § 905(3) (Supp. II 1984).
324. See id. § 905(1).
325. See Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 17, at
S12,917 ("However, the customer's permissible use does not include reproduc-
ing the semiconductor chip product (except in the course of reverse engineer-
ing, which is separately governed under Section 906(a))."). For the text of
SCPA § 906(b), see supra note 303.
The copyright law first sale rule, 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982), does not au-
thorize customers to reproduce purchased works. The corresponding patent
law rule, 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1982) does not authorize customers to make pat-
ented articles in addition to those purchased. However, purchasers of patented
articles are entitled to repair or modify them, at times to an extent that, but
for the initial purchase, would be considered a construction or making of the
patented article. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365
U.S. 336, 346 (1961).
326. Presumably, however, the customer could modify a semiconductor
chip product purchased from the mask work owner without incurring liability
for infringement of mask work rights. At present, modification of a semicon-
ductor chip product is infeasible or at least very uncommon. But changes in
technology might make it advantageous to modify semiconductor chip prod-
ucts to alter their functions, for example, by changing the clock speed or acti-
vating a differint microcode.
In the past, patent owners have demanded additional royalties from pur-
chasers of patented machines who sought to modify or enhance the machines,
for example, by increasing the throughput or changing the size of the product
that the machine made or operated on. In Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther, 377 U.S.
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ing or knowingly causing a purchaser of a chip to reproduce it
is a violation of section 905(3).327
F. APPLICATION OF THE FIRST SALE DEFENSE
The first sale or exhaustion doctrine of section 906(b) is
probably not a major defense in actual infringement of mask
work rights cases. Ordinarily, a semiconductor manufacturer
will not sue purchasers of its chips for infringement. A manu-
facturer accused of unlawful reproduction of the semiconductor
chip product cannot assert the defense because only a pur-
chaser of a semiconductor chip product can invoke the de-
fense.328 Finally, whenever the first sale defense is applicable,
ordinarily the innocent infringement defense would apply as
well.
V. INNOCENT INFRINGEMENT
A. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
Innocent infringement provisions of one kind or another
have been in all of the major bills leading up to the SCPA. As
originally introduced, the Senate32 and House 330 bills included
a compulsory licensing provision and an innocent infringement
provision to protect the positions of persons who bought semi-
422 (1964), the Supreme Court, relying on Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.)
453, 456 (1873), held that a first sale wholly exhausts the patentee's monopoly
in the machine and permits the owner of the machine to modify it as he
wishes. 377 U.S. at 425. Under copyright law the matter is less clear. Com-
pare Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 753 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (owner
of coin-operated video game machine may not change computer program of
machine) with C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 189, 191 (N.D. Tex. 1973)
(purchaser of copyrighted greeting cards may turn them into plaques).
Because the first sale provision of SCPA § 906(b), 17 U.S.C. § 906(b)
(Supp. II 1984), is so much more explicit than that of the Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982), and so clearly parallels the concept of the patent law's
exhaustion doctrine, courts would probably follow the patent law exhaustion
precedents if such a case arose.
327. See 17 U.S.C. § 905(3) (Supp. II 1984).
328. By its terms, SCPA § 906(b) applies only to an owner of a particular
semiconductor chip unit that has been made by the mask work owner or a per-
son authorized by the mask work owner. See id § 906(b). One who repro-
duces the work could qualify only if authorized by the mask work owner to
reproduce it, i.e., if the person were a licensee. In that case, however, the de-
fendant would invoke the license defense, not the first sale defense.
329. S. 1201, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 5, 7, 129 CONG. REC. S5993 (daily ed.
May 4, 1983).
330. H.R. 1028, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 5, 7, 129 CONG. REc. H643-44 (daily
ed. Feb. 24, 1983).
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conductor chips without knowing that the chips were infring-
ing.331 The use of the term "compulsory licensing" greatly
disturbed some persons. Therefore, to avoid controversy, all
references in the legislation to compulsory licensing were de-
leted and replaced by an expanded innocent infringement pro-
vision.332 The innocent infringement section was largely
equivalent in substantive effect to its predecessor, but a provi-
sion limiting damages to a reasonable royalty and eliminating
the possibility of an injunction was substituted for the provision
providing for a compulsory license at a reasonable royalty.333
Both the Senate and House provisions exempted conduct
occurring before an innocent purchaser of semiconductor chips
learned that the purchased chips were infringing.3s4 Thus, the
purchaser's resale of such chips before notice of mask work
rights, for example, as part of electronic equipment, would not
create liability for infringement. The Senate and House bills
differed in a number of ways, however. The issues in dispute
included whether an innocent purchaser may continue to oper-
ate on a royalty basis after it learns that the purchased chips
were infringing, whether a purchaser from an innocent in-
fringer enjoys the same status, and whether the innocent in-
fringer has manufacturing rights. These issues were eventually
resolved by informal conference.3 35
331. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 23-26.
332. See id. at 25-26.
333. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 23-24, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5772-73; SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 10-11.
334. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 23-24, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5772-73; SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 10-11.
335. S. 1201's innocent infringement provision differed from the House ver-
sion in three-main respects: First, it allowed an innocent infringer to continue
to operate indefinitely on a reasonable royalty basis after innocence ended, if
the "equities" of the situation favored the innocent infringer. In contrast, H.R.
5525 dispensed with balancing the equities. The innocent purchaser was al-
lowed to sell off all semiconductor chip product inventory acquired before no-
tice of infringement on a reasonable royalty basis. After that, no special
privileges attached to the once-innocent infringer. Second, the Senate bill al-
lowed a good-faith purchaser from an innocent infringer the same privileged
status as an innocent infringer. Under H.R. 5525, however, all of the innocent
infringer's innocently acquired semiconductor chips (and products in which
they were incorporated) could be sold off to purchasers, who would also enjoy
all the privileges of an innocent infringer, whether or not the subsequent pur-
chasers were good-faith purchasers. Third, in some circumstances, S. 1201 en-
titled the innocent infringer to make the semiconductor chip or have it made,
on a reasonable royalty basis. Under H.R. 5525, no innocent infringer ever ac-
quired any right to make chips or have them made. Compare SENATE REPORT,
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B. INNOCENT INFRINGEMENT UNDER THE SCPA
Under section 901 an innocent infringer is a person who
buys semiconductor chip products without actual notice of
mask work rights and without reason to believe that the chip
layout is protected under the SCPA.3 36 Section 907 provides
that the innocent infringer is not liable for any acts done before
it had notice that the mask work was protected.337 After the
innocent infringer has notice, it enjoys reasonable royalty
rights as to inventory purchased before notice.338 Any subse-
quent purchases of additional units of the semiconductor chip
product, however, are fully subject to the SCPA.339 Customers
who directly or indirectly purchase semiconductor chip prod-
ucts or equipment containing chip products from the innocent
infringer have the same status as the innocent infringer.340
Innocent infringement is an affirmative defense and must
be proved by the alleged infringer.341 The principal issue in-
supra note 8, at 23-25 with HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 23-24, 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5772-73.
The compromise that emerged in the SCPA has these features: As in both
the Senate and House bills, a person who buys infringing chips and resells
them before ever having knowledge of any mask work rights is not liable for
such conduct. See 17 U.S.C. § 907(a)(1) (Supp. II 1984). As in both bills, the
concept of payment of a reasonable royalty for the use of the mask work and
withdrawal of injunctive relief is used to balance and compromise the conflict-
ing interests of the mask work owner and innocent infringer. See id.
§ 907(a)(2). The SCPA section was broadened to apply to importation as well
as distribution. See id § 907(a)(1)-(2). The language was clarified to empha-
size that an innocent infringer's exemption from liability applied only to the
particular product units that the innocent infringer bought before getting no-
tice of mask work rights. See id § 907(c). The Senate's balance of equities was
dropped in favor of the House's cut-off of reasonable royalty privileges as to all
further semiconductor chips bought after notice. See id. § 907(d). The Sen-
ate's manufacturing provision was dropped, and the Senate's limitation to
"good faith" later purchasers was omitted. See id § 907. This provision would
have made it difficult for equipment manufacturers to market products via re-
tailers and others who had notice.
336. See 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(7)-(8) (Supp. II 1984).
337. Id § 907(a)(1).
338. Id § 907(a)(2).
339. Id. § 907(d).
340. Id § 907(c).
341. The legislative history is silent on this point. The prima facie notice
provisions of SCPA § 909(a), id § 909(a), and the fact that the defendant is in
control of the evidence, however, would seem to require that the defendant
adduce some evidence of innocent infringement. Since innocent infringement
has all the appearance of an affirmative defense, the defendant undoubtedly
would have the burden of persuasion as well. For a description of the prima
facie notice provisions of SCPA § 909, see infra notes 344-349 and accompany-
ing text.
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volved is whether the defendant had actual notice, or at least
should have known, that the chip layout was protected under
the SCPA when the chip was purchased. This is a matter of es-
tablishing the defendant's good faith. A related question is the
time at which the defendant's innocence may have ended.342
Finally, there is the problem of determining a reasonable
royalty.343
C. NOTICE
Usually the mask work owner will comply with the statu-
tory notice provisions of section 909.3" The owner will thus be
in a position to rely on section 909(a)'s rule that use of the no-
tice is "prima facie evidence of notice of protection" under the
SCPA.345 If the defendant stands mute, that will be the end of
the issue. Of course, the defendant will not stand mute. The
defendant will produce testimony of its officials to support its
ignorance of the plaintiff's rights, arguing that the defendant
simply bought the chips from a third party and that the circum-
stances gave the defendant no reason to believe that the chip
was pirated. The defendant may also point out that the statu-
tory notice was not placed on the pirated chips that it bought
and assert that, had it known of the plaintiff's rights, it never
would have encroached on them.
Section 909(a) does not make the affixation of the statutory
342. The question of when the defendant was put on notice of the plain-
tiff's rights will ordinarily raise the same factual issue as whether the defend-
ant had notice in the first place. See infra text accompanying notes 344-349.
343. See 17 U.S.C. § 907(a)(2)-(b) (Supp. II 1984).
344. Section 909 provides:
(a) The owner of a mask work provided protection under this
chapter may affix notice to the mask work, and to masks and semi-
conductor chip products embodying the mask work, in such manner
and location as to give reasonable notice of such protection. The Reg-
ister of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation, as examples, specific
methods of affixation and positions of notice for purposes of this sec-
tion, but these specifications shall not be considered exhaustive. The
affixation of such notice is not a condition of protection under this
chapter, but shall constitute prima facie evidence of notice of protec-
tion.
(b) The notice referred to in subsection (a) shall consist of-
(1) the words "mask force [sic]", the sumbol [sic] *M*, or the
symbol @ (the letter M in a circle); and
(2) the name of the owner or owners of the mask work or an
abbreviation by which the name is recognized or is generally known.
Id § 909 (footnotes omitted).
345. See id § 909(a); see also id § 901(a)(8) (defining notice of protection).
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notice a constructive notice of mask work protection. 346 Nor
will affixation have much evidentiary significance, since a third
party supplier's infringing chips will carry no mask work label
advising of the plaintiff's rights, unless the third party is a
counterfeiter or the equivalent. Therefore, the plaintiff's notice
on its own chips tells the defendant nothing unless defendant is
aware, or should otherwise be aware, that the same chip lay-
outs are involved.
The legal standard for notice is what a reasonable person
in the trade would have known.347 Thus, if the plaintiff's chip
is widely hailed in the trade press as, for example, the first chip
to contain analog and digital computer circuitry on the same
chip, or the first 64-bit microprocessor, or the first 2-megabit
EPROM, a prudent member of the trade might make some in-
quiry when a second source appears before purchasing from the
second source.3 8 In the same vein, if the plaintiff had given
the defendant actual notice of its mask work rights previously,
for example, by mailing the defendant's general counsel a copy
of the mask work registration certificate, the defendant would
be hampered in arguing that it was reasonably unaware of the
risk of mask work infringement.349
D. DETERMINATION OF REASONABLE ROYALTY
The parties are free to determine by voluntary negotiation
the rate of reasonable royalty.A° In the absence of such an
agreement, a court may determine the reasonable royalty in an
infringement action brought by the mask work owner against
the innocent infringer, 351 or in a declaratory judgment action
by the purchaser against the mask work owner.
The legal standard for a reasonable royalty has been set
down in numerous decisions under the patent laws. The rate is
what a willing purchaser who was not forced to buy would pay
346. In contrast, SCPA § 903(c)(1) makes recordation constructive notice.
I. § 903(c)(1).
347. See id. § 901(a)(8); SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 25.
348. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 25 (widespread publicity would
constitute reasonable grounds for belief in protection).
349. See id. (expressly recognizing that actual notice may take the form of
"a letter from the copyright owner to the infringer advising that a specific chip
is copyrighted.").
350. See 17 U.S.C. § 907(b) (Supp. II 1984). Parties are not required by the
SCPA to reach or to try to reach an agreement on reasonable royalty. See
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 23, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5772.
351. 17 U.S.C. § 907(b) (Supp. II 1984); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 23,
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5772.
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as a license fee to a willing seller who was not forced to sell.32
In the decisions applying this standard,3sa courts have consid-
ered the following factors, among others: the cost savings to
the defendant from the use of the patented technology com-
pared with the cost to the defendant to develop alternative
technology;3M the going rate of a similar license, granted by the
plaintiff to others or in the same industry generally;ss and fi-
nally, the price that would allow both parties to make a profit
on the transaction.35
Ordinarily, both parties will have experts familiar with li-
censing, preferably in the semiconductor industry, testify on
the issue of reasonable royalty. Specifically, witnesses would
testify about the "going rate" for a similar license in the indus-
try and the manner in which percentage or lump sum royalties
are usually determined. They would then apply these general
principles to the facts of the case to arrive at a rational number.
It should be noted that the payment of a reasonable royalty
covers all downstream purchasers of the semiconductor chip
product or equipment containing it.
357
VI. FRAUDULENT PROCUREMENT AND
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT BEFORE THE
COPYRIGHT OFFICE
Fraudulent procurement of a mask work registration, or
other inequitable conduct before the Copyright Office, is an af-
firmative defense to a claim of infringement of mask work
rights.358 A plaintiff who fraudulently procured a mask work
352. See, e.g., Horvath v. McCord Radiator & Mfg. Co., 100 F.2d 326, 335
(6th Cir. 1938), cert denied, 308 U.S. 581 (1939), cited with approval in SENATE
REPORT, supra note 8, at 25.
353. See, e.g., cases cited id. at 333-36.
354. See id. at 333-34.
355. See id. at 334-35.
356. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446
F.2d 295, 299-300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971). For a comprehen-
sive list of factors relevant to the determination of a reasonable royalty for a
patent license, see Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers,
318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 446 F.2d 295 (2nd Cir.), cert
denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).
357. See Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 17, at
S12,917.
358. The two forms of misconduct have been distinguished in patent cases.
Fraud invalidates the patent. Inequitable conduct or nonpurgeable misuse,
however, usually make the patent unenforceable. See, e.g., Timely Prods.
Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 297 (2d Cir. 1975); cf. American Hoist & Derrick
Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1364 & n.5 (Fed. Cir.) (declining to
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registration does not have "clean hands." Therefore, the court
will be unwilling to assist the plaintiff in enforcing its tainted
rights. Similar considerations apply to conduct that, while per-
haps not sinking to the level of fraud, is sufficiently inequitable
to deprive the plaintiff of recourse to the courts.
A. THE DOCTRINE OF FRAUDULENT PROCUREMENT AND
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
The doctrines of fraudulent procurement and inequitable
conduct have developed primarily in patent cases359 and, to a
lesser extent, in copyright cases.3r° The defense requires a
showing that the plaintiff made a misstatement 361 to the agency
on a matter of importance in the proceeding, knowing that the
statement was incorrect and perhaps also knowing that it was
important. A showing that the agency actually relied on the
misstatement to its detriment, i.e., "but for" the misconduct,
the agency would not have issued the patent or copyright, an
element of common law fraud, is generally considered superflu-
ous, at least insofar as defensive use of the doctrine is
concerned.362
discuss "the distinction between invalidating fraud and unenforceability"),
cert denied 105 S. Ct. 95 (1984).
It is generally agreed that a person asserting fraud must prove it with
clear and convincing evidence, which is a higher burden than a mere prepon-
derance of the evidence. See, e.g., Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144,
1151 (Fed. Cir. 1983). It may be argued, however, that the preponderance of
the evidence standard applies when the plaintiff's conduct is characterized as
"inequitable," rather than "fraudulent." See Monsanto Co. v. Rohxn and Haas
Co., 312 F. Supp. 778, 791 & n.11 (E.D. Pa. 1970), affd 456 F.2d 592 (3d Cir.),
cert denied 409 U.S. 934 (1972). But see J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd.,
747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (court characterized both forms of conduct
as "inequitable conduct" and said that inequitable conduct must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence), cert denied 106 S. Ct. 73 (1985).
359. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.,
382 U.S. 172 (1965); Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance
Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
360. See Russ Berrie & Co. v. Jerry Eisner Co., 482 F. Supp. 980, 987-88
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Vogue Ring Creations, Inc. v. Hardman, 410 F. Supp. 609, 614-
16 (D.R.I. 1976).
361. An omission of information necessary to make the rest of a statement
not misleading may also constitute fraud. Similarly, failure to disclose infor-
mation that the applicant has a duty to disclose may constitute fraud. See, e.g.,
Charles Pfizer & Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574, 579 (6th Cir. 1968), cert denied 394
U.S. 920 (1969).
362. See Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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B. MATERIAL MISSTATEMENTS
For this defense to apply, the mask work owner must have
made an incorrect statement to the Copyright Office on a mate-
rial matter on the application form or in some other connection
with the registration proceeding. The misstatement must in-
volve a matter that could affect the proceeding, such as one
that would, or at least might, influence the Copyright Office to
grant the registration. More specifically, the false statement
must tend to induce a grant while the true statement would
have tended to cause rejection. 363 Thus, for a Brazilian national
and domiciliary to falsely assert that its mask work was first
commercially exploited in the United States is clearly material,
since section 902(a) makes a Brazilian mask work first commer-
cially exploited in Brazil ineligible for protection.364
A more difficult question would arise if a United States cit-
izen falsely stated that its mask work was first commercially
exploited in the United States, when in fact it was first com-
mercially exploited in Brazil. Arguably, the false statement is
immaterial, since section 902(a)(1)(A) makes the fact of the ap-
plicant's United States citizenship enough to render the mask
work eligible for protection.3 5 On the other hand, the Copy-
right Office should not be made to act on false information.
Hence, if the misstatement is intentional or inexcusable, the ap-
plicant should be penalized as a matter of equity and as a lesson
to others not to make intentional false statements on poten-
tially important matters.36 Treating such a misstatement as
material is consistent with the prevailing view in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has held
that falsity is material if it relates to a matter that could affect
the outcome in some circumstances, even if not those of the
case at bar.36 7
Another difficult question regarding materiality could oc-
363. See American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350,
1362-63 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 95 (1984).
364. See 17 U.S.C. § 902(a) (Supp. II 1984).
365. See id § 902(a)(1)(A).
366. See Corning Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F. Supp.
461, 470 (D. Del. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 374 F.2d 473 (3d Cir.), cert de-
nied, 389 U.S. 826 (1967); Abington Textile Mach. Works v. Carding Specialists,
Ltd., 249 F. Supp. 823, 839 (D.D.C. 1965). But see Henkels & McCoy, Inc. v.
Elkin, 316 F. Supp. 303, 309 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (stating in dictum that misrepre-
sentation to cause expedited handling of application does not make patent un-
enforceable; false statement must go to patentability issue), a f'd 455 F.2d 936
(3d Cir. 1972).
367. See, e.g., Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 884-85 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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cur when a mistake is made "against" the interest of the appli-
cant. Suppose the applicant files on June 1, 1987, and there is a
question of whether first commercial exploitation occurred on
July 1, 1986, or March 1, 1987. Either way, the application is
still timely under the two year rule of section 908(a). The ap-
plicant resolves doubts "against" himself and puts the July 1986
date in the application, so that the term of protection ends in
1996 instead of 1997.3 8 It is later decided that March 1987 was
the correct date. The misstatement probably is not material,36 9
unless the earlier date preceded damaging prior art that would
have or might have invalidated the registration under section
902(b). 370
C. SCIENTER
It is not enough that a statement be incorrect and material.
An applicant must either know that a statement is incorrect or
be sufficiently careless as to be culpable. The standard for lia-
bility appears to be failure to make proper inquiry, when a rea-
sonable person would inquire. An alternative standard,
however, borrowed from patent law, may be that the applicant
must act in a grossly negligent manner or recklessly.3 7 1 There
368. See 17 U.S.C. § 904 (Supp. II 1984).
369. Suppose, however, that the applicant puts the March 1987 date in the
application and it is later decided that July 1986 was correct. Again, the differ-
ence is immaterial under SCPA § 908(a). See id. § 908(a). Such a misstate-
ment also has no effect for purposes of establishing originality under SCPA
§ 902(b). See id. § 902(b). The duration of the rights might be affected, how-
ever, because the term of protection will end in 1997 instead of 1996. See id.
§ 904. Whether the applicant acted in good faith may be the determinative fac-
tor in such cases.
370. See 17 U.S.C. § 902(b) (Supp. II 1984).
371. See Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1151-52 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 795-96 (C.C.P.A. 1970). The distinction be-
tween negligence and gross negligence appears to have been blurred by the de-
cision in J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 73 (1985), in which the court stated: "Gross negligence
is present when the actor, judged as a reasonable person in his position, should
have known of the materiality of a withheld reference." Id. at 1560 (citations
omitted).
The Ninth Circuit took a stricter view in one patent fraud case. In W.R.
Grace & Co. v. Western United States Indus., Inc., 608 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 953 (1980), a patent was held invalid for fraud be-
cause of an incorrect affidavit, which denied advertising of the product. In
fact, the corporation had extensively advertised the product. The affiant said
that he erred because he misunderstood his subordinates' reports. The court,
nonetheless, imputed the subordinates' knowledge to the corporate employer,
for whom the patent application was being prosecuted. Hence, the corporation
was held to have knowingly filed a false affidavit and thus to have procured
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is probably a sliding scale to determine when an applicant also
must know that the statement is material and when it is
enough that the applicant knows that it is false.3 7
2
D. JURY QUESTION GUIDELINES
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in American
Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc.,373 recently formu-
lated guidelines for federal trial courts regarding which aspects
of patent fraud cases are matters for the jury and which are
matters for the district judge.3 74 Reserved for the jury, as ques-
tions of fact, are determinations of the importance of informa-
tion withheld from the application and of the patentee's intent,
whether resolved by evidence of deliberate scheming or by in-
ference from gross negligence or recklessness. A legal conclu-
sion, reserved for the district judge, is the decision whether
information withheld from an agency would have been likely to
the patent by fraud. Id. at 1218-19. The Patent and Trademark Office's rule,
in contrast, imputes to the corporate applicant (the assignee of the inventor)
only the knowledge of each "individual who is substantially involved in the
preparation or prosecution of the application." 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1985).
372. See American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350,
1363 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 95 (1984); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Dia-
mond, 653 F.2d 701, 716 (1st Cir. 1981); see also Kayton, Lynch & Stern, Fraud
in Patent Procurement" Genuine and Sham Charges, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1,
132-35 (1974) (creating four categories of knowledge). With regard to a false,
clearly material statement, as, for example, when the date of first commercial
exploitation is 25 months before the application but is represented as being
only 23 months, it is probably enough that the applicant knew that the state-
ment was incorrect. Even clear proof that the applicant did not know what
SCPA § 908(a) provides would not excuse the intentional false statement.
Even if the applicant made the statement carelessly, rather than intentionally,
he should still be found culpable. Any reasonable person who read and under-
stood the statute would know that the date of first commercial exploitation
was an important material fact. Therefore, the appropriate standard of care as
to this fact should be quite high. At the other extreme, considerable careless-
ness might be tolerated, for example, in ascertaining the correct ZIP code for
the mask owner's street address.
In patent fraud cases, the current standard for assessing the applicant's
knowledge of materiality is whether the applicant knew or should have known
that the statement was important to the agency in making the decision
whether to issue the patent. Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1152
(Fed. Cir. 1983). It is probably easier to find a culpable state of mind on an
important issue concerning the mask work that the applicant incorrectly rep-
resents to the Copyright Office than it is on a less important one. See Rohm &
Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert de-
nied, 105 S. Ct. 172 (1984); Kansas Jack, 719 F.2d at 1151-52.
373. 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir.), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 95 (1984).
374. Id. at 1363-64.
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have influenced the agency's decision on issuing the patent.3
75
The district judge is also responsible for the "careful balancing
of intent in light of materiality" to determine whether the pat-
entee fraudulently procured the patent.376 Whether the guide-
lines set forth in American Hoist would apply377 or be useful
37 8
in a case under the SCPA is unclear.379
375. Id at 1363 n.4. In J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553
(Fed. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 73 (1985), however, the court said that
both intent and materiality "are factual issues subject to the clearly erroneous
standard of review," id at 1562, which necessarily means that, in a case tried
to a jury, they are both jury matters, see id. J.P. Stevens was tried without a
jury on the fraud issue. On appeal the issue was the appropriate standard of
appellate review, which raises the same question. Id.
376. American Hoist 725 F.2d at 1364. In J.P. Stevens, the court amplified
this point by stating that the court must determine, "as a matter of law," how
the balance should be struck once the minimum thresholds for materiality and
culpable intent are each crossed. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d
1553, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 73 (1985). The court appar-
ently meant that if the jury finds that a reasonable examiner would have
thought that the misstated or withheld information was important in deciding
whether to allow any aspect of the claimed subject matter, and if the misstate-
ment or withholding was at least negligent, then the court should do the bal-
ancing. See id The argument may be urged that this division of authority
effectively usurps the jury's fact finding power.
377. Like patent appeals, SCPA appeals probably go to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(1), 1338(a)
(1982); see also 17 U.S.C. § 912(d) (Supp. II 1984) (providing that the provisions
of section 1338 of title 28 apply with respect to exclusive rights in mask works
under the SCPA).
378. The first several guidelines may be helpful in a mask work case, but
the last one may not. A jury may not be able to quantify intent or scienter
sufficiently to permit the judge to factor its factual determination into the slid-
ing scale process in which intent is balanced against materiality to determine
whether fraudulent procurement had occurred.
The problem is analogous to that of deciding whether the defendant's ve-
hicle was going too fast, given the road conditions at the time of the accident.
Perhaps, the decision cannot effectively be made if one person must decide
what the road conditions were, while another person must decide what was
the right speed for those conditions. In the case of intent to procure registra-
tion by fraud, the problem is even more difficult, because there is no numeri-
cal measure of intent analogous to miles per hour. It could therefore be said
that the determination should be left entirely to the jury, after a suitable
charge. This would also avoid the contention that the jury's fact finding power
was being usurped.
379. If the approaches taken in American Hoist and J.P. Stevens & Co. v.
Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 73 (1985),
prevail in cases involving alleged "inequitable conduct" in procuring mask
work registrations, the procedure for determining liability could be illustrated
by the following graph:
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E. CONSEQUENCES OF A FRAUD RULING
In a case of misstatement of information that would invali-
date the mask work registration, such as first commercial ex-
ploitation more than two years before the registration, the
mask work is cast into the public domain irrespective of fraud.
The court in such a case would almost certainly award attor-
ney's fees under section 911(f).380
When the misstatement or failure to disclose information is
sufficiently culpable, even though, absent fraud, the mask work
would still be registrable, the court may hold that the mask
work rights are unenforceable. In some cases of negligent mis-
statement, a court would probably allow the mask work owner
to correct the registration, thereby reestablishing the validity
GOOD FAITH Materiality Threshold
NEGLIGENCE __------- __ Scienter
--- "-- . . . .Threshold
RECKLESSNESS
INTENT TO
DECEIVE
VERY IMPORTANT IMPORTANT IRRELEVANT
DATA DATA DATA
First, the jury decides whether clear and convincing evidence establishes
that the defendant's conduct falls within the area defined by the broken lines,
more specifically, whether the defendant's state of mind falls below the scien-
ter or culpability threshold and whether the pertinence of the data is to the
left of the materiality threshold. If the jury decides in the negative for either
threshold, the mask work owner is exonerated of the inequitable conduct
charge. If they find that both of the threshold tests are met, the matter be-
comes one for the court. In that case, the court, not the jury, determines as a
matter of law the exact coordinates of the materiality and state of mind appli-
cable to the mask work owner's conduct and whether they fall within the
shaded area of the graph or within the unshaded area. If the coordinates are
within the shaded area, the mask work owner is guilty of inequitable conduct.
If the coordinates are in the white or clear area, the mask work owner is
exonerated.
380. SCPA § 911(f) provides: "In any civil action arising under this chap-
ter, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs, including
reasonable attorneys' fees, to the prevailing party." 17 U.S.C. § 911(f) (Supp. II
1984). The question whether an award of attorneys' fees is appropriate in an
infringement of mask work rights case under the SCPA is discussed in R.
STERN, supra note 5, § 6.8.
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and enforceability of the registration.38'
Finally, enforcement of a fraudulently procured mask
work registration may serve as the basis of a claim for damages
under unfair competition law or under state or federal antitrust
laws.38 2 The theory of such an action is that the intellectual
property owner, by bad faith litigation akin to malicious prose-
cution,3 3 excluded or attempted to exclude the alleged in-
381. The mask work owner could then enforce the mask work rights
against all others, except where res judicata barred the action. In Rohm &
Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 172 (1984), the court indicated that a patentee might "purge" the effects
of fraud on the Patent and Trademark Office by bringing the correct facts to
the attention of the Office. Id& at 1572. The patentee's conduct in that case,
however, was held to be not adequate to rehabilitate itself or the patent. Id& at
1573.
Perhaps a defective assignment could be cured to restore registrability of a
mask work. For example, consider the following hypothetical: Contractor A
in Iceland creates a mask work for Icelandic corporation B, which then assigns
its rights to its United States subsidiary C. The mask work is then first com-
mercially exploited in the United States and C applies for registration. C's at-
torney somewhat carelessly states on the registration form that C owns the
mask work, that C acquired all United States rights from the prior owner B,
and that B created the mask work by its employees as part of their employ-
ment. In fact, A owns the mask work. B never did, and C does not. B never
secured a written assignment from contractor A as SCPA § 903(b) requires.
See 17 U.S.C. § 903(b) (Supp. II 1984). The registration is invalid. Under
SCPA § 908(a), nonowner C cannot register the mask work. See id § 908(a).
Suppose that all of this comes out in litigation against defendant D only
one year after first commercial exploitation began, and C immediately takes
the following steps: (1) A assigns all its rights to B, in writing;, (2) B assigns all
its rights to C, in writing;, and (3) C reapplies for registration, this time cor-
rectly stating the facts and advising the Copyright Office of the prior error.
Does the earlier carelessness of C's attorney bar registration? Or may a regis-
tration now validly issue? If the court considered C's conduct not too culpable,
it might well permit the rescue and rehabilitation of the mask work registra-
tion. But if defendant D had secured an intervening judgment, C would be
faced with a res judicata bar as to that defendant.
The facts of the case may prevent rehabilitation, however. If first com-
mercial exploitation had been in Iceland, rather than the United States, SCPA
§ 902(a)(1)(A) would prevent registration. If two years had passed between
the first commercial exploitation and the discovery of the facts, SCPA § 908(a)
could create the same problem. A further difficulty is that the Copyright Of-
fice takes the position that there is no authority for correcting mistakes in
mask work registrations. See R. STERN, supra note 5, § 3.10.
382. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.,
382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965) (patent-antitrust case); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v.
Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 597-600 (7th Cir. 1971) (patent-antitrust
case), cert denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972); Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 35
F.2d 403, 407-08 (7th Cir. 1929) (patent-unfair competition case), cert denied,
281 U.S. 737 (1930).
383. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 379-80
(1973) (bad faith litigation over power to issue municipal bonds); California
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fringer from competing in the sale of the product involved.As 4
VII. ESTOPPEL
A defendant may successfully raise the affirmative de-
fense 38 5 of estoppel 386 in an action for infringement of mask
work rights if the defendant can prove that the plaintiff was re-
Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511 (1972) (bad faith
litigation over motor carrier permit).
384. Such antitrust actions face a severe obstacle in most circuits: the anti-
trust claimant must show that the defendant controls a substantial share of
the market for the product. See, e.g., Acme Precision Prod., Inc. v. American
Alloys Corp., 484 F.2d 1237, 1244 (8th Cir. 1973) (patent-antitrust case). This
consideration appears to be inapplicable in an unfair competition action. It
also appears to be of less significance in antitrust actions based on bad faith
assertion of infringement. See, e.g., Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d
416 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952) (substantial share of market
test not applied in patent-antitrust case involving bad faith assertion of in-
fringement).
If the mask work owner claimed a very expansive scope for the registra-
tion, the argument of narrowness of mask work rights would lose its force.
For example, if A sues B for infringement of A's mask work rights in a 1
Megabit DRAM under an interpretation of A's mask work rights that is so
broad that it would cover any other 1 Megabit DRAM, the defendant might
successfully argue that A is attempting to monopolize the whole 1 Megabit
DRAM business, which may be a relevant product market. A's counterargu-
ment would presumably be that 4K, 16K, 64K and 256K DRAMs and static
RAMs and also all PROMs, EPROMs, EEPROMs, and floppy disks are part of
the relevant market.
Most semiconductor chip product layouts do not so uniquely dominate a
product market that possession of exclusive rights over the layout confers mo-
nopoly power (or other substantial economic power) over the sale of the prod-
uct, even under a broad definition. Most layouts represent only one way of
accomplishing a particular purpose, although many others exist. If this were
not so in a particular case, the doctrine that functionally dictated aspects of
mask works are unprotected by the SCPA would govern. See supra notes 91-
99 and accompanying text.
385. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
386. Estoppel is similar to, but not the same as, laches. Laches refers to a
willful delay in bringing suit which prejudices the defendant, for example, by
causing witnesses to become unavailable to the defendant. The gravamen of
estoppel, on the other hand, is the defendant's action in detrimental reliance
on plaintiff's misleading conduct. The same facts may give rise to both de-
fenses.
It is sometimes said that laches merely deprives the plaintiff of the right
to damages, see Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 524 (1888), while estoppel fore-
closes the plaintiff from all right to prospective or retrospective relief of any
kind, see, e.g., Potter Instrument Co. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 641 F.2d 190, 192
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981); Advanced Hydraulics, Inc. v. Otis
Elevator Co., 525 F.2d 477, 479 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 869 (1975). For
a discussion of laches in infringement of mask work rights cases, see R. STERN,
supra note 5, § 7.4[B].
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sponsible for some part of the alleged infringing conduct.
387
The defense of estoppel is recognized in copyright and patent
infringement cases.388 It is reasonable to assume that the
courts will follow the same principles in infringement of mask
work rights cases. The elements of a case of copyright estoppel
can be restated in terms of mask works. The first element is
that the plaintiff mask work owner must have known of the
387. For example, a mask work owner who holds out the defendant's sup-
plier as the owner's partner or licensee, or who knowingly fails to correct such
a misimpression created by the supplier, might be estopped from claiming in-
fringement. Estoppel might also apply in the following situation: the mask
work owner accuses the defendant of infringing its mask work rights; the de-
fendant denies infringement or validity, claiming that it has copied an earlier
work in the public domain; the mask work owner then remains silent for a
substantial period, while the defendant expands its production facilities. See
Jensen v. Western Irrigation & Mfg., Inc., 650 F.2d 165, 169 (9th Cir. 1981)
(patent case); Advanced Hydraulics, Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co., 525 F.2d 477, 481-
82 (7th Cir.) (patent case), cert denied, 423 U.S. 869 (1975); Continental Coat-
ings Corp. v. Metco., Inc., 464 F.2d 1375, 1380 (7th Cir. 1972) (patent case). Es-
toppel is also an appropriate defense when a mask work owner has permitted
widespread infringement of the semiconductor chip product for several years
prior to the time that the defendant entered into the manufacture of that
semiconductor chip product. See Faulkner v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 189
U.S.P.Q. 695, 728-32 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (15-year silence in face of patent infringe-
ment by entire industry), qffd on other grounds, 561 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978). The following is another situation in which
the defendant could argue estoppel: A gallium arsenide wafer fabricator (die
supplier) and an equipment manufacturer collaborate on developing new de-
signs for a high speed semiconductor chip product. Nothing is said of mask
work rights for four years. The equipment manufacturer spends large sums to
expand its capacity to develop products utilizing the new designs, including
semiconductor chip product wafer fabrication facilities. Eventually, the equip-
ment manufacturer begins to make a large part of its gallium arsenide semi-
conductor chip product requirements. The supplier then asserts mask work
claims against the manufacturer. See Lukens Steel Co. v. American Locomo-
tive Co., 197 F.2d 939, 940-41 (2d Cir. 1952). A final example is as follows: A
mask work proprietor sells or licenses mask work rights to a semiconductor
manufacturer. The mask work proprietor then acquires from a third party ad-
ditional mask work rights in an earlier mask work, which dominate the mask
work rights sold or licensed to the manufacturer. In other words, the mask
work sold or licensed to the manufacturer contains part of the subsequently
acquired but earlier mask work, so that the reproduction of the later work is
an infringing reproduction of the earlier work. The original mask work pro-
prietor then asserts these new rights against the manufacturer. See Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 448 F.2d 54, 57-58 (7th
Cir. 1971); AMP, Inc. v. United States, 389 F.2d 448, 451-53 (Ct. Cl.) (implied
license), cert denied, 391 U.S. 964 (1968).
388. See, e.g., Jensen v. Western Irrigation & Mfg., Inc., 650 F.2d 165, 169
(9th Cir. 1980) (patent case); Houts v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 603 F. Supp.
26, 28-32 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (copyright case).
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defendant's infringing conduct.38 9 Another element is that the
plaintiff mask work owner must have acted in a way that gave
the defendant infringer a reasonable basis for believing that the
plaintiff did not intend to assert the mask work rights, if any,
against the defendant. 390 Further, it must be shown that the
defendant did not actually believe that the plaintiff would as-
sert mask work rights against it.391 Finally, the defendant must
have relied on the plaintiff's conduct in a way that would make
it unfair to let the plaintiff assert its rights because of the re-
sulting detriment to the defendant.392 The elements of estoppel
in patent infringement cases are similar.393
VIII. MISUSE AND ANTITRUST
Misuse of intellectual property rights has been recognized
as a defense to an infringement action.3 94 The fact that the
plaintiff has engaged in an antitrust violation involving the in-
tellectual property rights is also a defense.3 95 The legislative
history of the SCPA includes reference to one of the earliest
precedents on misuse of a copyright, 39 6 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus, 97 in which the United States Supreme Court refused to
enforce a license notice in a copyrighted book fixing a mini-
mum resale price for the book.398
389. See Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 882 (1960).
390. See id.
391. See id.
392. See Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 592 F.2d
651, 655 (2d Cir. 1978); Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104
(9th Cir.), cert denied, 364 U.S. 882 (1960). But see Houts v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 26, 31 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (detrimental reliance is not
part of prima facie case of copyright estoppel).
393. See, e.g., Continental Coatings Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 464 F.2d 1375, 1379-
80 (7th Cir. 1972); Armstrong v. Motorola, Inc., 374 F.2d 764, 770 (7th Cir), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967); Faulkner v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 189
U.S.P.Q. 695, 728-32 (N.D. Ill. 1976), affd on other grounds, 561 F.2d 677 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v.
Berwick Indus., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 851, 869 (M.D. Pa. 1974), cffd, 532 F.2d 330
(3d Cir. 1976).
394. See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491-94
(1942).
395. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665-671
(1944) (stating further that defendant may assert counterclaim against plain-
tiff's antitrust violation).
396. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 23, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5772; SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26.
397. 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
398. Id, at 350-51.
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The doctrine of misuse is considered an equitable defense.
Thus, in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,39 the Supreme
Court considered whether an infringer could assert the defense
that the patentee had misused its patent by requiring licensees
of the patented machine to purchase unpatented supplies.40
The lower court rejected the defense, on the ground that the
defendant had not shown that the patentee's tying of the patent
license to the purchase of supplies lessened competition suffi-
ciently to violate the antitrust laws.401 The Supreme Court said
that the proper question was not whether the patentee had vio-
lated the antitrust laws, but rather "whether a court of equity
will lend its aid to protect the patent monopoly" when the pat-
entee is using the patent to impose a tie-in.402 Enjoining the in-
fringer would assist the patentee in "thwarting the public
policy underlying the grant of the patent. ' 403 Accordingly, the
Court dismissed the patentee's infringement complaint for
want of equity. The Court noted that the "unclean hands" de-
fense involved did not depend on whether the particular de-
fendant had suffered from the misuse of the patent, because
the purpose of the doctrine was to protect the public interest,
as opposed to the interest of the particular defendant.4°4
A. ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS
As Morton Salt expressly held, it is not necessary to prove
an antitrust violation to sustain a misuse defense. 405 Misuse,
although an equitable civil doctrine, is like the criminal law
399. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
400. See id. at 490-94. The patent was on a machine for dispensing salt tab-
lets in the process of canning foods. Morton infringed Suppiger's patent and
sought to defend on the ground that Suppiger was using the patent to compel
users of the machine to'buy salt tablets from Suppiger. The effect was alleg-
edly to supplant Morton in selling salt tablets to users of the machine. See id
at 491.
401. G.S. Suppiger Co. v. Morton Salt Co., 117 F.2d 968, 971-72 (7th Cir.
1941).
402. Morton Salt 314 U.S. at 490.
403. Id at 493. The patentee was using the patent monopoly on the
machine to restrain competition in the market for salt tablets, an unpatented
article. This attempted monopoly of the unpatented article was against the
public interest in the benefits of free and open competition in the market for
that product.
404. Id at 494. Other decisions make misuse a legal defense as well as an
equitable one. Thus, a licensee may defend a suit for royalties due under a
patent license by raising the patentee's misuse. See MacGregor v. Westing-
house Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402, 407 (1947).
405. See Morton Sal4 314 U.S. at 494.
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concept of a lesser included offense. The misuse doctrine usu-
ally sweeps up conduct of the same general kind as might vio-
late the antitrust laws, but which, in some way, falls short of
being a full-blown antitrust violation.4°6 Recently, the Ninth
Circuit found that a computer manufacturer violated the anti-
trust laws by tying the purchase of its computers to licenses of
its copyrighted software. 40 7 It seems inconceivable that the
court would hold that the defendant violated the antitrust laws
by refusing to allow the plaintiffs' potential customers to use
the software unless they bought the defendant's, rather than
the plaintiff's, computers, and yet at the same time would let
the defendant maintain a copyright infringement action against
the plaintiffs if they had infringed the copyright on the
software as "self help" against the defendant's antitrust viola-
tion. Hence, whenever the challenged use of the intellectual
property right, such as a mask work right, is proved to be an
antitrust violation, it should automatically be a misuse as well.
B. COPYRIGHT MISUSE CASES
The misuse doctrine has also been applied in copyright and
trademark 408 cases, although not as frequently as in patent
cases.40 9 In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
406. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140
(1969) (proof of patent misuse is not proof of antitrust violation; the latter re-
quires proof of additional elements). There appear to be no decisions holding
abuse of patent rights to be an antitrust violation but not a misuse.
407. Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1338-39 (9th Cir.
1984), affg 490 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Cal. 1980) and revg 529 F. Supp. 801 (N.D.
Cal. 1981), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985).
408. Trademark misuse has usually involved tying the use of a trademark
to the purchase of supplies from the owner of the trademark or its designee,
often in the context of a franchise. See, e.g., FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223,
226-31 (1968); Siegel v. Chicken-Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 49 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); see also Lanham Trademark Act § 33(b)(7), 15
U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7) (1982) (making the plaintiff's use of a trademark to violate
the antitrust laws a defense in trademark infringement litigation).
409. Courts have held a wide variety of practices engaged in by owners of
patents, trademarks, and copyrights, usually in licensing, to be misuse. Exten-
sive discussion of these practices is outside the proper scope of this Article. A
very abbreviated list of mask work analogs to these practices follows, to illus-
trate the kind of mask work misuse defenses that defendants might raise in
infringement of mask work rights litigation.
Tie-ins are by far the most frequently raised misuse and antitrust defenses
in intellectual property litigation. An example of a mask work tie-in would be
tying the sale of a chip protected under the SCPA to the purchase of another
chip, whether protected under the SCPA or not, or to the purchase of disk
drives or other products.
Another defense that might be raised in mask work infringement litiga-
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System,410 the Supreme Court apparently approved misuse as a
defense in a claim of copyright infringement.411 The Second
Circuit had held that certain copyright licenses were illegal per
se because of their inherent harmful tendencies, regardless of
their actual competitive effect under the antitrust laws.4 12
Therefore, the court concluded that the copyright proprietors
had committed copyright misuse.413 The Supreme Court re-
versed on the ground that the license restrictions were not per
se illegal, but were illegal only if they unreasonably restrained
trade by causing adverse competitive effects in the market-
place.414 The Court remanded for a determination on that
point.415 The Court appears to have ruled that the challenged
practices could constitute copyright misuse and antitrust viola-
tions if, in fact, they unreasonably restrained trade.416
tion is the plaintiff's use of a mask work tie-out. A tie-out is an agreement not
to deal in a competitive chip. An example of a mask work tie-out would be the
sale of microprocessor A to a customer only if it agrees not to use other
microprocessors in general or not to use particular microprocessor B.
Other practices which might also constitute grounds for a misuse defense
include imposing restrictions on the use or disposition of a semiconductor chip
product, contrary to SCPA § 906(b)'s first sale rule; licensing a cell library
with restrictions on the price of the semiconductor chip products made under
the license; agreeing with existing mask work licensees not to grant other per-
sons subsequent licenses without the consent of the earlier licensees; and li-
censing a cell library with royalties running for 15 years. For a more extended
discussion of antitrust considerations in the context of licensing mask works,
see R. STERN, supra note 5, § 12.4.
410. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
411. See id. at 6 & n.9, 24-25.
412. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. American Soc. of Composers, Authors
and Publishers, 562 F.2d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Broadcast Mu-
sic, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
413. See id. at 140, 141 n.29.
414. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 24.
415. Id. at 24.
416. See id. at 24-25. Accord, F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, 214 U.S.P.Q. 409, 413 (7th Cir. 1982) (in dictum, antitrust violation is
equitable defense to contributory infringement claim); Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Moor-Law, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 357, 365-68 (D. Del. 1980) (denial of summary
judgment on copyright misuse issue, defendants entitled to go to trial); see also
United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45-46 (1962) (applying patent tie-in
case law to copyrights); Mitchell Bros. Film. Group v. Cinema Adult Theater,
604 F.2d 852, 865 (5th Cir. 1979) (in dictum, misuse of copyright statute in way
that subverts purpose of statute may constitute bar to judicial relief), cert. de-
nied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d 1, 4
(9th Cir. 1967) (suggesting that price fixing by association functioning as li-
censing agency for composers, authors, and publishers would constitute mis-
use), cert. denied 389 U.S. 1045 (1968). A number of earlier district court
decisions, however, had ruled against allowing misuse as a defense in a copy-
right infringement case. See, e.g., Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474
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IX. LACK OF STANDING TO SUE
Lack of standing to bring an infringement suit is a defense
in actions under the SCPA. Section 910(b)(1) permits the
owner of the mask work or the exclusive licensee of all rights
to sue.417 Because the statute contains only this limited grant
of authority to sue, the plaintiff should allege its standing, and
the defendant may simply deny standing.
In a noninfringement action, such as a declaratory adjudi-
cation of rights relating to a mask work, the defendant may as-
sert that the plaintiff lacks a sufficient interest in the subject
matter of the claim to entitle the plaintiff to bring the action.
Such a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is similar to a
claim of no case or actual controversy between the parties.
Similarly, a defendant might assert failure to state a claim for
relief.4 1 8 Nonetheless, it would be prudent for a defendant also
to raise lack of standing as an affirmative defense in its
answer.
419
X. OTHER DEFENSES
Other defenses to a claim of infringement of mask work
rights may overlap with those already discussed. It is often tac-
tically advantageous, however, to restate a defense in as many
legal formulas as applicable. One formulation may prove more
effective than another before different tribunals or in situations
where the fact pattern or evidence develops differently from
what was expected.
F. Supp. 672, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Grant's Cabin, Inc.,
204 U.S.P.Q. 633, 635 (E.D. Mo. 1979); see also 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 80,
§ 13.09[A] n.3 and cases cited therein. In view of the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Broadcast Music and United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962),
and the recent Second and Seventh Circuit rulings in Columbia Broadcast Sys.
v. American Soc. of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 562 F.2d 130 (2nd Cir.
1977), and F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 214 U.S.P.Q.
409 (7th Cir. 1982), these district court decisions have very limited precedential
value. Moreover, some of them appear to turn on the point that the alleged
misuse. was extraneous to the controversy involved in the litigation, so that for
the court to assist the plaintiff by enforcing the copyright against the defend-
ant would not assist the plaintiff in carrying out the scheme said to be the
misuse.
417. See 17 U.S.C. § 910(b)(1) (Supp. II 1984).
418. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
419. Failure to join a necessary party may also be an appropriate argument,
especially if someone other than the plaintiff may be the owner or exclusive
licensee. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7).
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A. LICENSE
An alleged infringer of mask work rights may contend that
its allegedly infringing conduct was authorized by the mask
work owner. For example, in the case of a dispute over the in-
terpretation of a license agreement containing a field-of-use or
territorial limitation, the licensee may assert that its activity
was within the scope of the license, while the mask work owner
contends that the activity was outside the terms of the license
and thus an infringement. Establishing that the defendant had
a license is a complete defense to the charge of infringement of
mask work rights.420 License is an affirmative defense which
must be pleaded and proved by the defendant.421
B. COMMERCE
Lack of effect on commerce by the alleged infringement is
a defense, but not an affirmative defense. Rather, showing ef-
fect on commerce is part of the plaintiff's case, because section
910(a) defines infringement as conduct in or affecting com-
merce.422 Hence, if the plaintiff alleges effect on commerce in
the complaint, the defendant should simply deny the allegation,
leaving the plaintiff to prove it at trial. This defense will rarely
be successful because commerce is nearly always affected by in-
fringement. For example, shipment of infringing semiconduc-
tor chip products across a state line or interstate sales provide
the requisite effect on commerce. 423
C. OTHER TYPES OF FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
The mask work owner who sues prematurely may fail to
state a claim.424 For example, the defendant may have only be-
gun preparation for the activities that the plaintiff alleges in-
fringe its mask work rights. At that stage, it is uncertain
whether the acts the defendant will commit, if ever committed
at all, will be infringements. 425 The plaintiff's complaint may
420. See, e.g., De Forest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 241-42
(1927) (patent case); McKay v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 324 F.2d 762, 763
(2nd Cir. 1963) (copyright case); Anthony Co. v. Perfection Steel Body Co., 315
F.2d 138, 141 (6th Cir. 1963).
421. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
422. See 17 U.S.C. § 910(a) (Supp. II 1984).
423. See, e.g., Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 10 (1939); Dahnke-Walker Mill
Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 290-91 (1921).
424. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
425. For a general discussion of prematurity and standing to bring actions
for a declaration of rights as to mask works, see R. STERN, supra note 5, § 6.9.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
also fail to state a claim if none of the defendant's acts are
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or if
those acts that do occur within the jurisdiction of the United
States do not violate section 905.426
Defenses of this type go to defects in the plaintiff's case,
and the defendant is not required to plead them.42 7 However,
the surprise value of reserving them until the last minute is
limited, and by not pleading them affirmatively as defenses or
counterclaims, the defendant loses the opportunity to shape the
attitude of the court favorably as early as possible. Moreover,
failure to assert a sound defense by way of a motion for sum-
mary judgment will needlessly increase the defendant's legal
expenses by sending the case to trial.
XI. PRIORITY BETWEEN CLAIMANTS
The question of priority between conflicting claims to the
same or substantially similar mask works is not settled under
the SCPA. The legislative history of the SCPA does not di-
rectly address the issue, although there are references to it in
the Senate memorandum on the final bill.42 8
The question of priority can arise between rival first cre-
ators of a work when each seeks to assert rights in the work
against the other. Priority conflicts may also arise between two
alleged first creators in determining which creator is harmed
by the infringement of some third party or which creator may
properly license the third party. Hence, although a priority is-
sue can be raised as a defense to a charge of infringement of
mask work rights, priority may also be raised offensively. For
this reason, it is treated here separately from other defenses.
The question of priority occurs frequently in patent law
and trademark law, but it does not arise under copyright law.
Under most patent law systems of the world, the first person to
file a patent application disclosing and claiming an invention
will have priority over anyone who later files an application on
the same or a very similar invention. Under United States pat-
426. See 17 U.S.C. § 905 (Supp. II 1984) (specifying owner's exclusive
rights). If these rights are not violated, the mask work owner will not have a
claim for relief. See also id& § 910(a) (limiting subject matter jurisdiction in in-
fringement actions to conduct in or affecting commerce subject to congres-
sional regulation).
427. See 2A J. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 18.19[1], at 8-157 (2d
ed. 1985).
428. See Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 17, at
S12,917.
[Vol. 70:271
1985] SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP PROTECTION ACT 377
ent law, however, the right to a patent belongs to the first per-
son to complete the invention rather than the first person to
file.429 Under United States registration law, subject to some
qualification, the right to a federal trademark registration and
the rights that the trademark confers belongs to the person
who first commercially exploits the trademark in commerce.430
Under copyright law, each person who creates the same work
independently is entitled to a separate copyright on that
work.431
Under the SCPA, the question of priority will probably not
arise in the critical area of second sourcing. In a second sourc-
ing case, the second source will base its work on the first mask
work. Presumably, the first mask work will already be regis-
tered. Therefore, the second source will generally create a
mask work that is not original, and consequently, its mask
work will not be entitled to registration except where it de-
parted from the first mask work.432 The reverse engineering
provisions of section 906(a) would probably govern whether the
first source would have a claim against the second source for in-
fringement of mask work rights.433
Given the general premise of the SCPA that infringement
of mask work rights occurs only if there is very close similarity
between the two works,434 the question of priority between two
mask work proprietors will probably arise only in regard to
cells or other small modules. Moreover, the question would
arise only as to configurations that are not dictated by function,
because mask work protection does not extend to functionally
dictated topography. 435 Accordingly, the priority issue is not of
429. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (1982). This assumes that a person who is
first to complete the invention, but is the second or later person to file an ap-
plication, did not "abandon" the invention or wait to file until a year or more
had passed after a publication or first commercial exploitation of the inven-
tion. It also assumes that the fact situation is not so complex that a circularity
of priorities, possible under United States law, by which A is prior to B, B is
prior to C, and C is prior to A, has arisen. For further discussion of this issue,
see Stern, Priority Paradoxes in Patent Law, 16 VAND. L. REv. 131 (1962).
430. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1982).
431. For a discussion of this point, see supra notes 104-108 and accompany-
ing text.
432. See 17 U.S.C. § 902(b)(1) (Supp. II 1984). Even if the second source
could register before the first, the second mask work would not be original
over the first.
433. See id. § 906(a). For a discussion of the reverse engineering provisions
of the SCPA, see supra notes 199-261 and accompanying text.
434. See supra notes 79-101 and accompanying text.
435. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
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major practical concern.
It is conceivable, however, that the issue could arise, for ex-
ample, in the case of a memory cell configuration that was arbi-
trary rather than functionally dictated. If two semiconductor
chip product manufacturers independently created the same
cell layout, or a substantially similar one, perhaps each could be
an "original" creator for the purposes of section 902(b)(1). This
would assume that "original" under section 902(b)(1) means
"not plagiarized," as it does under copyright law, rather than
"first in time. '4 36 If each manufacturer completed its design
before the other first commercially exploited the semiconduc-
tor chip product or published the layout, perhaps each manu-
facturer might also succeed in filing its application before the
layout was "staple, familiar, or commonplace. '437
Because the Copyright Office has no facility for examining
mask works for novelty or priority,438 the Copyright Office
would probably be unaware of the similarity of the two mask
works. Therefore, each manufacturer might end up with a re-
gistration certificate from the Copyright Office, which would be
prima facie evidence of the registrant's compliance with the re-
quirements of the SCPA.439 That, of course, would not be con-
clusive of entitlement to registration or of validity. If the
doctrine of independent creation were carried over from copy-
right law to mask work law, priority would be immaterial and
each manufacturer would be entitled to mask work protection
on the mask work." 0 If the doctrine of independent creation
were not incorporated into the SCPA, relative priority of mask
work rights would have to be decided by reference to what the
courts consider pertinent dates. These could be the respective
dates of creation of the mask work, fixation in a semiconductor
chip product, first commercial exploitation of the mask work,
registration, or some combination of dates. How the courts
would choose among these dates is unclear. Perhaps, a court
would consider registration of a mask work under section
908(a) constructive notice to subsequent applicants, as is recor-
i
436. See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.
437. SCPA § 902(b)(2) denies protection to designs that are staple, familiar,
or commonplace, or that are variations of such designs. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 902(b)(2) (Supp. II 1984). These characteristics are to be measured as of the
date of registration of the mask work. See Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memo-
randum, supra note 17, at S12,917.
438. See supra notes 189-192 and accompanying text.
439. See 17 U.S.C. § 908(f) (Supp. II 1984).
440. See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
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dation of a transfer or license under section 903(c)(1), 4 1 so that
only the first applicant could claim that its version of the mask
work was "original" under section 902(b)(1) or was not "famil-
iar" or "unoriginal" under section 902(b)(2). 442 Because the ar-
gument for this approach is not strong, however, it remains
uncertain how a court would resolve a priority dispute between
two rival registrants.443 It is possible that the kind of fact situa-
441. See 17 U.S.C. § 903(c)(1) (Supp. II 1984).
442. The Senate memorandum on the final bill twice directs the courts to
determine validity by looking to the state of the prior art on the date of regis-
tration. See Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 17, at
S12,917 (referring to the prior art "at the time of registration" and "on the
date of registration"). SCPA § 908(e), 17 U.S.C. § 908(e) (Supp. II 1984),
equates the date of registration with the date on which an application is filed
in proper form. It may be appropriate to consider anything registered as a
mask work in the Copyright Office to be prior art for the purposes of validity
under SCPA § 902(b). See id. § 902(b). Moreover, the SCPA "requires regis-
tration within a reasonable time upon pain of forfeiture of rights under the
Act," in order "to create greater certainty of rights, both for the public and the
owners of mask works." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 24, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5773; cf 17 U.S.C. § 908(a) (Supp. II 1984) (application
for registration must be made within two years after the date on which the
mask work is first commercially exploited). Hence, it may be said that Con-
gress focused on the date of registration (i.e., application) as particularly im-
portant in determining mask work rights and sought to encourage early
registration. Awarding priority of mask work rights to the first to register
would be consistent with and would further that congressional policy. While
this argument is reasonable, it is not so compelling that courts will necessarily
adopt it.
443. Recordation of a transfer or license under SCPA § 903(c)(1) might as-
sist a mask work owner in establishing that a subsequent registration was in-
valid on "originality" or "familiarity" grounds under SCPA § 902(b)(1)-(2). See
17 U.S.C. §§ 902(b)(1)-(2), 903 (c)(1). Although SCPA § 908(a) does not by its
express terms make registration constructive notice to all later applicants,
SCPA § 903(c)(1) does expressly make recordation constructive notice of the
facts concerning a transfer or license that are stated in a recorded transfer or
license document. See id. §§ 903(c)(1), 908(a).
Thus, a recorded license identifying the licensed mask work with a com-
posite drawing or overlays might give any potential subsequent applicant for
registration constructive notice of the licensed mask work as a "fact concern-
ing the license." See id. § 903(c)(1). Arguably, on the basis of that notice the
mask work could no longer be "original" for a future applicant or could be
deemed "staple, familiar, or commonplace" on the date of any subsequent ap-
plication for registration of the same mask work or a variation of it. See Ma-
thias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 17, at S12,917 (date of
registration, not that of creation, significant for determining invalidity in light
of prior art).
Accordingly, a first creator's prompt registration followed by recordation
of a license might bar subsequent applicants from securing valid registrations
on the same work. Alternatively, prompt registration followed by widespread
publicity regarding the layout might make the mask work "staple, familiar, or
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tion that would require courts to adjudicate priority is so rare
that there may never be a decision on this point.
SUMMARY OF PART TWO
Persons accused of infringement of SCPA mask work
rights are accorded defenses generally parallel to those under
the patent and copyright laws, such as license, estoppel, and
misuse, some of which are expressly recognized by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Some of the defenses under the
SCPA, invalidity, for example, have counterparts under the
patent or copyright laws, but the SCPA defense has new
ingredients.
Other defenses are not found in preexisting law and are pe-
culiar to the SCPA. The SCPA defenses of reverse engineering
and innocent infringement are in the latter category. They
have no parallels in United States intellectual property law.
They were created as part of the legislative compromise leading
to enactment of the SCPA; conceding them as limitations on
the rights or remedies available to mask work owners was nec-
essary to building the consensus that permitted passage of the
new law. That Congress chose to include these defenses under
the new statute illustrates that the SCPA is an industrial prop-
erty law specifically directed to the economic needs of a new
technology, rather than just a further development of artists'
and authors' rights in their intellectual creations.
CONCLUSION
The elements of a cause of action for infringement of mask
work rights, discussed in Part One of this Article, and the de-
fenses to such a claim and the limitations on liability, discussed
in Part Two of this Article, together illustrate the SCPA's pe-
culiar blend of patent, copyright, and sui generis elements and
illuminate the new law's policy parallels to and departures
from preexisting intellectual property doctrines. The interests
at stake under the SCPA are industrial property interests,
which are generally more like those of the patent system than
they are like those of the traditional subject matter of copy-
right, i.e., belles lettres, art, and music. In other words, the in-
terests sought to be protected and advanced under the SCPA
are primarily economic and material. A further interest, which
commonplace" in the semiconductor industry before another applicant could
file its application for registration. See supmr note 348 and accompanying text.
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is largely a means to accomplishing material progress, is that of
promoting and encouraging technological progress in the semi-
conductor electronics field. Investment in technology, the se-
curity of that investment, and business certainty therefore
assume more importance under the SCPA than under copy-
right law.
At the same time, the personal and ideological values em-
bedded in copyright doctrine assume relatively less importance
under the SCPA. Copyright law reflects a concern for the per-
sonal interests and rights of individual creators in their cre-
ations; in the semiconductor chip field, by contrast, the context
is one of team members producing a collective product owned
by the employer of the team. Perhaps the SCPA can be simi-
larly contrasted with the patent law, where the team concept
and the economic values of the corporate investor have not yet
fully supplanted the myth of the struggling garret or garage
inventor.
The primacy of economic values under the SCPA tends to
militate against there being, as elements of either party's case,
matters that concern personal, noneconomic factors important
in other areas of intellectual property law, such as leaving
breathing room for the first amendment or for individual crea-
tivity, protecting the artistic integrity of a work against mutila-
tion, and assuring due personal credit for authorship or
inventorship. This emphasis on economic values greatly dimin-
ishes the relevance of the doctrine of independent creation in
SCPA cases. 4 " It also accounts for the absence of the proper
attribution of creation in the registration application as a signif-
icant issue in mask work infringement cases." 5
By the same token, in mask work cases there is a height-
ened concern for the economic interests of competitors and cus-
tomers of the mask work owner, and for those of the general
444. The doctrine of independent creation is discussed supra notes 104-131
and accompanying text.
445. Incorrect naming or joinder of inventors has been a frequent patent
validity issue in patent infringement litigation. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp.
v. Dow Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 1036, 1054 (D. Del. 1985) (patentee's misat-
tribution of inventorship held prima facie fraudulent). Problems with proper
attribution of inventorship in corporate team settings, see In re Bass, 474 F.2d
1276, 1286-87 (C.C.P.A. 1973), have led to a recent amendment of the patent
law. See Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat.
3383, 3384 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982)); see also 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5827, 5833-34 (stating that the amendment changes "case law which
discourages communication among members of research teams," citing Bass as
an example of such case law).
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public and other members of the electronics industry. The ex-
haustion doctrine446 and reverse engineering4 7 provisions of
the SCPA reflect that concern, as do the innocent infringement
provisions.448 The reverse engineering defense goes far beyond
copyright's fair use defense and has no parallel in patent law.
The innocent infringement defense is not paralleled in either
copyright or patent law.
Another feature of the SCPA that illustrates its focus on
economic interests is the unusual prominence given under the
SCPA to those interests reflected in the unfair competition doc-
trine against the misappropriation of the quasi-property inter-
est that is said to be created by an investment of toil and money
in a design.449 Sections 902(b)450 and 906(a)451 of the SCPA re-
flect the application of this interest in the "investive step" to
the mask work owner's and the alleged infringer's respective
cases. That interest, although present, plays a far more sub-
dued role in patent and copyright cases.
More generally, the entire contour of an infringement of
mask work rights case reflects the economic setting of the tech-
nology involved. As compared with the subject matter of pat-
ents, mask works tend to have a substantially shorter economic
life. This fact has lead to a ten-year term of protection under
the SCPA,452 as contrasted with seventeen years for patents45 3
and approximately seventy-five years for copyrights.454 The
446. The exhaustion doctrine is codified in section 906(b) of the SCPA, 17
U.S.C. § 906(b) (Supp. II 1984). Section 906(b) is discussed supra notes 278-328
and accompanying text.
447. See 17 U.S.C. § 906(a) (Supp. II 1984). The reverse engineering provi-
sions of the SCPA are discussed supra notes 199-261 and accompanying text.
448. See 17 U.S.C. § 907 (Supp. II 1984). The innocent infringement provi-
sions of the SCPA are discussed supra notes 329-343 and accompanying text.
449. See supra text accompanying notes 168-169, 208-210; Raskind, Reverse
Engineering, Unfair Competition, and Fair Use, 70 MINN. L. REv. 385, 403-11
(1985). For a criticism of the misappropriation doctrine as unsound in unfair
competition law, see Stern & Hoffman, Public Injury and the Public Interest
Secondary Meaning in the Law of Unfair Competition, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 935,
939-42, 955-56, 966-71 (1962).
450. 17 U.S.C. § 902(b) (Supp. II 1984) (providing that protection shall not
be available under the SCPA for a mask work that is not "original"). The
originality requirement of SCPA § 902(b) is discussed supra notes 144-174 and
accompanying text.
451. 17 U.S.C. § 906(a) (Supp. II 1984) (reverse engineering). The original-
ity requirement of SCPA § 906(a) is compared to the originality requirement
of SCPA § 902(b) supra notes 237-248 and accompanying text.
452. See 17 U.S.C. § 904 (Supp. II 1984).
453. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
454. See 17 U.S.C § 302 (1982).
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same consideration led to postponement of the front end costs
of the examination process for mask works until infringement
litigation actually, if ever, results.455 Thus, issuance of a patent
takes approximately three years and the expenditure of
thousands of dollars,45 but the cost and complexity of patent
infringement litigation is presumably lessened by the adminis-
trative screening that the patent received before issuance. In
the case of infringement of mask work rights litigation, how-
ever, there has been no significant prior administrative screen-
ing and all major issues must be addressed for the first time in
the district court. This different strategy reflects Congress's de-
cision that the interests to be served by the SCPA would be
better advanced by faster and simpler establishment of prima
facie mask work rights, even at the price of potentially more
complex and expensive litigation. The elements of the plaintiff
and defendant's respective cases in an action for mask work in-
fringement necessarily reflect that congressional decision.
In interpreting the requirements of the new statute in
mask work infringement litigation, the courts may find some
assistance in referring to patent and copyright infringement
precedents. In many respects, however, the policies and inter-
ests at stake under the SCPA differ so significantly from those
of the earlier bodies of intellectual property law that uncritical
reliance on these precedents will lead to error. The courts will
often be obliged, therefore, to define and give content to "a new
body of law specifically applicable to semiconductor chip in-
fringement," by deciding which interpretation of the SCPA will
be most consistent with the congressional purpose behind the
Act.457
455. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
456. The author's personal estimate of corresponding data for mask works
is at most a few months and a cost of several hundred dollars, assuming no
need to seek judicial review for refusal to issue the registation, see 17 U.S.C.
§ 908(g) (Supp. II 1984) (authorizing mandamus action to compel registration).
457. See HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5775 ("While the Committee believes that the courts may usefully
consider the copyright law precedents concerning substantial similarity, the
Committee also intends that the courts should have sufficient flexibility to de-
velop a new body of law specifically applicable to semiconductor chip
infringement.").

